tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31286292594619433282024-03-12T23:45:06.275-05:00Max More's Strategic PhilosophyMax Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.comBlogger32125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-71605039768210052602021-04-11T12:51:00.004-05:002021-04-11T13:17:25.732-05:00Don’t Trust the CDC, Question It<p> Most of us tend to trust a centralized, official agency regardless of its performance. It’s much easier to look to the official, well-known source rather than to check multiple independent sources. Are you wondering when you can reasonably stop wearing a mask at work? In public places inside or out? Are you wondering whether your children should be back in school? Whether you can safely travel, especially after being vaccinated? If you are looking to the CDC for advice be aware that they have made an enormous mess. They have often failed to “follow the science”. They are a bureaucratic and politicized organization. To think of them as providing an objective, apolitical, reliable opinion is naïve. Look at the CDC’s advice, of course, but then question it and look elsewhere. </p><p>Too many people hear the phrase “follow the science” and make two critical mistakes. The first is believing that there is a body of firm conclusions that constitute “the science” and all you have to do is accept them. Such an approach effectively turns science into religion, at least from the point of view of the believer. In a few physical sciences, there may be something very close to a core of firm conclusions – although even long-held laws in physics, chemistry, and cosmology can be and have been overturned – but the core of most sciences is much less firm. In the fields of nutrition, climate, and economic forecasting – to name just three – even many core principles and assumptions are highly contested and often on the brink of being falsified. It is fundamentally an error to see “science” as a thing. Science is a process of conjectures and refutations. </p><p>The second critical mistake is to equate “the science” with official government agencies, such as the CDC, FDA, and all the other three- and four-letter agencies. Science is a highly distributed process. Today, a disturbing amount of its funding and publication has been centralized and brought under the control of government agencies and self-appointed gatekeepers. The CDC is a disturbing case in point. </p><p>The CDC has been inexcusably wrong on too many major issues. They have been wrong on testing, wrong on masks, wrong on schools, wrong on travel, the effect of COVID on life expectancy, and now they are wrong on the effects of mask mandates and on-site dining. </p><p><b>Testing</b>: The CDC is directly responsible in large part for the failure in the USA to get up to speed on testing in the crucial early days, when test-and-trace might still have worked. When the coronavirus was spreading early on the in the USA, the CDC told state and local officials that its “testing capacity is more than adequate to meet current testing demands,” according to a Feb. 26 agency email seen by <i>The Wall Street Journal.</i> In the first week of February 2020, the CDC sent 160,000 tests to labs around the country. </p><p>The agency botched that test kit, developed in one of their labs, leading to the retraction of many tests. After the tests were withdrawn still no approval was being given for private labs to produce tests. Private labs were eager to fill the gap but were barred. State officials and medical providers pled with the agency to open up testing, but the CDC turned away. Nor did health officials coordinate with private companies to ensure the availability of test-kit supplies. These delays at a critical early stage seriously damaged the country’s ability to contain the spread of the virus. The botched tests made it impossible to accurately assess how far and how fast the disease was spreading. </p><p>Among those coercively prevented from improving early testing was infectious disease expert, Dr. Helen Y. Chu. (Her story is told in a March 10 <i>New York Times</i> article.) Her requests for permission to test nasal swabs from people experiencing symptoms were turned down by the CDC for weeks. The CDC told her that she needed approval from the FDA, but they would not give it. Finally, Dr. Chu did the tests without permission. She found a positive test for a teenager from Seattle who had not recently traveled – a discovery she would have made weeks earlier if not suppressed by the bureaucracy. They did not admit to their error or give her credit. Dr. Scott Lindquist, Washington state’s epidemiologist for communicable diseases, says, “What they [the CDC and the FDA] said on that phone call very clearly was cease and desist to Helen Chu. Stop testing.” </p><p>The core problem here is coercive power and monopolization. No one could know precisely how the virus would spread. People other than the CDC should have been allowed to do what they thought best based on their distinctive view of the situation. This is a classic example of the value of economic freedom though what Friedrich Hayek, co-winner of the 1974 Nobel Prize in economics, understood as its allowing people to act on dispersed information, or what Hayek called knowledge of “particular circumstances of time and place.” The CDC ignored pleas from state officials and medical providers to broaden testing, and failed to work with outside companies to help the availability of test-kit supplies. (For more on this, see David Henderson’s “<a href="https://www.aier.org/article/capitalism-is-still-working-thank-goodness/" target="_blank">Capitalism is Still Working, Thank Goodness</a>”) </p><p>The CDC hasn’t always acted so disastrously and arrogantly. Just a decade ago, in the H1N1 flu epidemic, the CDC worked with private labs and medical facilities to get tests into people’s hands. Even former director of the CDC (2009 to 2017) Tom Frieden said “This was kind of a perfect storm of three separate failures”, noting the botched test, overstrict FDA rules and sidelined private labs. Lacking reliable early testing, the opportunity to map early outbreaks and impose effective quarantines was blown. The World Health Organization (WHO) had sent out hundreds of thousands of testing kits to numerous countries and, on January 17, 2020 published a protocol of German origin that gave instructions that would help laboratories develop the tests. The same day, Dr. Nancy Messonnier, the director of the U.S. National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, stated that the CDC would produce its own version. (Learn more from “<a href="https://www.aier.org/article/the-monumental-failure-of-the-cdc/" target="_blank">The Monumental Failure of the CDC</a>”: </p><p><b>Masks</b>: The CDC (and Anthony Fauci) did not provide a consistent or evidence-based recommendation on masks. For several weeks, the CDC assured Americans that wearing a face mask in public was not necessary to stop the spread of COVID-19. They eventually changed their messaging but then played a major role in creating shortages of face masks, along with other federal agencies that prevented the importation of KN-95 masks. (The feds finally backed off on April 3, 2020.) Back-and-forth messaging first said that only health care workers and people who were sick needed to wear masks and then recommended that everyone wear face coverings when they’re out in public. The CDC utterly failed to provide clear and consistent communication. </p><p>Along with the FDA, it was the CDC that played a major role in creating a face mask shortage. Hospitals are not allowed to purchase masks from any suppliers they think suitable. They may only buy from suppliers certified by both the CDC and the FDA. As demand for masks in America grew, supply was constrained by the slow certification process. The CDC’s own data shows that it takes an average of 95 days to approve new certifications for face mask suppliers. Numerous foreign companies that could have supplied us with masks were not allowed to do so. Even certified suppliers had to jump through bureaucratic hoops in our highly-interventionist economy before they could fill orders. (For more information, see “<a href="https://reason.com/2020/03/31/america-could-import-countless-more-face-masks-if-federal-regulators-would-get-out-of-the-way/" target="_blank">America Could Import Countless More Face Masks if Federal Regulators Would Get Out of the Way</a>” </p><p>In addition, the CDC’s messaging about masks has been inconsistent and even dishonest. As a result, many people have understandably lost trust in their guidance. For more, see this article from <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/3/21206728/cloth-face-masks-white-house-coronavirus-covid-cdc-messaging" target="_blank">The Verge</a>. </p><p>Before COVID, there was never a demand that Americans be forced to wear masks outside of specific medical settings. Growing evidence, piled on top of pre-COVID evidence, suggests that they may be essentially useless (given the kinds worn and how they are worn) and may make things worse both in their direct effects and by lulling people into thinking that other measures no longer matter. Whatever your evaluation of the conflicting evidence, each individual should be free to decide whether or not to wear one, so long as they abide by the rules of each house and business they visit. Although the agency’s guidance is officially nonbinding, it has more power than many formal regulations while lacking transparency and public scrutiny. </p><p>For links to evidence you probably haven’t seen: “<a href="https://www.aier.org/article/masking-a-careful-review-of-the-evidence/" target="_blank">Masking: A Careful Review of the Evidence</a>”, and <a href="https://swprs.org/face-masks-evidence/" target="_blank">this </a> and <a href="https://www.cebm.net/covid-19/masking-lack-of-evidence-with-politics/" target="_blank">this</a>.</p><p><b>Schools</b>: School closures were enforced for months despite the evidence and despite the tremendous downsides to forcing young children to stay home for a year. Some of the blame for this can certainly be placed on teachers’ unions. The unions have talked about “the science” when it suited them but ignored it when it became entirely clear that children were at very low risk of contracting or passing on the virus. Rather, they demanded that teachers stay home but continue to get paid. </p><p>School closures have especially harmed those from poor backgrounds, often living in dense conditions in bad neighborhoods, and autistic children and others with special needs. Instead of the excessive CDC guidelines, schools could have followed the Israel approach of regular testing of teachers and students and self-isolation when infection is found. Despite the data being clear since mid-2020, the CDC only changed its guidance for schools in January 2021. Derek Thompson’s article in The Atlantic makes us ask why the media, government leaders and bureaucrats, and medical experts all act to damage our children with unsupported school closures. See more <a href="https://www.aier.org/article/cdc-has-become-centers-for-the-destruction-of-childhood/" target="_blank">here</a>. </p><p><b>Travel</b>: The CDC and President Biden acknowledge that it’s safe for fully vaccinated people to travel. Even so, they should not! They are over-cautious in a way that defies common sense. CDC Director Rochelle Walensky wailed “We’re all doomed because I feel it!” on one day after proclaiming the amazing power of COVID vaccines. The next, she undermines her previous statements by insisting that the fully vaccinated should continue to wear masks, socially distance, and avoid travel if they can. This confusing behavior can be understood if you understand that the CDC is a devotee of the precautionary principle, and doesn’t want people to do anything that carries the tiniest risk of harm. Apparently, avoiding tiny risks of harm is more important than anything else in life. </p><p>For more, see Robby Soave’s “<a href="https://reason.com/2021/04/02/cdc-rochelle-walensky-travel-covid-19-coronavirus" target="_blank">The CDC Says Vaccinated People Can Safely Travel, But Please Don't</a>” and “<a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/despite-cdc-says-domestic-travel-200311387.html" target="_blank">Despite what the CDC says, domestic travel is safe for fully vaccinated people, even Biden is doing it</a>” and “<a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/fixing-americas-covid-19-mistakes-let-people-travel-2021-3" target="_blank">Stop telling people not to travel. Health officials should be teaching us how to do it safely</a>” and “<a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/vaccines-reduce-coronavirus-transmission-early-research-2021-2" target="_blank">Even more evidence shows vaccinated people are unlikely to transmit the coronavirus or get asymptomatic infections</a>”.</p><p><b>The six-foot mandate</b>: How many Americans are aware that the six-feet distancing guideline is based on extremely little evidence? And that many countries in Europe and elsewhere have different guidelines? The United States has some of the strictest social distancing measures in the world. Europeans in many countries only have to stand 1 meter (about 3 feet) apart. Do they know more than us? Or are both prescriptive orders set arbitrarily? China, France, Denmark, and Hong Kong choose one meter. South Korea went for 1.4 meters; Germany, Italy, and Australia chose 1.5 meters. We still don’t know how the CDC arrived at 6 feet as the magic number. More: “<a href="https://www.aier.org/article/the-6-foot-mandate-was-bad-science/" target="_blank">The 6-Foot Mandate Was Bad Science</a>” and “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/wheres-the-science-behind-cdcs-6-foot-social-distance-decree-11616358952" target="_blank">Where’s the Science Behind CDC’s 6-Foot Social-Distance Decree?</a>” </p><p>The WSJ article makes the point that the complaint is not that experts were wrong in the absence of good information. “The question is whether there is an effective process for establishing these measures and re-evaluating them as new information emerges. Science isn’t a set of unchanging truths handed down by a government agency.” Compounding the problem, the CDC “the CDC isn’t always clear on when the science is unsettled. This makes it harder for the American public to identify which recommendations are more open to discretion. The agency also doesn’t always identify the underlying science of its recommendations.” </p><p><b>The extension of the unjust eviction ban:</b> It’s been announced that the CDC will be extending its eviction moratorium through the end of June. While delinquent renters may welcome this, landlords will be rightly unhappy that they are banned from taking back their property from nonpaying tenants. Previously good tenants who have fallen behind on payments aren’t at much risk. With so many people unemployed, it’s difficult for landlords to find new, reliable tenants. Rental listing website Zillow found, in states where data are available, that actual evictions have come in far below predicted evictions. Claims about ridiculously large numbers of likely evictions are unsupported and use crazy assumptions. For more, see “<a href="https://reason.com/2021/03/29/the-cdc-keeps-extending-its-illegal-eviction-ban" target="_blank">CDC Keeps Extending Its Illegal Eviction Ban</a>”. </p><p><b>CDC misleadingly says COVID caused a reduction of one year in US life expectancy</b>: A CDC spokesman has claimed that Covid has resulted in U.S. life expectancy falling by a year. (This was <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/.../podcasts/2021/20210219/20210219.htm" target="_blank">Elizabeth Arias</a>. The real number is about 5 days or 0.013 years. How could the CDC be so badly wrong? How could it promote that false information to an already-traumatized public? </p><p>In one sense, that estimate follows standard guidelines for calculating changes in life expectancy. When a change is expected to affect life expectancy each year in the future to about the same extent as in the latest year, the process produces reasonable results. The CDC calculated what the effect on life expectancy would be if mortality rates stayed at their 2020 level. In other words, they figured out how much Covid would reduce life expectancy if the pandemic were repeated every year forever. </p><p>What the CDC should have assumed is that Covid-19 will increase mortality for only a brief period relative to the span of a normal life. The standard method of calculating life expectancy is extremely sensitive to passing events such as pandemics and wars. The CDC’s statement is concerning because almost everyone will take it to mean that Covid has shortened the life of every person by a year on average. For those in the 20-49 age group, the decline in life expectancy is less than one day. Even for seniors, the days lost comes to 87 days of discounted quality-adjusted life expectancy. </p><p>Quick math: Counting the 362,000 deaths in 2020, and accepting the (possibly excessive) estimate of 12 years of life lost on average, you get 4,344,000 life years lost. Divide by population = 0.013 or 4.75 days. Counting all Covid deaths to date: 570,294 x 12 = 6,843,528 = 0.02 or 7.5 days. For more, see Peter B. Bach, “<a href="https://www.statnews.com/2021/02/25/cdc-one-year-decline-life-expectancy-really-five-days/" target="_blank">CDC estimated a one-year decline in life expectancy in 2020. Not so — try five days</a>” <https://www.statnews.com/2021/02/25/cdc-one-year-decline-life-expectancy-really-five-days/> </p><p>Excessively precautionary: Behind many of the CDC’s mistakes is its implicit attachment to the precautionary principle. (You can find plenty of thoughts about that principle elsewhere on my blog.) As Robby Soave from Reason notes, “It’s important to keep in mind that the CDC has always urged people to follow impractically cautious health guidelines. For instance, the CDC currently recommends that men consume no more than two alcoholic drinks and that women consume no more than one drink, each day. The agency’s clear preference is for people not to consume alcohol at all.” </p><p>The CDC has gone beyond excessive caution to bad policies and embarrassing public doomsaying. Director Rochelle Walensky warned of “impending doom” if states reopen too quickly. As POLITICO put it, a “visibly shaken” Walensky stood in front of the cameras and said, “Right now, I'm scared” and implied that her feelings were a sound basis for us all to be deeply fearful. Of course, fear is an effective tool of control. </p><p>The CDC has acted much as one would expect a centralized government agency to act. This is not the fault of the people working there. It’s the result of the agency’s structure and incentives. Unfortunately, most of the American public persists in the foolish belief that the CDC is doing fine and, if not perfect, that can be solved by throwing more taxpayer money at it and installing “the right people”. </p>Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-10387894959345316172021-01-21T18:11:00.002-06:002021-01-21T18:11:58.266-06:00How deadly is COVID-19 to me, and people like me?<p> </p><p class="MsoNormal">Is going out of your house for anything other than
absolutely life-critical reasons comparable to going to an active shooter
location? This is the claim made recently to me by a colleague. The same person
tried to emphasize how awful the risk is by saying that I was 50 times more
likely to die from COVID-19 than from influenza. More generally, how worried
should someone of my age and health be about going to shop for groceries,
getting take-out food, or other regular activities that could be avoided but
that don’t involve getting close to unmasked people? And how should be most
usefully frame that risk.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The numbers in this piece are for people like me. I’m male
in the 55 to 64 age group with no major medical issues. I’m white, not
desperately poor, not diabetic, not obese, and do not have reduced kidney
function, stroke, or dementia, nor any neurological conditions. I do have other
medical issues, but they have no bearing on my COVID risk.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">In discussing how to communicate the risk to others, a
colleague made two comparisons: The risk of dying from COVID as compared to
dying from influenza; and the act of going out of your home for anything other
than absolutely survival-critical reasons as being like entering an
active-shooter location. Let’s take the flu comparison first.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">My interlocutor said that males of our age (we are both
between 55 and 64) are 50 times as likely to die from COVID as from flu. If you
look at the CDC’s numbers for 2020, that will appear correct. Making that comparison
is misleading because it would be natural to assume he wants you to compare the
risk of dying from COVID to the usual risk of dying from fly. But flu killed only
about a quarter as many as it typically does. So, the real number is that, if
you catch flu, you are about 12 more likely to die of it compared to your
fatality rate if you catch COVID.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The 50:1 ratio came from a June 23, 2020 article in <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-death-rate-us-compared-to-flu-by-age-2020-6" target="_blank">BusinessInsider</a>.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Other sources given a lower ratio even than my corrected
12:1. According to the October 2020 piece <a href="https://freopp.org/comparing-the-risk-of-death-from-covid-19-vs-influenza-by-age-d33a1c76c198" target="_blank">here</a>: for males, 55-64, they are 5.97 times more likely to die of COVID than of flu.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">between the beginning of February and January 2, 2021, there
were around 318,786 deaths with confirmed or presumed COVID-19. There were also
8,846 fatalities involving influenza, which had pneumonia or COVID-19 also listed
as a cause of death. If I were to use the same tactic by selecting a different
year for flu, let’s say 2017-2018, I could change the picture greatly. That was
an unusually bad year for influenza. According to the CDC, the overall burden
of influenza for the 2017-2018 season was an estimated 45 million influenza
illnesses, 20 million influenza-associated medical visits, 800,000 influenza-related
hospitalizations, and 61,000 influenza-associated deaths. That’s 61,000
compared to 2020’s 8,846. I could then say that you are only 6.9 times more
likely to die of COVID compared to flu. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">You could also compare the Flu vs COVID hospitalizations vs.
deaths. As of 01/20/21:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Flu: 458,320/37,239 = 8.1%<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">COVID: 5,729,000/486,965 = 8.5%<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">So, risk of dying from COVID <i>after hospitalization</i> is
almost the same as for flu.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Similarly, a study published in the December 15, 2020 <i>BMJ</i>
put the death rate among COVID-19 patients at 18.5%, while it was 5.3% for
those with the flu. Those with COVID were nearly five times more likely to die
than flu patients.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 533.45pt;">But none of these comparisons to
flu mortality is particularly helpful.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The relevant comparison with flu is <i>not</i> the chance of
dying if you have flu, it’s the chance of catching flu/the chance of dying of
flu. I don’t concern myself even a little about the mortality risk from flu. It’s
so low that I find it an unhelpful point of comparison. (But I <i>do</i> get my
flu shot every year, as early as possible, since non-lethal flu is nasty, and the
shot costs me nothing other than a few minutes.) For males in my age group, flu
is not even listed among the top 10 causes of death.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 533.45pt;"><b>The active-shooter risk comparison<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 533.45pt;">This is even less helpful than
the comparison to flu mortality. I don’t happen to know the mortality risk of
every type of event. I estimated it as higher than it is. (In so far as there
are reliable numbers and definable groups-at-risk.) So, my conversant jumped on
that as supporting his point. Except it didn’t. My response (the rational one)
was NOT to increase my estimate of the risk of dying from COVID-19; it was to
reduce my estimate of dying should I somehow find myself in an active shooter
situation. It caused me to lower my (already very minor) concern about getting
shot.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 533.45pt;">Even more so than for influenza,
the relevant comparison is not the chance of dying in an active shooter
situation. It’s the chance of getting into an active shooter situation/the
chance of dying in such a situation. We are ALL in an active COVID situation!
(Unless you are a very strict hermit.)</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 533.45pt;"><b>Most sensible measure of risk
of dying from COVID-19<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 533.45pt;">What is the most reasonable and
useful measure of risk of dying from COVID-19? Again, to keep the discussion
manageable, I’m focusing on the absolute annual level of risk for someone like
me. A good first approximation puts the risk at 2.8%. But MY risk – and the risk
to other males my age who also lack risk factors – is less. A more accurate
number (which is hard to ascertain) would be much lower since I lack any of the
risk factors. But here are the current stats on raised risks for each of the
major risk factors that I lack, other than being male. [Source: https://www.rgare.com/knowledge-center/media/research/covid-19-mortality-by-age-gender-ethnicity-obesity-and-other-risk-factors]</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The major factors increasing the mortality risk from COVID-19
are:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: Verdana;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">1.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->High deprivation (low socioeconomic status)<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: Verdana;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">2.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->Male<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: Verdana;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">3.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->Obesity<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: Verdana;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">4.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->Uncontrolled diabetes<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: Verdana;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">5.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->Being black or Hispanic<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: Verdana;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">6.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->reduced kidney function<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: Verdana;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">7.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->stroke or dementia<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="margin-left: .75in; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: Verdana; mso-fareast-font-family: Verdana;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">8.<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->neurological conditions</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The 2.8% fatality risk already includes being male, so let’s
set that aside. When it comes to economic deprivation, “The magnitude of risk
amplification [for COVID-19] is 0.41 and 0.23 for Quintiles 5 and 4,
respectively.” <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">As for ethnicity, Asians have a slightly lower risk compared
to white. Blacks have 1.48 times the risk. Surprisingly, this sources does not
break out the risk for Hispanic people. That’s stunning, given the incredibly
high proportion of all cases accounted for by Hispanics in Southern California.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Obesity: Risk increases from 1.40 to 1.92 depending on how
obese you are. (I saw no definition of Type I and Type II obesity.) <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Diabetes: 1.31 (controlled) to 1.95 (uncontrolled). <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Reduced kidney function: eGFR 30-60: 1.33. eGFR <30:
2.52.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Stroke or dementia: 2.16. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Neurological conditions: 2.58.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Since I’m not clear on the overlap between these factors, I’m
not going to try to compute an overall risk for people of my age and condition.
But it’s very clear that the risk is much lower than 2.8%. My WAG is that my
risk is around 1%. That’s very close to my risk of dying in any year from other
causes in non-COVID times. (Obviously, that’s <i>in addition to</i> my normal
background risk.)</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">To further keep my risk in perspective (and yours, with
appropriate adjustments), I consider my normal risk of dying in a non-COVID
year. I don’t have figures adjusted for multiple factors as above. I only have
the average for a male my age. I’m about to turn 57. My death probability is given
as 0.9156%. Interestingly, that’s awfully close to (probably higher than) my best
current guess for my COVID-19 mortality risk.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 533.45pt;"><b>My estimated mortality risk
for COVID is probably around 1% (with fairly large error bars).</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 533.45pt;">If you are not a male of my age
group and health, I hope exercise helps you to estimate your mortality risk
from COVID-19. Of course, where you live should certainly have a bearing on
your evaluation of the risk. Not only the mortality rate in your state and
county, but also the level of stress on medical facilities.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: 533.45pt;">Also, mortality risk is far from
the only consideration. Lung damage and “long COVID” actually concern me more
than my own mortality risk. The evidence is too early to estimate risks of these,
but it looks like a major problem.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Even the most intelligent people can get sucked into the
pull of fear. It’s a huge problem in our thinking today. It helps to put risks
in context by breaking them down and by comparing to other baselines, such as
regular mortality rates. <i><o:p></o:p></i></p>Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-71738526493120860402014-08-26T16:33:00.002-05:002014-08-26T16:33:08.001-05:00The Diachronic Self: Bibliography<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 20.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">BIBLIOGRAPHY<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Adams,
R.M. (1989). Should ethics be more impersonal? A critical notice of Derek Parfit’s <i>Reasons and Persons</i>. <i>The
Philosophical Review</i>. Vol.XCVIII,
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Agnew,
William F. and McCreery, Douglas B., eds.
(1990). <i>Neural Prostheses: Fundamental Studies</i> (Prentice Hall Advanced
Reference Series).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Ainslie,
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">D.M.
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Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-50771827316600867702014-08-26T16:32:00.002-05:002014-08-26T16:32:37.009-05:00The Diachronic Self, chapter 4: Technological Transformation and Assimilation<div class="chapterhead" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Chapter 4<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="chapterhead">
<b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 18pt;">TECHNOLOGICAL
TRANSFORMATION AND ASSIMILATION<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">In the previous chapter I examined the various kinds
of psychological attributes that constitute our identity and their relative
importance. I argued that, even after allowing for the differing contributions
to connectedness of the various attributes, we can rationally be concerned for
our future phases more than proportionally to the degree of connectedness. In
this chapter I will focus on various changes in or additions to the self,
especially as effected through our bodies. Although normative issues will
arise, most of the discussion will deal with the metaphysics of identity. In
the first of three sections I will distinguish augmentative from deteriorative
transformation. Then in Part II, in trying to develop principles to help decide
when a new ability or a physical change becomes part of us, I will develop an
account of functional integration. After considering how we assimilate changes
in ourselves I will distinguish enhancement from supplementation—a distinction
that can help clarify normative issues. Part III investigates whether a
psychological reductionist should in any way grant intrinsic significance to a
person’s body.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
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<h1 style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%; text-transform: uppercase;">I. AUGMENTATIVE AND
DETERIORATIVE Transformation<o:p></o:p></span></h1>
<h2 style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Augmentative vs. Deteriorative Transformation<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">A rough distinction can be made between <i>deteriorative</i> changes or transformations
in a person’s characteristics, and what I will call <i>augmentative</i> (or developmental) changes. Deteriorative changes
weaken or destroy some personal attribute without any compensating addition.
Deteriorative changes include losing my ability to do arithmetic in my head; a
weakening of visual discrimination; the fading away of a disposition; the loss
of a memory, and so on. Augmentative changes preserve at least some of an
existing attribute but add to it or alter it. Examples include having your eyes
and optical center replaced with a synthetic optical system capable of seeing
in a broader spectrum; the addition of foreign language skills to preexisting native
language ability; and the acquisition of a new desire. I said the distinction
was a rough one because there will be cases which could be classified either
way; the two classes are not sharply disjoint. Consider the case above where my
visual system is replaced with a synthetic optical system. If my new system
maintains all the capabilities of the original while also allowing me to see
into the infrared, ultraviolet, and microscopically, then this is a pure case
of augmentative change. However, the synthetic system might give me these new
abilities while, let us say, delivering inferior night vision or weaker color
differentiation. In this latter case the change may be predominantly
augmentative but also partly deteriorative. We could alter the example to
change the mix along a spectrum from entirely augmentative to entirely
deteriorative. More psychologically oriented examples of augmentative changes
that involve some loss include a disposition for generosity becoming more
selective in its objects; a system of beliefs becoming modified to more
accurately reflect the truth.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Augmentative
changes are likely to result in less reduction in connectedness than are
deteriorative changes in any particular aspect of self. This is because they
keep some or all of the old characteristic while adding to it or altering it,
whereas deteriorative changes simply take away an attribute or replace it with
something unrelated. It is easy to slide from metaphysical to normative
thinking in personal identity discussions, so here I will make explicit what I
mean: We will generally <i>prefer</i>
augmentative to deteriorative changes. Most of us in most circumstances would
rather trade an existing ability for an altered one of greater power or range,
or trade a belief-system for an altered one of higher accuracy, than have an
ability or belief-system destroyed. This will be important when considering the
desirability of changes in ourselves, but the question of desirability should
be kept distinct from that of the actual change in connectedness. The change in
connectedness between person-stages is an objective matter. The fact that I
find a particular augmentative change more desirable than a particular
deteriorative change in itself has nothing to do with the extent of reduction
in connectedness. We should not weight the deteriorative change more heavily
simply because we find it less desirable. If I lose a small amount of visual
ability, the change in connectedness can be smaller than if my new visual
system has powerful but only slightly overlapping abilities compared with my
old. I may prefer the augmentative change even though the loss of connectedness
is greater than would be the case with the deteriorative change.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
same principle applies to changes in a person as a whole, as well as to
individual characteristics: In one possible situation, I undergo a series of
physical, cognitive, and emotional changes resulting in a person-stage
stronger, smarter, and more emotionally well-tuned than my current stage. In a
second possible situation, I suffer a gradual physical, cognitive, and
emotional decline, becoming weaker, duller, and emotionally less integrated
than my current stage. The degree of connectedness between current and future
person-stages in the two possible situations depends only on the extent of the
change; the degree of connectedness is unaffected by the <i>direction</i> of change. If the extent of the developmental
(augmentative) changes are similar to the extent of the deteriorative changes,
then the change in connectedness will be similar. In practice, developmental
changes involve smaller changes in connectedness since they add to and
partially modify existing characteristics. Deteriorative changes, by destroying
or impairing existing characteristics, tend to involve larger changes in
connectedness. These practical differences, though, have nothing intrinsically
to do with the direction of change; they result from the objective nature of
the changes.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> We
might alter the two possible situations so that the augmentation and
deterioration happen abruptly and discontinuously rather than gradually. In the
case of an abrupt deterioration (perhaps resulting from a major accident or
massive stroke, for instance) the later person-stage (if he were still a
person) might not be a stage of the same person as my current stage. The change
may have been so extensive and discontinuous that I cease to exist, being
replaced by a different person (or by no <i>person</i>,
just a living human body). The parallel between deteriorative and augmentative
change is preserved even under these conditions. It can equally be true that,
if I improve drastically and discontinuously rather than gradually, my current
stage and that future stage will not be stages of the same person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Augmentative
and deteriorative changes, then, should be treated the same when estimating the
degree of reduction in connectedness. Despite the absence of any metaphysical
priority of one type of change over another, there can be an axiological or
normative difference between them. At least given the typical values people
hold,</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> deteriorative changes we will see as undesirable,
developmental changes as desirable. In deteriorative change we lose
characteristics we value. In developmental change we willingly exchange old
characteristics for new or partly new characteristics we value more highly.
This is one way, as I argued in the previous chapter, that we can rationally
have self-interested concern for future stages more than proportionally to the
degree of connectedness between current and future stages. Most of would rather
survive—maintain psychological continuity—while gradually losing some
connectedness through developmental change than stay just as we are now. The
question arises: Would we, or should we, be willing to change so drastically and
abruptly that we have effectively been replaced by a different person, albeit
one who we believe is superior to us according to our current values? I now
turn to examine Raymond Martin’s argument that we <i>would</i> make such a choice if it were possible. Martin’s view, if
correct, strongly undermines the view that the extent of our (rational) concern
for our future stages depends on the degree of connectedness, at least in a
range of possible situations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<h2 style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Raymond Martin on Tranformation and Replacement<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">This sub-section deals primarily with a normative
issue. The discussion will, however, lead me to clarify some terms involved in
the metaphysical issues of the next sub-section, terms such as
“transformation”, and “replacement.” The critical discussion here of a paper by
Raymond Martin</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> follows naturally the previous sub-section and
helps prepare the way for the subsequent part. Martin’s view is especially
relevant since it sounds similar to the Transformationist view I defined in the
previous chapter. I will compare and contrast the two views after clarifying
what Martin is proposing.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Martin
presents two examples intended to show that identity is less important than
generally supposed. The first example involves a person fissioning into two, in
a manner familiar from Parfit. Some will respond to this kind of example by
being unimpressed. This may be on the basis that all that fission examples
demonstrate is that we do not care very much about the technical question of
the transitivity of identity. In other words, we do not lose our identity in
fission examples except in a narrow technical sense. Others, such as Lewis,
argue that fission examples fail to show that identity is not what matters.
Lewis holds that there are two persons sharing one person-stage prior to
fission; both of these persons retain their identity through the fission. Since
the fission example may be unpersuasive in showing that identity is not as
important as typically thought, Martin gives a second example. This example is
intended to demonstrate that not only is it not identity that matters most to
us in survival, neither is it continuity (with or without branching).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> If
this second example is persuasive, it “will show that there are situations in
which many of us would prefer to give up our identities and transform into the
persons we most want to be rather than to retain our identities and fail to
make such a transformation.” It is neither our identity nor continuity that
matter most to us, Martin suggests. We value becoming who we most want to be
more than either of these. His example is as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> We
imagine that it is possible for a person to undergo a painless, safe, and
inexpensive operation in which we exchange some physical or psychological trait
for a better replacement. “So, for instance, you could, through a single,
almost instantaneous operative procedure, one say, that simply used sound waves
and involved no cutting, become physically better—stronger, more flexible, more
beautiful, and so on—[and] psychologically better—more patient, more generous,
more intelligent, and so on.” [295] The only cost to the procedure is that you
lose some memory of your life up to that point. “Because you have only one
chance at the operation, and the alternative ways of changing yourself
dramatically for the better are so onerous and unreliable, there would be a
tremendous incentive to change yourself drastically in all the ways you would
like to change to become the person you most want to be. However, the greater
the changes, the greater the tax on your personal memory. You could change
radically and become the person you most want to be (assuming you are not
already close to that sort of person), but only by ceasing to be either
physically or psychologically closely continuous with your current self. On
most theories of personal identity, perhaps on all psychological-continuity
theories, this would mean you could change radically and become the person you
most want to be only by ceasing to be the person you now are.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Martin
believes that most people, if this procedure were available, would choose to do
it. He concludes that the fact that we would choose changes that would cost us
our identities shows that “becoming the persons we most want to be is what
matters primarily in survival.” [296] “This conclusion reveals something
fundamental and perhaps also startling about our most basic values. In simplest
terms, it reveals that many of us crave to be fulfilled more than we crave to <i>be</i>—that, paradoxically, we would choose
to cease to exist if by so choosing we could realize our deepest selfish
desires.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> In
order to address Martin’s view, and to prepare for my subsequent thoughts, I
will pause to define some terms such as <i>disruption</i>,
<i>transformation</i>, <i>replacement</i>, and <i>becoming</i>.
For the present discussion, the most important contrast is that between changes
to a person compatible with continuity, and changes in a person that
effectively result in the loss of the original person with a new person
appearing in their stead. I will use the term <i>transformation</i> in a way that seems to accord with Martin’s use
(though he does not explicitly define it). Transformation is a spectrum of
degrees of change from the slightest change in a person to total change in
which not a single original attribute remains. Transformation typically implies
<i>some</i> degree of change while leaving
something of the original intact. If nothing at all remains of the original, or
if the change is extremely small, we will not usually talk of transformation
(because to say “x is transformed” implies tht x still exists”). Nevertheless,
we can regard the cases where the term feels odd simply as extreme ends of the
spectrum of transformation. We will feel differently about different points (or
regions) along the transformation spectrum. Martin’s argument, and analysis of
it, requires that we be able clearly to distinguish between cases of
transformation in which we feel we would continue and cases of transformation
where we feel that we would not continue.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">I will refer to cases near the conservative end of
the transformation spectrum as <b><i>continuous transformations</i></b>, or as <b><i>sustaining
transformations</i></b>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">I have already defined <b><i>deteriorative changes</i></b> as
those that “weaken or destroy some personal attribute without any compensating
addition.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 6.0pt; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">I will refer to those cases where most or all of the
original person’s characteristics have been destroyed, with new ones in their
place, as <b><i>discontinuous transformations</i></b>. (Discontinuous transformations
are therefore a subset of deteriorative changes; those involving a sudden,
dramatic deterioration rather than a gradual deterioration.)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">When the transformation is discontinuous I will say
the person has been <b><i>replaced</i></b>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">When the transformation is continuous or sustaining
I will say the original person-stage has <b><i>become</i></b> the later person-stage.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Replacement involves the disruption of most or all
of a person’s central characteristics with new characteristics being put in
their place. Replacement is a form of transformation that starts to appear
about halfway along the spectrum. At earlier parts of the spectrum the
person-stage is becoming another stage. The central opposition is between
becoming and being replaced. We need not pretend there is any sharp line
between the two. There will be many clear cases and there will be a fuzzy
region where both descriptions can reasonably be applied. Parfit would place
the cut off between becoming and replacement at a loss of 50% of connectedness
over a day.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
question at issue in Martin’s paper can now be stated as: Would most people
choose to be replaced if their replacement were the person they most want to
be? The main conclusion at issue is Martin’s view that an affirmative answer
shows that most important to us in survival is not identity but transforming
into the person we most want to be. (This seems to be a peculiar way for Martin
to state his conclusion, but he <i>does</i>
use the phrase “important to us in survival.” His way of stating it apparently
begs the question as to whether or not we survive the transformation. A better
phrasing would be: “most important to us in our considerations about the future
is not identity but transforming into the person we most want to be.”) I agree
that most of us, or at least many of us, would choose to undergo the operation
to transform into our ideal self. My view diverges from Martin’s in that I
think he has described the choice in a misleading way. Also, the conclusion he
draws, while accurate for some us, seems to be an overgeneralization.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Martin
presents the operation as a choice between either staying as you are or
transforming into your ideal self all at once, where the latter choice involves
giving up your identity. The operation involves such a massive change that
psychological continuity and personal identity are breached. In fact, I will
argue, undergoing this operation, in most cases, will <i>not</i> require us to relinquish our identity. This is because a major
part of our identity is constituted by our values and we would not want to
change our values. Our values form the core of our identity. This is not true for
everyone, and in some cases Martin’s description will be appropriate: Some
persons lack a strong core of values. These persons would give up their
identity through transforming. Although it seems to me that most of us could
transform into our ideal self without being replaced, the nature of the
identity of persons is sufficiently vague that no strongly compelling
demonstration can be made. It is at least arguable that even those of us with
well-developed values would be giving up our identity in transformation. If so,
this would show that it is not our <i>identity</i>
that matters to us in survival, but that part of our identity constituted by
our values. It is not true for all of us, as Martin claims, that transforming
into who we most want to be is the most important thing in survival. Values
differ: this will be true for some of us but not for others. Those who value
self-transformation strongly can undergo more changes in other characteristics
while maintaining identity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> What
is the basis for these claims? First, my claim that, for most of us,
transforming into our ideal selves would not require us to relinquish identity.
Martin attempts to influence our intuitions by the way he describes the
operation. What you are asked to give up is your memories of your experiences.
Abolishing these memories certainly would be a major loss, though the impact on
our degree of connectedness would be small. In an earlier chapter, when
examining the relative contribution to overall connectedness of particular
types of personal characteristic, I argued that memory contributed much less to
connectedness than other types of characteristic. (It only seems particularly
significant if we count as memory other things like skills and abilities.)
Undergoing the changes described by Martin would detract little from
connectedness, since memory is only a small part of it. If the memory losses
were all we had to give up, we could undergo transformation without coming near
loss of identity and replacement by a new person. In addition to this, most of
the other changes Martin describes involve additions to you or strengthening of
existing characteristics. When you acquire an attribute there need be no loss
of connectedness (unless it is incompatible with a pre-existing
characteristic). We measure connectedness not by the number of the later
stage’s characteristics shared by the earlier stage, but the converse. I may
come through the operation stronger, healthier, more imaginative, with new
abilities to play musical instruments, to comprehend abstractions previously
too difficult for me, and with the addition of new desires and dispositions
(compatible with the rest of my character). But these leave the characteristics
of my earlier stage intact. (Gaining other psychological characteristics will
mean giving up preexisting characteristics: gaining an attribute of tolerance
or serenity will mean giving up anger.) Neither the loss of declarative
memories nor the addition of new features removes a critical degree of
connectedness. If these are what transforming into my ideal self entails, then
I can become that ideal self rather than be replaced by him.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> This
problem with the persuasiveness of Martin’s example can be remedied. We can
imagine that to become your ideal self, you would have to cut away much more
than memories. You would have to remove most of the desires, dispositions,
abilities, and intentions that constituted you. This would have to mean that
most of your existing characteristics are incompatible with your ideal self.
Certainly this is possible. However, it seems like an uncommon situation. For
the example to genuinely show the transformation to involve replacement, it
would have to mean that most of our existing characteristics would not exist in
the person we most want to be. This implies a high degree of self-rejection and
dislike. For some of us the example then would involve replacement, but for
most of us it would not.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Another
consideration corroborates the low likelihood that transforming into our ideal
self would mean our replacement rather than our continuation: Our ideal selves
will reflect our values, and our values form much of our connectedness. When I
examined, in an earlier chapter, the relative contributions to overall
connectedness of types of attribute, it turned out that values form a central
and widely ramifying part of our identity. Values shape many aspects of us;
they influence which (non-value) desires we act on or accept, affect which
skills and abilities we acquire or use, largely determine which intentions we form,
and they shape our long-term projects. If our values form the major part of our
identity, then we would have to become, rather than be replaced by, our ideal
self. This is because we would not choose to give up our values to transform
into the person we most want to be. Our ideal self is one that accords with our
ideals. It will include abilities and qualities that we do not yet have, but it
cannot have values incompatible with our current values. If I now value my
honesty and rationality, I will not conceive of my ideal self as a lying
irrationalist. If I will not give up my values in transforming into my ideal,
and my values constitute most of my identity, then I will not have to
relinquish my identity to become my ideal. For something to be my value, rather
than simply my desire, it must be integrated into a system of desires (as
explained in an earlier chapter). Since it is the integrated person—not some
errant transitory desire—who chooses the ideal self, the person’s conception of
their ideal self will not involve destruction of existing values. Your “values”
are not your <i>values</i> if you would do
away with them.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Even
if we grant that values are the weightiest component of our identity, we might
argue that all the other characteristics summed together outweigh the
contribution of our values. If so, in transforming into our ideal we <i>could</i> retain our values but lose our
identities. Though this could happen, and for some persons would happen, it
will be quite uncommon. Values may not be able to outweigh all other types of
characteristic added together in terms of contribution to connectedness, but
they will contribute at least a large minority. You would only lose continuity
in that case if your ideal involved the abolition of a large majority of your
other characteristics. Values are more likely to be outweighed by other
characteristics if the person has only weak values. An extreme case of this
would be a schizophrenic. In individuals with poorly integrated desires, values
exist weakly if at all. An individual with weak values but strong desires could
choose an ideal self that involved a discontinuity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> To
sum up: It is unlikely that most of us would be replaced by, rather than
become, our ideal self. Replacement seems more likely for certain persons such
as schizophrenics and those with weakly-formed values. Though it seems unlikely
to be a common result, I grant that it is arguable that even some normal
persons, in order to transform into the person they most want to be, would have
to give up so many characteristics other than their values that they would be
replaced. Granting these possibilities, should we concur with Martin’s view
that this shows that it is not our identity that matters most to us in survival
(or in our thinking about our place in the future), and that what does matter
most is transforming into our ideal self? Yes and no. Yes, we will have to
agree that identity is not the most important thing. Some, and possibly many,
of us would be willing to give up our identity to be replaced by an ideal self.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> However,
it does not follow that what matters most to everyone is transforming into the
person we most want to be. The example reveals that we care most about the
continuation of our values—the core of our identity—rather than about our
identity as a whole. This conclusion is interesting and might lead us to
reevaluate some notions, such as the view that personal responsibility is tied
to the persistence of identity. Perhaps responsibility (for past actions and
commitments) instead is tied to the persistence of values even when identity is
lost. However, considering such possible implications would take me far afield.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> When
I claim that it does not follow that what matters most to everyone is
transforming into the person we most want to be, I am not denying that this is
the most important thing for some of us. Our values are the most important
thing for each of us in our survival. Obviously Martin highly values
self-improvement and self-transformation. So do I, and so do many
self-reflective persons. But, in making a general claim that transforming into
our ideal is the most important thing in survival, Martin overgeneralizes. This
claim seems natural to Martin and may appeal to many of us, but not everyone
places any substantial value on self-transformation. Such people may be
self-satisfied, deluded about their own perfection, or simply minimally
self-aware or imaginative. Others may feel dissatisfied with who they are but
have little or no idea how they would improve if they could. What they care about
is the persistence of their values, and these do not happen to include
self-transformation. (Some will care about self-transformation but only when
brought about <i>by</i> the self.) Those to
whom self-transformation seems a natural value tend to reflect on themselves
and have developed a relatively high degree of self-awareness. They will tend
to be questioning, challenging, imaginative persons. (Or, to recognize negative
motivations, some of those to whom self-transformation seems a natural value
will be self-hating.)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> It
is worth noting that the more strongly we value self-improvement and the more
broadly that value ramifies through our behavior, the greater the
transformation we can undergo before we feel that we will lose what matters in
survival. We might be willing to give up not only memories, desires, and
abilities in the process of transforming into our ideal but even some of our
other values. When we value self-transformation, we are really holding a
complex of values rather than one simple value. The drive to self-improvement
(if positively rather than negatively motivated) involves optimism (you must
believe that improvement is achievable), enjoyment of experimentation,
appreciation of novelty, tolerance of uncertainty, a willingness to take
responsibility for your destiny, enjoyment of challenge, and desires for
autonomy and self-direction. Self-transformation will also link to a
disposition to think critically and imaginatively.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> I
will conclude this subsection by relating the present conclusions to the view I
called Transformationism in the previous chapter. Transformationism consists of
a normative claim to the effect that:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .2in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 6.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">(2) Earlier stage A may reasonably care about later
stage B more than proportionally to the degree of connectedness between them;
i.e., continuity is significant, not just connectedness. This is because:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> (i) the
person may value their life as a whole (or long stretches of their life).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .2in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> (ii) B
may be closer to A’s conception of an ideal self.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: .2in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> (iii) the person may hold self-transformation
as a central goal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The
conclusion I have reached here, through consideration of Martin’s example, that
what we value most in survival is the continuation of our values and, for some
of us, our becoming the person we most want to be, adds further support to the
previous chapter’s defense of (2)(ii) and (iii). Consideration of Martin’s
example gives further reason to believe we can reasonably have concern for our
future person-stages much more than proportionally to the degree of
connectedness we have to them. By complementing the earlier chapter’s ideas, we
can now see more clearly which parts of ourselves matter most in survival—which
parts will most strongly support our future-concern.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
<h1 style="line-height: 200%;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Assimilation"></a><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 16pt; line-height: 200%; text-transform: uppercase;">II.
INTEGRATION OF CHANGE<o:p></o:p></span></h1>
<h2 style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Assimilation<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">This section analyses the notion of assimilation in
order to determine when physical additions to us become part of us. I begin by
applying the idea of assimilation to modify Parfit’s criterion for continuity.
I will develop an account of assimilation in terms of functional integration.
It will turn out that functional integration seems to require something like
exclusive, or at least interference-free, access to and interdependence with a
part of the self. It does not require physical connection, conscious or direct
control, nor sensory awareness of the part.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Earlier
in the chapter I expressed dissatisfaction with the criterion for continuity
given by Parfit. According to this criterion, continuity persists so long as
there are overlapping chains of strong connectedness, where “strong
connectedness” is defined as persistence of at least 50% of the typical
psychological connectedness over the course of one day. The 50% connectedness
over the course of a day seems arbitrary. Why should we look at the degree of
psychological connectedness over the course of a <i>day</i>? Why not 3 hours? Or 14 days? Or 7 months? Or 23 seconds? The
50% condition, though an obvious choice, also seems uncomfortably arbitrary. I
will propose an alternative criterion for continuity, one suggested by the
considerations involving assimilation which occupy this section.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> A
person is a reasonably well-integrated system of beliefs, desires, values,
abilities, and so on. Persons are dynamic entities, constantly changing in
response to both external and internal pressures. There are limits, however, to
the degree of change possible for a person to assimilate. Equivalently: there
will be a maximum rate at which changes in the self can be assimilated. This
will vary between individuals, with the extreme limits being set by the common
genetic, neurological, and biological nature of humans. If a person goes
through changes in excess of their ability to assimilate, they will
disintegrate or fracture. (Disintegration may occur for other reasons, such as
an extreme trauma, or neurochemical disorder.) Disintegration means that
personality fragments or decomposes: the systematic interrelationships between
elements of the self dissolve. This might occur because of (a) the loss of
elements or aspects of a person, leaving gaps that interfere with their overall
functioning. Fragmentation of this kind may be gradual, as in senility, or
sudden, as in the case of a head injury or neurotoxic accident. Disintegration
may also result from (b) the introduction of discordant elements that cannot be
assimilated.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Considering
the actual conditions in human beings that lead to disintegration or
fragmentation of self, the 50% connectedness criterion begins to look less
innocuous in its arbitrariness. The 50% criterion has been chosen because it is
in the middle of the range, and not because of any attention given to the
psychological nature of humans. Let us imagine someone undergoing change: each
day they lose 40% of their characteristics. (We can assume they receive new
characteristics in their place so that they are not simply being rapidly
erased.) After four days they will have only about one-eighth of their original
characteristics. Since less than 40% of their characteristics are changing over
the course of any one day, the same person would continue to exist, according
to Parfit’s criterion. Yet, it seems unlikely that anyone could survive such a
rapid transformation intact. They might survive if their core values and
associated beliefs were mostly untouched, so that almost all the changes were
restricted to less critical abilities, memories, beliefs, and desires. If there
is no such restriction on the transformation, then it seems psychologically
unrealistic to believe that a person would survive such rapid transformation.
They would be unable to assimilate the changes before the next round of
alterations arrived. I will not attempt to suggest a particular limit, such as
30%/day, or 15%/day change that would allow a person to continue as an
integrated individual. Such an attempt at precision would be unrealistic.
Nevertheless, I can now suggest an alternative criterion for continuity. It
will be less precise, on its face, than Parfit’s, but more psychologically
realistic:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Continuity is maintained (identity persists) so long
as the changes undergone by the person are limited enough so that fragmentation
(which would destroy personhood) does not occur. Rather than 50% connectedness
over the course of a day, identity persists so long as, over any given period
of time, the degree of change remains within the capacity of the person to
assimilate.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Over any time period, a person may be able to absorb
and integrate</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> changes in 10% of their characteristics, or 20%, or
whatever. Whereas Parfit seems to assume that we could set the degree of change
to any percentage up to 50% and still secure the person’s continued identity,
my view modifies his criterion. I assume that there will be some critical point
or small range after which the extent of transformation becomes excessive;
there comes a discontinuity or phase change where transformation leads to
disintegration and an abrupt fall in connectedness.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">ASSIMILATION AND
FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION:</span></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Although I have
made what will be a minor modification in Parfit’s criterion of continuity for
most purposes, the idea of assimilation will lead me consider when some change
in us or addition to us becomes part of us. I will examine familiar cases of
psychological change, but will primarily be concerned with additions to our
abilities. When does an added ability, such as provided by a device, really
become part of us? Some people casually talk of their car as part of them, or
their computer, or their clothes as part of them. Is there any truth to these
statements? If not, could they become true as technology advances? To answer
these questions I will develop an account of assimilation. This will lead to a
distinction between supplementation and enhancement—a distinction with weighty
implications for normative issues such as fairness, merit, and good
competition. I will begin by proposing a notion of assimilation as functional
integration.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> In
order to assimilate a new characteristic, we need to bring it into harmony with
our existing condition. We do this by functionally integrating it with us. When
we first acquire a new characteristic it may seem unfamiliar, odd, or awkward.
In the case of a new belief, we integrate it by coming to understand its
implications, how it supports or conflicts with our other beliefs (or how it is
irrelevant to our other beliefs), and (sometimes) how we came to hold the
belief. Before we go through this process, the belief is only peripherally our
belief. Until it is assimilated, it may have little effect on action if it is
overridden by conflicting established beliefs. (A largely unassimilated, unconscious,
or repressed belief may have some effects on behavior. The low level of
assimilation is nevertheless indicated by the unresponsiveness of the repressed
belief to the conscious beliefs.) In the case of forming—or being induced to
have—a new desire, we integrate it by bringing it into our system of desires,
accepting it, willingly letting it control our actions, and by working out its
place in our hierarchy of desires. Assimilation of new abilities, involving
physical modifications, appears to be quite different from assimilation of
beliefs and desires, yet entails analogous processes of mutual accommodation.
In this discussion I will be focusing primarily on assimilation of abilities
and physical alterations and additions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Some
obvious points about assimilation of physical changes can be made quickly. As
Peter Unger</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> notes: “For me to survive their replacement,
larger, more central parts of me will require more assimilation than smaller,
less central ones. More than this, a sequence wherein all my matter changes
over by several abrupt replacements of greater, more central parts will demand
more assimilation than a sequence where complete material changeover is by way
of the replacement of lesser, less central ones.” [152] Since Unger holds a
physical not a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, I should
note that a psychological reductionist would allow that continuity has been
maintained despite a sweeping <i>material</i>
changeover so long as this did not involve a sweeping change in function. Thus,
if I go through the Teletransporter, all of my matter is replaced but no change
is made in my functioning. Since, in the absence of teletransporters or
uploaded personalities, functional changes generally are tied to physical
changes, we can ignore this distinction for the purpose of developing an
account of assimilation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Quite
apart from the foregoing point, there is reason to describe assimilation as
functional integration, rather than as physical or structural integration.
Physical or structural integration implies a direct physical connection between
parts of a single entity. Certainly, in most cases that come readily to mind, a
functionally integrated entity will <i>also</i>
be structurally or physically integrated. It would be a mistake to make the
latter a <i>condition</i> of integration
rather than a typical <i>concomitant</i>. We
can surely imagine entities that are spatially distributed, and we can surely
find them in the actual world. A corporation whose offices, resources, and
personnel are scattered across a city, country, or the world, may be counted as
an entity if we can find a concordance between the parts. If the vital skills,
knowledge, and resources of the corporation are divided spatially so that no
one location could function alone, and if communication and movement of
resources between locations ties them together, then we have a spatially
distributed entity. As computers and software have developed, the idea of
distributed processes and entities is becoming more familiar. Increasingly,
specialized, expensive supercomputers are being replaced by networked desktop
computers. These may often be physically connected through permanent wire or
fiber-optic lines, but may also be physically disconnected, working together by
temporarily hooking up to a communication system, or even by transmitting
signals through electromagnetic emissions.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Early in the evolutionary process nature did not
have the means to secure communication and coordination between physically
separate structures. Simple organisms became physically connected, as when
cells formed. Technology is allowing us to separate functional integration from
physical connection, so this should be reflected in our account of the
assimilation of new abilities by persons.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
kind of functional integration occurring when a person assimilates physical
changes depends heavily on internal processes. The situation is quite different
with artifacts. Our judgment that an artifact has survived through replacement
of its parts depends significantly on external relations. Consider the standard
example of the Ship of Theseus: Parts of the original ship are gradually
replaced with new material until none of the original parts of the ship remain.
As the old parts are removed, one by one, they are gathered and used to construct
another ship, identical in form. Many who consider this case are more inclined
to view the ship whose parts are being replaced as the original ship surviving
if that ship remains in use throughout the process: Between each replacement,
the ship is sailed. If that ship is never sailed, we may be more inclined to
judge as the original the ship constructed entirely out of the original parts.
We judge the ship-with-replacement parts as the continuing original partly
because it continues to fulfill the function of the original, whereas the ship
constructed out of the original parts is not used until completed, if then. By
fulfilling a function determined by its users’ purposes, the first ship wins
the title of continuer of the original.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> When
a person undergoes changes, it is internal processes that count in
assimilation, not external functions and purposes. Even if a replacement or
addition is made to a person by someone else—such as a muscle graft, or a gene
inserted by a surgeon to alter neurochemical balances—it must still be
internally integrated with the rest of the system, unlike a ship’s new plank
that can simply be nailed into place. Functional integration is relevant both
to the person and the artifact, but in different ways. The replacement part of
the artifact becomes part of the artifact if it enables the artifact to
continue its functional role, a role determined by external factors. The
replacement part of the person becomes part of the person if the function of
the part becomes interwoven with the functions of the rest of the body. What is
the nature of this interweaving of function, this integration of parts?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> For
something to be mine, for me to have assimilated it, need I have direct or
conscious control over it? This may seem plausible as a requirement if we
consider selected cases. This is <i>my</i>
arm because I can move it through an act of will. I can also feel sensations
directly with my arm. I can use someone else’s arm, but only either by asking
them to move it in a particular way or by grasping it and making it move by
applying external force. I can distinguish my vocal ability from that of
another person because only my own can I activate at will. If we consider other
cases, it will be obvious that unmediated or conscious control cannot be a
condition for something to have been assimilated by me. I have numerous
physical and cognitive functions over which I have little or no direct or
conscious control. I cannot directly alter my body temperature, nor can I will
my stomach to halt its digestive processes, nor can I switch off my ability to
recognize faces. That direct control over parts of ourselves can lead us to
think they are ours, reflects a deeper condition for functional integration
that has not yet emerged in this analysis.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Does
assimilation of a new characteristic necessarily mean that only the person
assimilating it has access to it in the standard way? This seems plausible: In
a legal and moral sense, we say that someone owns something—that thing is <i>theirs</i>, it belongs to them—if they have
exclusive rights to its use. (This might seem similar to the last question;
however, I may have exclusive access to the use of parts of myself that I have
no conscious control over.) Similarly, it seems plausible to require that for
me to be integrated with a part (a heart, for instance), there can be no other
person who is also integrated with it. Whether we consider a part of me that I
can consciously control, such as my arm, or an ability or function outside my
control, such as regulation of body temperature, it looks like only I can use
it in the standard way.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Again,
though, exclusive access is a typical <i>consequence</i>
of integration, but not a condition of it. In virtually all the cases familiar
to us, if some organ or ability is mine—if we are functionally integrated—that
organ or ability will not be integrated with anyone else. We do discover the
occasional exception, such as siblings who have been physically joined at birth
and who have developed in that condition. Consider two siblings joined at the
hip or back to back. Neither of them have exclusive access to their legs or
their heart. Yet, it seems reasonable to say of each of them both that it is
their heart <i>and</i> that they share it
with their sibling. Normally if I were to share an organ or ability with
another person, my integration with it would have to be disrupted and their use
of it would interfere with my use. Consequently, the more the other person had
access to it, the less access I would have. In special cases like that of the
joined siblings, two persons can share access without this disrupting the
organ’s normal functioning. By developing jointly, the siblings both have
become effectively integrated with the single heart. The situation is less
clear in regard to the shared use of their legs. If both brains can send and
receive nerve signals to and from the legs, conflicts will arise, and access by
one sibling will interfere with access by the other.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> This
suggests that exclusive access is close to being a condition for integration
but needs modifying. A more accurate condition might be described as: Exclusive
access, unless shared access does not interfere with the functioning of the
part or the system. Stated another way: Access without interference by another
person. Exclusive access without interference does not require physical
attachment; the points of the above discussion of distributed entities still
apply. I could have access to abilities located physically externally to the
rest of me just as exclusively and just as immune to interference as more
standard internally-located parts. I might communicate, control, and be
influenced by an external organ or addition to my brain by means of signals,
just as in the file synchronization example above. I might encrypt these
signals so that no one else could access or interfere with my use of my
external part. If I were just as tightly integrated with this external device
as I am to an internal organ, or to either hemisphere of my brain, the
(modified) exclusive access condition gives us no reason to deny it to be
integrated with me.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Functional
integration, it turns out, seems to require something like exclusive, or at
least interference-free, access to a part of the self. It does not require
physical connection, conscious or direct control, nor sensory awareness of the
part. The initial plausibility of these non-conditions stems from their typical
concurrence with an underlying requirement for functional integration. This
condition I will call <i>interdependence</i>.
A system and a part can be interdependent in numerous ways, depending on their
functions, so I cannot give a thorough and universal account of
interdependence. A couple of examples should illuminate the condition
sufficiently for our purposes. Mere dependence of a person on an ability or part
will not suffice for that ability to count as functionally integrated with (and
so part of) them. The whole and the part must be bound together through
interdependence of function. In the case of beliefs and desires, as we have
seen, the nature of this interdependence is clear in essence. A belief, to be
my belief, must be interrelated with my other beliefs: they directly cause one
another to be supported or undermined to the extent that they are relevant to
one another). As briefly noted earlier, repressed beliefs may have effects on
behavior yet be only slightly integrated. This is because the person and the
repressed belief are less interdependent than in the case of other beliefs: The
person may be strongly though unconsciously influenced by the repressed belief,
but the belief has been pushed outside the person’s influence. The influence is
therefore one way, ruling out interdependence. For a desire to be mine, it must
be related to my other desires such that most of them contribute to a single course
of action, and they motivate only courses of action that do not interfere with
one another. (Similar comments apply here as applied to repressed beliefs.) We
can expect something similar to apply to abilities embodied in physical parts
of ourselves.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> What
kind of interdependence of abilities is involved in functional integration?
How, for instance, are my abilities to see and to lift weights interdependent?
I can lift weights without being able to see, and I can see without being able
to lift weights. As this suggests, the interdependence we are looking for is
not a direct interdependence between one ability and another randomly chosen
ability. For an ability to be functionally integrated it must be integrated
with the person (their physical system) as a whole. How does my ability to lift
weights using my muscles differ from my using a forklift truck, such that we
say my muscles are part of me but the forklift is not? I may become dependent
on the forklift truck for gathering food: perhaps I am trapped in an
environment where I can only reach food by moving heavy rocks. The case of my
muscles differs in that we are interdependent: I need my muscles to move myself
and other things, but they also need me. To function, my muscles require a
constant supply of oxygen and nutrients to generate adenosine triphosphate for
energy, and they depend on my body’s waste removal system to handle
accumulations of lactic acid and other metabolic byproducts. The muscles cannot
perform their function without a support structure; they need to work together
with my body’s skeleton, ligaments, and tendons in order to exert force. My
bodily system needs the muscles for mobility, gathering food and water, and to
realize my other abilities.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> An
objection might be raised when I say that while I would be dependent on the
forklift, it would not be dependent on me for its functioning. Surely, the
objection might go, does not the forklift depend on me for gasoline? If so, we
are dependent on each other to function, making the forklift, by this
criterion, part of me. In response I note that <i>anyone else</i> could <i>just as
easily</i> supply the truck with gasoline. It is true, in principle, that
someone else could supply my muscles with oxygen and nutrients. However, they
could only take over this function with enormous difficulty. If someone else
could get that deeply connected into my muscular system, very probably they
would disrupt my own control over and access to the muscles. So, although the
line between the forklift’s dependence on me to supply it with gas, and my
muscles dependence on me to supply them with energy and nutrients is not a
sharp one, they are far enough apart on a spectrum to say that the former is
not a case of significant interdependence whereas the second one is.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Suppose
my muscles and bones were rapidly wasting away. I replace their functionality
by means of a powered exoskeleton. Could this be part of me? Even though I
might depend on the exoskeleton in the same way I depended on my natural
muscles and bones, the exoskeleton would remain an external device since the
dependence is one way. What if I undergo a massive surgical procedure in which
the exoskeleton is linked directly to my nervous system? A large part of the
exoskeleton’s function now involves my nervous system. We are connected at a
much deeper, more pervasive level than if it were merely strapped to me and
controlled by voice commands. We might now grant the exoskeleton the status of
being part of me, though not so clearly as were my muscles. If we further suppose
that the exoskeleton responds to exercise and practice by becoming stronger and
more accurate, then it will be about as functionally integrated with me as were
my original muscles and bones.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
kind of interdependence involved in functional integration, whatever the
physiological details, entails <i>mutual
support</i>, <i>feedback</i>, <i>homeostasis</i>, and<i> adaptation</i>. We saw how my muscles support and sustain the other
functions and abilities of my body, and how other somatic processes sustain the
muscles. Whether conscious or not, feedback is required to control and
coordinate any bodily ability. Whereas the basic model exoskeleton lacked any
direct feedback, the second type (exoskeleton-2), linked into my nervous
system, does fulfill the feedback proviso, thereby explaining why this model
more plausibly counts as part of me. Exoskeleton-2, while clearly functionally
integrated to a substantial degree, lacks some of the responsiveness we are
used to with our natural muscular-skeletal system. Since the Nineteenth Century
it has been recognized that functionally integrated systems exhibit
homeostasis—a tendency for the system to return to equilibrium after a
perturbation. Homeostasis crucially requires feedback, but also the means for
the parts of the system to influence one another in a coordinated manner.
Homeostasis need not result only in a return to a pre-existing state: if new
demands on the system are now being made routinely, restoring equilibrium
between a system and the demands on it will require adaptation—growth and
development (or atrophy in the event of decreased demands). We will be even
more inclined to grant exoskeleton-3 the status of self than its predecessor
because, in addition to mutual support and feedback, it adapts to the needs of
the body.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Assimilation
is a process starting with something that is only partly integrated in these
ways, and ending with something highly integrated. Should we withhold our
judgment that something has become part of us until assimilation is complete?
This is unnecessary for two reasons: First, there are perfectly normal and
familiar parts and aspects of ourselves that are not totally integrated with
us, yet we do not question their status as self. Second, something that is only
partially assimilated can be part of us so long as the degree of integration is
increasing in a goal-directed manner. On the first point, consider
psychological characteristics such as beliefs. When we first form or are
induced to hold a belief, we do not instantly realize many of its consequences,
implications, and prerequisites. If we were never to think of the belief again,
it were never to affect our actions, and it had no interaction with any of our
beliefs or desires, it would not genuinely become part of the system or ecology
of self. We can count it as part of us, even before significant integration has
yet occurred, if it is subject to a goal-directed process of increasing its
degree of integration.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Since we are not normally completely integrated, it
would be inappropriate to impose on an added ability the requirement that it be
fully assimilated before it can be part of us.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> To
summarize: We assimilate a part or an ability by functionally integrating it
with us. Functional integration requires interdependence between us and the
part or ability. Interdependence involves mutual support, feedback,
homeostasis, and adaptation. If we are functionally integrated with something,
then we will generally have exclusive access to that thing. We can only be
functionally integrated with it while sharing access if that shared access does
not interfere with these four aspects of interdependence. Functional
integration need not be an all-or-nothing matter, so there may be cases where
we cannot say definitely whether something is or is not part of us.
Interdependence implies exclusive access (or access without interference)
because another person having access to the part or ability is likely to
interfere with feedback and adaptation: Their control signals will often
interfere with our own, and their adjustments to the part’s function will
interfere with its adaptation to our needs. If the other person’s requirements
for the part’s function differ from ours, then homeostasis cannot be attained.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<h2 style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Enhancement vs. Supplementation<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The account I have developed of assimilation of
abilities and additions to the person, as physically embodied, leads naturally
to a way of distinguishing the concepts of enhancement and supplementation. The
nature of and differences between enhancement and supplementation raise
normative issues. Clarifying this distinction helps productive discussion of
these normative issues (though is not sufficient to resolve them). Although I
will not address any normative issues here, I will point out how they are
affected by the enhancement/supplementation distinction. These normative issues
primarily revolve around notions of fairness in sports, games, and tests.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> We
assimilate a new ability or addition to our system by functionally integrating
it with us, as described above. I will reserve the term “enhancement” for
additions to our abilities that we have assimilated in a manner that produces
enduring</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> effects. According to this usage, if you have been
enhanced in some way then <i>you</i> have
changed rather than it being the conditions under which you are operating that
have changed. By contrast, if your abilities are being supplemented, then you
have not changed in any significant sense, but the conditions under which your
abilities function has changed. An example might help at this point, though
several examples will be needed to distinguish these two concepts more clearly.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Consider
two people each of whom can run 100 meters in 14 seconds. Both of them want to
be able to run the distance in a shorter time. The first person practices over
months, gradually building up her legs muscles and her ability to push herself
to the limit despite the discomfort. After six months, she is able to run 100
meters in 12.5 seconds. The second person does not practice hard, but completes
the course faster than ever before in, say, 13 seconds due to a strong wind
that pushes him along. I assume these are relatively uncontroversial cases,
given my analysis of functional integration and enhancement and
supplementation. I defined enhancement in terms of assimilating or integrating
changes, whereas supplementation involved changes external to self—changes in
the circumstances or conditions. The runner who puts herself through the
training has enhanced her abilities. She has made enduring changes in numerous
interrelated functions of her body and psychology. The runner who is assisted
by the gust of wind but who did not train enough to otherwise run faster than
14 seconds has not made any such enduring internal modifications. The second
runner in no way assimilates changes in such a way as to bring about an
increase in his running ability. As soon as the wind ceases, or when he runs
another race without the helpful gust, he can no longer run any faster than
before.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> What
about a variant on this example, where the second runner’s improved speed,
instead of being assisted by wind is due to taking amphetamine before the race?
I defined enhancements as additions to our abilities that we have assimilated
in a manner that produces enduring effects. According to this, the second
runner’s ability has been supplemented rather than enhanced since he has not
made any enduring internal changes. He has supplemented his abilities by
forcing his body to work beyond its normal limits by causing the release of
neurotransmitters and hormones, depleting them in an unsustainable way. As soon
as the amphetamine has passed through his system he can no longer run any
faster than before. It might be objected that it is <i>assimilation</i> rather than the <i>enduring</i>
nature of the effect that matters more if a change is to be a part of us. We
might change, but transiently, before returning to a previous condition. The
fact that the effects of the amphetamine last only a few hours therefore does
not show that it is a supplement rather than a (transitory) enhancement.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> This
objection has some force, though it does seem that the transitory nature of
this effect makes amphetamine a poor example of an enhancer. Furthermore, I
argued that assimilation or integration involves mutual support, feedback,
homeostasis, and adaptation. While the amphetamine does lead to internal
adaptation and homeostasis (at a temporary new state), it does not seem to be
involved in mutual support or feedback in any interesting sense. The body
responds to the amphetamine, but it does not respond to the body—such as by
increasing in supply. The effect is one way; the amphetamine affects the
runner, but the runner does not affect the drug (other than to simply use it
up). In this way it is rather like the runner who is pushed by the wind.
Amphetamine is a marginal case of enhancement. It sits on the borderline
between supplementation and enhancement. Since a person typically thinks of
their inherent abilities as those that last more than a few hours, we may be
inclined to think of stimulants more as supplementing our abilities than
enhancing them. However, we <i>do</i>
assimilate the drug in some respects, so it has some claim to being an enhancer
according to my criterion. If we are to count the effects of stimulants as
enhancement, we should consider them a marginal rather than exemplary instance
of the class.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> As
with the conditions of assimilation, it is easy to conflate typical
accompaniments of enhancement with necessary conditions of it. In this case, it
might seem that an increased ability counts as a genuine enhancement only if
gaining that ability requires considerable effort. The first runner had to
practice and gradually develop a new level of ability. Genuinely having the
skill to do arithmetic in one’s head requires practice, whereas supplementing
one’s ability by using a calculator is much easier. We could easily find many
other pairs of examples where enhancement of abilities involves great effort,
whereas supplementing one’s abilities requires much less exertion. Exceptions
that undermine effort as a general requirement include organ implants and
muscle grafts. Once muscle has been grafted on (at least in an ideal procedure
in which nerves and ligaments have been fully connected) the extra strength is
part of the person just as much as the strength they had with their
pre-existing amount of muscle.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Enhancing
oneself need not require hard work, struggle, or long-term persistence,
although this may often be the case. So long as the new ability has been
assimilated and integrated into the rest of our body and cognition, it is part
of us. Cases like a brilliantly executed muscle graft aside, most enhancements
we are familiar with are attained only with effort, for reasons rooted in our
physiology and neurophysiology. Increases in physical abilities generally demand
repeated stresses or patterns of activity to effect changes in our physical
structure. Learning skills like balancing on one foot, playing the piano, or
multiplying large numbers in our head, necessitates repetition to change the
firing properties of our synapses.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Apart
from enhancements usually requiring more exertion than supplements to our
abilities, the increase in our abilities associated with enhancements will
typically endure longer than those associated with supplementation. In the case
of the runners, the second runner loses the ability to run a sub-14 second 100
meters as soon as the wind ceases blowing in his direction, whereas the first
runner’s improved ability will persist for longer. This persistence of
enhancements as compared to supplements again reflects the former’s
assimilation into the person’s whole system. Structural changes have been made
to improve function, whereas a supplement produces improved performance only so
long as it is supplied. However, it is the integration or assimilation of
changes that essentially characterizes enhancement and not the persistence of
the effect. We can imagine cases where supplementation (or marginal cases of
enhancement) might have longer-lasting effects than a relevantly similar
enhancement. Suppose we have the means to surgically implant a vial containing
a drug which releases a chemical to supplement our natural level of certain
neurotransmitters (the catecholamines) so as to produce heightened alertness
and ability to concentrate. If the vial released the chemicals over a period of
months or years, the effect could be as long lasting as an improvement produced
by a structural change induced by practice. Despite this, we would be receiving
a supplement (or at best an enhancer close to being a supplement) and not an
enhancement. As the chemical is introduced to the system it pushes the body’s
biochemistry in a particular direction. The body only remains in that state so
long as the chemical is supplied—and supplied in increasing doses as resistance
builds. Here we do not see the mutual support or positive adaptation that
characterizes assimilation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Supplementation
does not change the underlying abilities of the person. Once ended, the person
returns to their previous state (perhaps with a temporary decline in ability).
Of course returning to a previous state is not sufficient to indicate
supplementation. Enhancements need not be permanent: If we discontinue
exercise, our muscles will gradually atrophy. If we do not practice our skills,
we will tend to lose them—some fairly quickly, others only partially over many
years (such as knowing how to ride a bicycle). Ending supplementation can
usually be expected to bring about a <i>faster</i>
decline in ability, since (clear cases of) enhancements involve integrated changes
not dependent on external supplies for their persistence. The crucial
difference, then, between enhancement and supplementation comes from the
former’s integration and the latter’s lack of integration rather than from one
requiring more effort or being more enduring than the other.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Merit"></a><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">MERIT
IN CONTESTS, GAMES, AND TESTS:</span></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">
Consideration of some normative questions regarding sports, games, and tests
may help to further illuminate the difference between supplementation and
enhancement. We will also discover difficulties in applying the distinction.
Although sharpening the distinction may not always resolve normative
disagreements, it will provide a sounder point of reference.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Persons
who compete in sports, or who play games with some seriousness of intent, or
who take tests, seek to improve their performance.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Spectators, sporting organizations, testing
institutions, and the general public hold conflicting views as to what forms of
advantage-seeking are appropriate. In the case of sporting contests, certain
methods of improving abilities are seen as cheating, while others are granted
legitimacy. It is thought legitimate for runners to train hard, eat special
diets, engage in “carbohydrate loading”, train at high altitudes, receive
expert coaching, and to wear well-crafted running shoes. It is usually judged
as cheating if runners take stimulants, injure other competitors, or cover the
course on bicycle or automobile. Ben Johnson, for example, was disqualified at
the 1988 Olympics track events because he was found to have been taking the
steroid Stanozolol. One objection to the use of certain performance improving
substances and techniques claims that the user gains an unfair advantage over
the other competitors. I think this argument has been decisively refuted (see
Gardner, 1989). Whether justified or not, a more revealing objection to certain
techniques, for our purposes, is not that an advantage is gained over other
athletes but that an advantage is gained over the sport itself. The intended
purpose or the obstacles of the sport are overcome. The purpose of the contest
is to test the athlete. If some performance-boosting substance or aid is more
responsible for the gained advantage, then we will be testing the substance
rather than the athlete.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Since
enhancements are changes in the person, whereas supplements are external to the
person, if we want a sport to test the athlete perhaps we should allow
enhancements but not supplements. This may not yield a usable policy, since it
may be impractical to enforce the principle consistently, or we may be unable
always to decide whether a particular means of performance improvement is more
like an enhancement or a supplement. Consideration of a few cases will
demonstrate that this indeed can be a difficulty.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Consider
four methods an athlete might use to improve her performance. (i) She might
hire a dietician and consume a carefully-tailored diet including larger than
normal quantities of amino acids, vitamins, and other nutrients. (ii) She might
spent a month before a competition training at a high altitude in order to
force her body to utilize oxygen more efficiently. (iii) She might engage in
“bloodpacking.” In this procedure, some of the athlete’s blood is extracted,
strongly oxygenated, and then reinfused shortly before a contest. (iv) She
might ingest anabolic steroids over the months before a contest, gaining
additional strength and power. Many people would find methods (i) and (ii) perfectly acceptable, method (iii) dubious,
and method (iv) unacceptable. It is not clear that those judgments can be
justified in terms of testing the athlete rather than the performance-boosting
substance or technique.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Although
nutritional modification might be thought the least controversial, it might
seem similar in one way to more objectionable methods. While maintaining a
highly nutritious diet will simply allow the athlete to bring out her abilities
effectively, the practice of carbohydrate loading might be thought of as akin
to taking amphetamine. They do differ in that one will be described as
“natural” and the other as “unnatural” (though substituting the stimulant found
in the ephedra herb will confound this move), but both give the athlete a very
transient and unsustainable boost. Here it becomes uncertain whether we are genuinely
testing the athlete or the supplementation. Carbohydrate loading is allowed
probably for a combination of reasons: it is practically impossible to test
for; it is counted as natural; it is not harmful; and although it may
temporarily boost the athlete’s ability, it does not defeat the point of the
competition or make it easier (unlike using a bicycle in a running race).
Although the carbohydrate that is loaded is more plausibly seen as a supplement
than an enhancement, the overall performance of the athlete and her ability to
utilize the additional calories still depends to a high degree on her true
capacities as determined by long-term training. (That this seems to be as true
of amphetamine ingestion suggests that current rules are not actually based on
any goal of <i>primarily</i> testing the
athlete.)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> High
altitude training probably provokes more suspicion of unfair advantage than
does carbohydrate loading and dietary expertise, perhaps because it is less
equally accessible. In terms of the goal of having a sport test the person
rather than a performance-increasing agent, however, high altitude training
seems more defensible. The athlete still must undergo the same
training—training that gradually makes integrated changes in the athlete’s
body—but the lower oxygen content of the air now provokes a stronger adaptive
response. This adaptation is considerably more enduring than the effects of
carbohydrate loading (or stimulant ingestion). The high altitude training does
result in enhancements to the athlete’s whole system, so the contest will test
the athlete in the desired manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Bloodpacking
or “bloodboosting” works because of effects on oxygenation, like high altitude
training. Nevertheless, bloodpacking has more in common with carbohydrate
loading in that the heightened performance capacity is transient. Clearly it is
a form of supplementation rather than enhancement. Again, this does not
necessarily mean we should rule it out in order to protect the integrity of the
sport. We may judge that the sport still primarily tests the athlete, the
supplementation merely adding slightly to performance without making the course
significantly easier.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Steroids
present an interesting case. They are universally rejected by sporting bodies
(though not by athletes) as legitimate performance aids, yet arguably they are
just as much enhancers as they are supplements. Steroids alone will not greatly
improve performance. They promote greater muscle anabolism and the resulting
growth in strength and power only when combined with hard training and good
nutrition. Their effects take months and endure for months after use is
discontinued—unlike stimulants, blood-packing, or carbohydrate loading. In
every way except their “naturalness” their effects appear similar in nature to
high altitude training. Anabolic steroids accelerate training-induced
adaptations in the athlete. These adaptations involve changes as
physically-integrated as those induced by training alone. Since steroids
enhance athlete’s abilities rather than supplementing them, there is no
justification for their prohibition if the grounds are the integrity of the
sport (rather than paternalistic concerns).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Similar
considerations arise outside sports, if we turn our attention to tests. These
include physical tests, but I will focus on cognitive tests such as IQ tests,
the SAT, GRE, LSAT, and GMAT, and various tests administered by potential
employers. The tests usually are given with the purpose of determining a
person’s abilities in order to ascertain how they are likely to perform at a
job or benefit from a certain level of training. If this is the purpose of the
tests, should the administrators prohibit, or at least discourage, the use of
neurochemical aids such as “smart drugs” or “nootropics” and mood modifiers
such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) of which the best known
is Prozac?</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Nootropics
work differently from stimulants such as amphetamine or dexedrine, in that they
do not result in depletion in neurotransmitter levels when discontinued. Nor do
they generate neurotoxic byproducts. Typically they work by increasing the
supply of neurotransmitter either by supplying more of them or by slowing their
breakdown. Although the mechanism of action differs from the more familiar
stimulants, bearing in mind the conditions of functional integration, they are
clearly supplementing rather than enhancing cognitive function. If a test
administrator wishes to test only the integrated abilities of test taker, she
will want to exclude the use of such substances. If the intent is the related
but separable goal of testing how individuals will be able to perform tasks
over the long term, there will be no reason to exclude these generally
non-toxic drugs whose effects do not diminish significantly over time. So, although
both nootropics and stimulants are supplements, they may be treated differently
if what is being tested for are sustainable abilities rather than strictly
intrinsic, integrated abilities. (For the same reason, a few years after
electronic calculators became commonplace, mathematical tests began to allow
their use, recognizing that anyone would later have access to these devices.)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Mood
modifiers such as the SSRIs can be treated similarly to the cognition
augmenting drugs. The improvement in mood and productivity resulting from
supplementation will not result in functionally integrated change (generally
SSRI users revert to their former condition upon discontinuance), but these
substances appear to be usable over long periods of time. If, instead of using nootropics,
someone undergoes gene therapy (if we can call the augmentation of normal
function “therapy”) the result of which is to produce enduring and endogenous
increases in neurotransmitter production or improved regulation, then they will
have been enhanced rather than supplemented. Permanent changes will have been
made; no infusions will be needed, and the augmented functioning will be
attributable to the person rather than to a substance. In this case, whether a
test is intended to measure native ability or to measure sustainable
performance, there should be no objection to genetically-caused performance
enhancement.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> As
a final example to help draw the slightly fuzzy line between supplementation
and enhancement, consider a series of devices starting with a handheld PDA
(personal digital assistant) and ending with a fully integrated
neuroprosthesis. Growing numbers of people are carrying around PDAs to help
them remember phone numbers, appointments, perform calculations, and to
communicate via e-mail and fax. Occasionally we may hear someone exclaim “I
couldn’t live without it. It’s practically a part of me.” In light of the
earlier discussion of the conditions of functional integration, it will be
clear that such talk is hyperbole. A PDA may be more flexible and powerful than
a paper-based organizer, but it is barely more integrated with the user. What
if such devices shrink until they can be worn in the form of a paper-thin
headband or a small earring, and become controlled by voice commands or gestures?
This would merely make our control over the device more natural. The PDA would
in no way adapt to us or be functionally interrelated with us in any deep way.
If the evolution of such devices were to continue, the clarity of the device
vs. integral part distinction might begin to blur, and eventually some
descendent of these devices might count as just as much part of us as does a
hemisphere of the brain and the functions it performs.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Suppose
these devices evolve beyond simple cleverness and programmability. They are
built with neural networks, genetic algorithms, fuzzy systems, and artificial
intelligence so that they monitor the wants and habits of the user and learn to
anticipate them. The device is connected to the body in such a way that it
notices changes in the skin’s electrical potential, alterations in brain wave
patterns, changes in pupil size, body temperature, and so on. It learns how
these changes are associated with various behaviors and demands on itself. It
might even be connected to implanted physiological tuning devices that alter
mood, hormone levels, or whatever. As the device becomes this interconnected
with us and responsive to us, and we come to depend on it more, we may begin to
feel the device to be a part of us. Taking the evolution of the device further,
suppose it is implanted in your brain. Nerve growth factor is used to induce
axons and dendrites to grow into the neuroprosthesis where they link up with
adaptable connectors. But the assimilation of the device is not simply physical.
You cannot immediately control it by issuing voice commands or gesturing at a
visual display. Instead, you learn to make it work by experimentation which
forges new connections and alters synaptic weightings. After a process of
assimilation, your cognition becomes distributed over your neural tissue and
the neuroprosthesis, so that the device cannot be removed with disrupting both
its and your functioning. You sense the results of the neuroprosthesis’
processes in a manner subjectively indistinguishable from your own. At that
point it no longer makes sense to distinguish yourself from the device, except
in the way that you might talk about the functions of your brain’s left
parietal lobe. This process of assimilation of a device proceeds in stages, so there
may a range of cases in which we have no clear answer to the question: “Is it
part of me?”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
<h1 style="line-height: 200%;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="EnhancementSupp"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="IntrinsicInstrumental"></a><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 15pt; line-height: 200%;">III. <span style="text-transform: uppercase;">Intrinsic
and Instrumental Bodily Identity<o:p></o:p></span></span></h1>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Many of the changes in self considered in this
chapter are those brought about by making alterations to parts of the body. On
psychological reductionist accounts of identity, what matters in survival is
psychological connectedness and continuity. What exactly is the relationship
between these changes made on a physical level and their effects on personal
continuity? Does psychological reductionism commit us to the proposition that
physical continuity, in itself, contributes nothing to survival? If so, what
precisely does this claim mean?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> In
considering these questions I will <i>not</i>
examine theories of personal identity as bodily continuity, nor defend
psychological reductionism against such theories. This dissertation starts from
an assumption of the truth of psychological reductionism in order to explore
the structure of such a view in detail. It is not my purpose to argue for
reductionism itself, nor to show that the psychological criterion is more
defensible than the physical criterion. Nevertheless, since changes to our
personalities, especially as considered in the current chapter, work through
physical causes, I find it necessary at this stage to clarify the
physical/psychological distinction. The main issue here is: To what extent is
psychological continuity or change independent of physical continuity or
change?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
question of the relation between the physical and psychological aspects of self
seems especially pressing if we accept physicalism—as I do. On any version of
physicalism, psychological characteristics are ontologically dependent on some
physical embodiment. A person consists of an embodied psychology. All that
exists is physical stuff and its relations and organization.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> How then do we decide which characteristics are
psychological and so constitutive of identity, and which are merely physical
and so only instrumentally important to identity? If our behavior and
personality depend on the structures in our brains and bodies, which were
shaped by evolutionary pressures, we face the challenge of usefully separating
the intrinsic from the instrumental aspects of persons. If we modify a brain,
or alter a hormonal balance, or change the shape of a body, it might seem that
we would <i>necessarily</i> alter the
associated personality.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Certainly
we must grant that the continuity of many aspects of our bodies will contribute
in a major way to the continuity of our personalities. In the most general
terms, without a body of <i>some</i> kind,
it seems incoherent to imagine existing as persons at all. We would have to
exist without existing in any place or time. We could have no point of view or
sensations or perceptions, since these would have no location or field of
input. Possessing a body must be at least of great <i>instrumental</i> significance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Here"></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Apart from the need to have some kind of body, it also
seems clear that the particular body we have will deeply affect our identity.
Our personalities <i>express</i> themselves
through our bodies. To express our values, to act on our desires, to carry out
our intentions, we need to use our limbs, voices, facial expressions, and
physical capabilities. For most psychological characteristics a wide range of
embodiments would suffice. The expression of generosity, anger, or joy are
compatible with almost any human body, and with many possible non-human bodies.
Some bodies will serve our expressive needs better than others. If I were
unfortunate enough to have an accident that deprived me of all control over my
facial muscles, I would find it more difficult to express feelings of many
kinds. I might find it more difficult even to <i>experience</i> some of those feelings. Some psychologists have argued
that part of feeling an emotion (at least consciously) is its expression.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">(Can you be
angry while your muscles are relaxed, your blood pressure and cortisone levels
low, and your physical motions non-threatening?) If these psychologists are
correct, emotional continuity will limit the range of bodily configurations
compatible with maintaining a particular psychology. Even without being able to
somatically experience an emotion, we might experience it in a weaker form so
long as the emotion can have hormonal and neurological effects. Bodily form may
therefore limit the intensity or clarity of emotional ability more than
limiting the <i>range</i> of emotions we can
experience.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Among
the personal characteristics I have listed as contributing to personal
identity, I included abilities. Aside from the most cerebral, abilities
confront us with another reason to grant the importance of the body’s
contribution to personal continuity. To be a particular person with a
particular life requires specific physical abilities. If all the passion in my
life is bound up with testing experimental aircraft, I will need a body with
keen vision and fast reflexes. If my life revolves around running marathons
then, should I suddenly become paraplegic, I may feel that I am no longer quite
the same person (connectedness has dropped considerably). Even our bodily
appearance, because of others’ reactions to it and our responses to those
reactions, powerfully affects our sense of self, encouraging us to develop one
kind of personality rather than another. Two persons with similar bodies, say
obese bodies, may be influenced in quite different directions depending on the
way they choose to think, yet both may develop differently than they would have
had their bodies been different.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Given
these considerations, what sense is left of the <i>psychological</i> in psychological reductionism? We need not deny any
of the foregoing grounds for assigning great importance to the body’s
contribution to our identity or continuity. Here is my thesis and its
explanation:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">THESIS:</span></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The contribution of bodily features to personal
continuity is entirely of instrumental importance. Parts of a body gain their
instrumental importance from their functional roles. The particular <i>matter</i> constituting a body, and even the
specific <i>form</i> of a body, have no
intrinsic significance for personal identity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> On
a psychological reductionist view, it will be clear that our survival does not
depend on the persistence of the <i>same
matter</i> constituting our bodies. We can see this even without invoking
imaginary possibilities. None of us worry that we will cease to exist within
months or years as a result of the turnover of cells and atoms through the
normal processes of metabolism and catabolism. Even those who believe
continuity of the body to be essential to personal survival do not attribute
intrinsic importance to the persistence of the very same matter in a body. I
will not argue further for the insignificance of material continuity; to do so
would be to repeat the arguments of Chapter 2, “Causal Conditions for
Continuity” and Chapter 3, “The Terminus of the Self.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Although
the substance of the body lacks significance for our continuity surely our
bodily <i>form</i> has intrinsic importance?
If my body suddenly transformed into something radically different, into
something with different kinds and numbers of limbs, scaly skin, five times the
mass, and a frightening appearance, wouldn’t <i>I</i> have changed? Obviously this would bring about a change in me
that I would reasonably count as a reduction in connectedness. However, we need
not grant any intrinsic significance to bodily form. To see this, notice first
that the changes in form gain their significance from associated changes in
function and, second, that we can have changes in form that do not have
associated changes in function. On the first point, suppose that the bodily
transformation happened instantaneously—objectively (a miracle) or subjectively
(I awake from a brain transplant). At first I would be strongly connected to my
pre-transformation stage. My memories, intentions, dispositions, and values
would remain intact, as would some of my abilities. One immediate change would
be the loss of abilities incompatible with my new body and the gaining of new
abilities. My personality might begin to change after the transformation in
response to the form of my monstrous new body. If others feared me or attacked
me on a regular basis, I might become more taciturn, less sociable, and
experience a change in my feelings about my body from positive to negative.
Numerous everyday observations support the idea that the form and appearance of
individuals’ bodies affect their personality. Spotty teenagers tend to be more
shy than those with clear skin; unusually short people may develop defensive
attitudes or seek compensatory achievements; the beautiful may be more
confident or vain.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> None
of this shows that bodily form, in itself, constitutes our identity. My
monstrous, reptilian body functions differently than my former human body. It
is this change in function, and the changes it leads to in my personality that
matter. Without hands with opposable thumbs, I will lose the ability to
accomplish certain tasks: the change in form brings a change in function. If
these tasks were important to me I will be unable to express part of who I was.
If I could compensate for this loss with tools, that part of my new form need
have no effect on my personality. The old and the new forms do not, in
themselves, make me who I am. Being healthy may, over time, affect my
attitudes, desires, intentions, and projects. The particular form of my immune
system has only instrumental importance to my health. If I can maintain my
health with differently formed organs, then the characteristics that constitute
me remain intact.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> It
may be objected that the form of internal organs differs in significance from
the external form and appearance of my body. In the case of internal
structures, the objection might say, it is true that the form is irrelevant.
However, if my limbs change their form their function will necessarily also
change. I may no longer be able to run swiftly or jump high. Also, as in the
case of the spotty teenager, or when I become reptilian, others will react to
the change in appearance. If I were a model or an actor, the change in form would
necessarily bring with it a change in function. My massive, scaly body simply
cannot effectively present an Armani suit. This objection seeks to collapse the
distinction between form and function, at least in some cases (however that
range is delimited), in order to make us grant that bodily form can matter
intrinsically.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> We
can reply by holding that <i>even if</i>
there were cases where form were inseparable, in principle, from function, it
would still be the function that we really care about. The distinction would
seem merely academic if form and function always were inseparable. If, as in
reality, the two are at least sometimes separable, it seems reasonable to pick
out function as what matters even in those cases where we cannot see how form
and function could be parted. We can reject the objection more firmly by
denying the existence of any relevant instances where form and function are
inseparable in principle. Suppose I am proud of my legs because they support me
well and enable me to move swiftly. A transformation into thick stubby legs
would continue to perform the same function if I relocated to a place with a
stronger gravity field. If the slim shape of my body affected my personality by
being attractive to others (and pleasing to myself), a change in form need not
change the associated function; the standards of attractiveness might change so
that my new, more adipose, shape had the same effects as the old. Our bodily
form, we can conclude, gains its significance from its effects on our
personality and from its enabling or restricting what we can do. The specific
effects of a bodily form and the abilities it gives us depend on our
environment and circumstances. Bodily form has instrumental but not intrinsic
significance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> I
have argued that neither the matter composing my body nor the form of my body
have any intrinsic significance for my identity. That leaves only bodily
functions and abilities as candidates for a way in which our bodies may have
intrinsic importance to our identity. Even here we should be careful in
granting more than instrumental importance. Only <i>some</i> bodily functions have intrinsic significance for identity. To
distinguish these from the others we should note that in saying some bodily
functions are intrinsically significant, I’m saying that <i>some functions that are embodied</i> have intrinsic significance.
Putting it this way stresses the importance of the function rather than its
particular embodiment. This follows from my rejection of the intrinsic
significance of bodily matter and form. Some of the intrinsically important
functions or abilities afforded by our bodies include the ability to
communicate (through gestures, facial expressions, sounds and words, posture,
etc.), to move through space, to have an effect on the world by affecting
objects, to perceive with our senses, and the sustenance of our life and
consciousness. These functions clearly are high-level and their functional role
is characterized quite abstractly. Each of these functional roles is tokened or
embodied in specific physical structures. These complex physical structures can
be broken down into collections of functional components. For example, our
ability to affect objects can be broken down into functional subsystems such as
the muscular-skeletal system, the nervous system, proprioceptive senses, and
energy production. Each of these can be further broken down. Our body’s
energy-producing function can be broken down into functional parts such as
digestion, hemoglobin, ATP, mitochondria, and so on. The particular embodiment,
the occupant of the functional role, has instrumental significance because it
is what actually embodies the high-level function. However, the particular
embodiment, the lower-level functions, lack intrinsic significance for our
identity. What matters to our personal continuity is, for instance, our ability
to perceive the world. In the world as it is, we do this through things like
muscular contractions of the lens of the eye, oxygenation of tissues, the
vibration of tiny bones in the ear, and so on. If the same high level functions
and abilities came to be embodied in other ways yielding the same level of
sensory ability and acuity, the functions crucial to the expression of our
selves would continue as before.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Changes
in high-level functions and abilities, such as our ability to communicate, to
perceive, and physically to affect the world, directly change us. A change in
my ability to perceive or to communicate will affect the degree of
connectedness between my phases. By contrast, a change in some lower-level
function such as the working of my retinal cells, will only affect
connectedness if it results in a change to the higher-level function. If my
failing retinal cells are replaced or supplemented with a synthetic implant so
that I continue to see as before, the change in function has no significance
for my connectedness. The intrinsic significance of changes in the high-level
functions is due to their <i>directly</i>
affecting what I can do and who I am; since they are the top-level functions,
when they change <i>I</i> must also change.
When lower-level functions change, I <i>might</i>
change but may not. This is <i>not</i> to
say that the effects on my identity of changes in high-level physical functions
does not depend on anything else, while changes in lower-level functions does.
Certainly, the overall effect on my identity will typically depend not only on
the change in physical function but also on how I respond to it. Suppose I
suffer a loss in hearing in the range normal for conversation. Depending on the
personality I already have, in response to this change I might (a) become more
assertive in having people repeat things and in seeking compensatory
strategies; or (b) become more shy and unwilling to socialize; or (c) become a
more angry person due to focusing on my frustration. This partial dependence of
the results of a change in physical function on existing personality, however,
does not detract from the intrinsic significance of the function that has
changed. It is merely a result of interdependence of personal characteristics.
Interdependence is just as true of the most purely psychological of attributes.
Interdependence of significance is not the same as instrumentality of
significance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> At
this point, it seems appropriate to note that the distinction between bodily
functions and psychological attributes may not be sustainable in every
instance. It may be that certain psychological attributes or modes of
experience not only <i>happen to be</i>
embodied in certain brain structures and chemical systems but <i>have to be</i> so embodied. Thinkers like
Roger Penrose and John Searle argue that features of persons such as
consciousness may necessarily require the very physical mechanisms that we find
in human beings. According to this view, brains made of silicon or optical
processors would not have these characteristics of persons. I strongly doubt
this view but need not argue it here. I will simply note that if they were
right then some bodily functions (such as neuronal function, or quantum
mechanical effects within synapses) would have intrinsic significance since
they would be type-identical with psychological attributes. In that situation,
we could say that only psychological attributes have intrinsic significance
only if we also granted that some physical functions were inseparable, even in
principle, from some psychological features.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Even
excluding the last possibility, I have granted intrinsic significance to
certain high-level physically-embodied functions which do not seem plausibly or
usefully described as psychological: the ability to communicate through
physical means, to move through space, to physically affect objects, to
perceive with our senses, and so on. All of these functions have numerous and
complex interrelations with psychological attributes and abilities, but are not
themselves psychological. This suggests that describing my form of reductionism
as “psychological reductionism”, or saying that I hold a psychological
criterion for reductionism, may be a little misleading. On the other hand,
these physically-embodied functions are not essentially physical. Although they
must have some bodily instantiation, what matters is the function and not its
particular embodiment. So it would also be misleading to say my criterion for
reductionism was partly psychological and partly physical. Since I do not have
a better term, and the existing one captures most of what I mean, I will
continue to describe my version of reductionism as psychological.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">I’ll conclude this section by considering possible
objections to my denial of the intrinsic significance of bodily matter or form
for identity: What if someone were to insist that without <i>this very nose</i> they now have, they would lose part of their
identity? Or they might insist that being exactly six feet tall was itself
intrinsically part of their identity. Viewed instrumentally, these features
could plausibly be seen to be significant to a person’s identity. Perhaps that
height is privileged in their culture, enabling them to engage in activities
otherwise unavailable. Instrumentally, someone’s nose might matter, perhaps
because its shape reminds that person of someone they admire and so serves as a
constant reminder to live up this person’s standards. If we leave aside all
instrumental and functional considerations, what sense can still be made of
insisting on the intrinsic significance of these features for identity?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Those
committed to the intrinsic significance of their somatic features might try to
turn the question around and ask: “Why hold memories or desires or dispositions
to matter to identity? Can any reasons be given, or is it just a brute fact of
what actually matters? If the latter, why can’t I believe my height or nose
matters without further justification?” Rather than trying to make a
complicated argument in response, it seems adequate to state that, yes, it is a
brute fact. When we ask <i>what matters</i>
in this context, we are asking what is it that must continue for a <i>person</i> rather than an object to survive.
What I have shown is that physical features, <i>in themselves</i>, do not constitute us. They do contribute to our
identity, but do so in virtue of their functions and the way in which we make
use of them. If we make no use of a bodily feature, and it has no effect on us,
then it makes no sense to claim that it still matters to our continuation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Another
approach might be taken by an advocate of the intrinsic significance of the
body. This approach claims that we can rationally attach intrinsic importance
to a particular body because of its <i>history</i>.
Such a claim may be made persuasively by a close analogy. Suppose you own an
original sketch by Leonardo da Vinci. Probably you would not be happy if I were
to take it away and replace it with a reproduction. If you are like most
people, you would want the original da Vinci. We might even suppose that, using
spectroscopic analysis and molecular nanotechnology, I have duplicated your
original exactly at the atomic level. My reproduction contains the same number
of the same elements (and each particle is indistinguishable) arranged in precisely
the same ways. If the original and the duplicate were mixed up, there would be
no way that anyone could tell which was which. Nevertheless, the objection
runs, most people would, perfectly reasonably, want to have the original. The
reason for this lies in the <i>history</i>
of the original. Only the original was actually touched and handled by the
great engineer and artist. By possessing and connecting with the original,
because of its direct causal connection with da Vinci, we are able to connect
with him (even if in a tenuous sense). This is something we can reasonably
value in itself. The argument, continues the objector, can easily be extended
to our bodies. We can rationally attribute intrinsic significance to the very
bodies we have because of their history. This consideration persists despite
the fact that a perfect copy or functional replacement could fulfill all
functions of the original.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> I
am not convinced of the reasonableness of preferring an original artifact over
an atomically exact duplicate. (In the case of informational artifacts, such as
software and algorithms, such a preference becomes completely baffling.)
However, I do feel some affinity for such a preference, and cannot demonstrate
it to be irrational. If the preference is maintained even after one understands
that there is no practical difference, perhaps we cannot criticize such an
unconditional preference as irrational. However, the case of granting special
status to original artifacts (or natural objects) does not support granting
intrinsic significance to our bodies. The feeling that it does arises from a
confusion of the normative and metaphysical senses of “what matters” in survival. Just as I might
prefer to have da Vinci’s original sketch, I might prefer to keep my original
body, rather than having a brain transplant or go through a <i>Star Trek</i> transporter. If I knew I was
to have the brain transplant, I might care less about my future phases than if
I were to continue to inhabit the same body. If I held to this preference after
understanding all the facts of the situation, perhaps my preference would not
be irrational. Nevertheless, the fact that I have the same body, or that I
prefer to keep the same body, has no effect on the actual degree of
connectedness. My body’s history is a fact about it, not a constitutive
characteristic of it. If I had a tremendously strong preference for keeping the
same body, I might not care at all about the post-transplant phase. I seriously
doubt the rationality of such a pattern of concern, since it seems too far
detached from the facts. Even if we granted this concern not to be irrational,
it would not change the fact that I would survive the procedure. I might not
care that I would survive, but I would survive nonetheless. All my
psychological characteristics would persist, and all my physically-based
abilities and functions would persist. The way I feel about the procedure has
no effect on this.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></u></b>
<br />
<h1 style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 0in;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Conclusion"></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Conclusion<o:p></o:p></span></h1>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">In this final chapter I have filled out an account
of psychological reductionism so as to take account of the fact that our
psychologies are physically embodied, and that changes in our physical nature
can have effects on our identity. I have tried to grant the significance of our
physical existence while maintaining the primacy of the psychological or
functional level of our identity. Without this consideration of our physical
nature, and the relationship between our physicality and our psychology, a
psychological reductionist view of identity would be in danger of falling into
a faulty dualism.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> While much of this dissertation has
followed the traditional path of ascertaining the conditions under which
identity is preserved, in this chapter and the previous one I have focused on
ways in which we can change and the significance of this to us. While some of
the examples used in formulating principles for continuous and discontinuous
transformation and assimilation have been imaginary or speculative, many have
drawn on self-transformative practices and technologies commonly employed. Over
the last few centuries, at least in the Western world, and particularly in
recent decades, increasingly humans have sought ways to transform themselves.
No longer content with their given identity, and faced with more alternatives
than ever, we have devised technologies, lifestyles, fashions, and beliefs that
increasingly allow us to transform ourselves—to create new identities in the
image of what we value. Given this continuing trend, and the accelerating
advances in genetics, biotechnology, neuroscience, computing, and other fields,
the normative issues touched on in this chapter—and related questions about the
propriety of altering the natural order—will receive increasing attention and
urgency. This dissertation was motivated by a desire to contribute towards an
improved understanding of these issues.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />
<div>
<!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><br clear="all" />
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<!--[endif]-->
<div id="ftn1">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">I include the qualification
because there will be some persons who will prefer deteriorative or destructive
changes. An extreme case would be one who finds life unbearable and who wants
to die or to slip into a persistent vegetative state where no decisions or
actions will be required or possible.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Martin, Raymond. (1991).
Identity, transformation, and what matters in survival. In Kolak and Martin, eds. (1991).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">This criterion seems
uncomfortably arbitrary. In the next subsection I will attempt to develop a
more useful criterion based on a notion of assimilation of changes to central
characteristics.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Integration comes in degrees, so
questions will arise such as: At <i>what
point</i> has a person integrated a change? Suppose someone undergoes a
horrific experience, an experience too painful for them to cope with. If they
repress the memory of the experience but it still has effects on their
behavior, should we say they have integrated the experience? Conditions for
assimilation will be developed below. Here, I will say that there has been
partial integration, since the experience can have reliable effects on the
person, but clearly the integration has not been complete. Fuzzy cases like
this warn us not to try to force a yes-or-no answer to every question about
integration.</span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Unger, Peter. (1990).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Some personal digital assistants
(PDAs) and portable computers are able to synchronize their files with those on
a desktop computer without any physical connection: The PDA is held near the
computer, they recognize each others transmissions, and automatically exchange
information.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">McInerney suggests this condition
in McInerney (1985), p.200.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Obviously terms like “enduring”
are not precise. As my examples will show, there is no clean line separating
enhancements from supplements. Therefore I do not seek to make my definition
less vague than what it represents in reality.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">In some discussions this is
referred to as “performance enhancement.” See, for example, Gardner (1989) and
Shapiro (1990). However, that usage covers both what I call enhancement and
what I call supplementation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Helvetica","sans-serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Apart from Prozac (fluoxetine),
other SSRIs include sertraline and paroxetine.</span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; mso-ansi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 10pt;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">We could accept mathematical
Platonism without affecting this issue, since persons are not numbers or sets.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in; text-align: justify;">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/4.DOC#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Wilhelm Reich, for example, used
this now widely accepted hypothesis in his therapy. Reich’s “body armoring”
idea suggested that repressed emotions manifest themselves as areas of tension.
By releasing the bodily tensions the emotions were released and experienced.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-41251369514199536722014-08-26T16:31:00.002-05:002014-08-26T16:31:58.945-05:00The Diachronic Self, chapter 3: A Transformationist Account of Personal Continuity<div align="left" class="chapterhead">
<b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 16pt;">PART 2: CONTINUITY, TRANSFORMATION, <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div align="left" class="chapterhead">
<b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 16pt;">AND VALUE<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="chapterhead" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Chapter 3<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="chapterhead">
<b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 18pt;">A
Transformationist Account of Personal Continuity<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">INTRODUCTION<o:p></o:p></span></b></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Part One of this
dissertation examined causal conditions necessary for personal identity, and
then developed a new conception of death based on this. In Part Two I develop
the psychological reductionist theory, but focus more on the effects of changes
in a person on the degree of their psychological connectedness. This part of
the dissertation will move from metaphysical considerations to normative
conclusions about the rational constraints on our concern for our future
phases.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The current chapter begins with metaphysical concerns:
First, I fill in the blanks in Parfit’s explanation of psychological
connections as memories, intentions, and dispositions, by examining more
closely various components of connectedness to clarify their relative
significance and weighting. I have endeavored to be as precise as the subject
matter allows, but without pretending a quantitative pseudo-precision
inappropriate to the subject matter. Because Parfit did not develop a thorough
account of the nature of psychological connections, I argue, he ends up with
implausible normative conclusions. Although I largely agree with Parfit’s
metaphysical views on identity, in filling in the missing parts of his account
I show how we can come to normative conclusions that diverge from his.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In the second, normative, part of this chapter I analyze
Parfit’s view on the relative importance of connectedness and continuity. Then
I set out a <i>transformationist</i> view of
the normative consequences of psychological reductionism. I show that our
degree of concern for our future phases need not (rationally) be proportional
to the degree of connectedness, and that psychological reductionism does <i>not</i> show that life is less “deep” than
we thought (as Parfit claims). Connectedness may be higher than apparent in a
simple counting of connections, and we may care less about reductions in
connectedness that move us closer to our “ideal selves.” I examine the role of
projects, principles, life plans, and a concern with meaningfulness in
connecting us with and sustaining our concern for our future selves.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The metaphysical disagreement in this chapter, then, is
not with Parfit but with essentialist views. Essentialist views of personal
identity (which can be reductionist or non-reductionist) hold that we require
strong connectedness with regard to an essential property, such as a soul, a
brain, or the capacity for consciousness.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In terms of the normative issue, a question implicit in
my position is: Why should we value remaining unchanged? Parfit appears to care
little or nothing for future stages of his with whom he is weakly connected. It
is not clear whether Parfit is saying (a) it is rationally defensible to care
only in proportion to connectedness, or (b) it is irrational to care more than
proportionally to connectedness. Even if Parfit doesn’t hold (b), someone
might, and I will take that strong position as a foil in contrast to which to present
my view.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="DiachronicID"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Measuring"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; text-transform: uppercase;">Part 1: The Metaphysics of
Connectedness<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">MEASURING PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONNECTEDNESS<o:p></o:p></span></b></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit’s version of
reductionism is based on the R-relation: Psychological connectedness and
continuity. He tells us little about the elements of psychological connectedness.
Since my transformationist account of psychological reductionism accepts the
basics of Parfit’s theory but seeks to fill in the gaps and develop further
lines of inquiry, I recognize the need to examine in more detail the components
of continuity and their relative contributions to psychological continuity.
Rather than simply extending Parfit’s discussion, it will turn out that a
closer look at the components of continuity will lead me to conclusions at
variance with Parfit’s when it comes to issues of the rationality of prudence
and our attitudes towards death, as well as providing grounds on which we can
determine the relative importance of various kinds of changes in the self.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Which connections does Parfit identify? In defending
Locke against certain criticisms Parfit suggests revising Locke’s view to allow
in elements of psychological connectedness other than memory:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Quotations">
Besides direct
memories, there are several other kinds of direct psychological connection. One
such connection is that which holds between an intention and the later act in
which this intention is carried out. Other such direct connections are those
which hold when a belief, or a desire, or any other psychological feature,
continues to be had.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit explicitly mentions memory, intention, belief, and
desire, but allows for contributions to continuity by “any other psychological
feature.” For convenience I will often
refer to a limited set of psychological features such as this, but here I will
set out a more extensive list of features, comment on each, and assess their
relative significance. The list of features is as follows:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Memories<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Intentions<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Dispositions<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Beliefs<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Abilities<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Desires<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Values<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Projects<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Memories: </b>According
to John Locke, personal identity over time is secured by memory connections. I
am the same person as an earlier person if I can remember “from the inside”
doing the actions done by the earlier person. But memory alone is not
sufficient to cover all the psychological connections of importance. I might
remember (or q-remember) someone’s past experiences, but I will not count as
the same person if my character is entirely different from that of the person
whose experiences I remember. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Suppose I have q-memories of being Prime Minister of
England during the Second World War. I remember giving dramatic speeches and
taking decisive actions and having the name “Winston Churchill.” If I now am a very timid and indecisive
person and have no interest in politics, I should think that I am not Winston
Churchill. Some of Churchill’s psychological characteristics have survived in
me, but too few for me to feel intimately connected psychologically with
Churchill. The degree of connectedness is too minor to sustain a judgment of
psychological continuity between Churchill and myself. If some unknown cause
actually preserved Churchill’s memories, later sparking them in me, we might
say some part of Churchill had survived, but not the person himself. I would be
too much myself and not Churchill.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Contrary to Locke, I maintain that I would still not be
Churchill even if I lost all my own memories, so long as all (or enough of) my
other characteristics remained intact. Memory alone constitutes a small part of
personal continuity, unless we stretch the concept to include other processes
and characteristics. Memory is often divided into declarative and procedural:<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
If I have all the declarative memories of Churchill I will be only very weakly
psychologically connected with him, if at all. Simply being able to recall the
same facts as another person leaves room for enormous differences in character.
The possession of bits of information need have little effect on a personality,
especially if the information is of an impersonal kind. The same is true if we
include procedural memory. I might start to q-remember Parliamentary procedure
and how to plan a battle or a national budget, yet I still would say that I had
acquired someone else’s q-memories rather than that I was that other person. If
we talk in terms of survival or continuity rather than identity, we would say
that a small aspect of Churchill’s person had continued on in me but so small a
part that it would not be of significant comfort to Churchill’s surviving
friends or family and would not lead me to think that my own personality had
been displaced. The Churchill q-memories would be more of an addition to than a
displacement of my own selfhood. The new q-memories would be interpreted with
my own unique ecology of psychological characteristics rather than those of their
original context in Churchill’s personality. Compared with Churchill, I may
respond to the q-memories with quite different emotions, draw different
conclusions and lessons, and evaluate remembered situations differently.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Memory will seem more important if we stretch its meaning
to blur the distinction between memory and other psychological features. If my
memories of Churchill caused me to start acting like him, then there would be
more continuity of Churchill’s personality. To the extent that remembering a
past action, intention, or belief leads me to adopt those actions, intentions,
and beliefs I will be the person who had those psychological features. However,
while memory may sometimes have some effect of this kind it is not so much the
having of the memory that constitutes continuity but its effect in bringing
about or maintaining other psychological connections that is important. To some
extent we can blur the distinction between memory and other psychological
features if we include dispositions as a form of memory. If I am disposed to
act in many particular ways just as would Churchill (and because of a causal
link to Churchill), I am psychologically connected to Churchill. However, I
will keep memory distinct from dispositions and other characteristics.
Remembering (or q-remembering) a former person’s intentions, dispositions, and
values will not in itself cause me to adopt them because my view of them will
be filtered through my existing personality and because dispositions, for
example, are formed over a period of time through repeated stimuli;
dispositions do not spring into existence because of a memory.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Intentions: </b>I
am connected to earlier person-stages if their intentions cause my actions. The
earlier person-stage forms an intention, say to donate $2,000 to life extension
research, and I now fulfill that intention by carrying out that action.
However, a mere coincidence of intention and later action is insufficient for a
connection to exist. The connection between intention and fulfillment must be <i>causally</i> <i>direct</i>: My carrying out the intended action must be <i>because of</i> the earlier intention. (As we
will see, there can be cases in between mere coincidence and causal
directness.) This causal connection between intention and fulfillment, to count
as direct, will also have to operate internally to my psychology. By this I
mean to exclude cases like the following:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(1) In 1994 Sarah forms the intention to read the
complete works of Aristotle. After a few months of failing to start reading
Aristotle’s works, Sarah relinquishes her intention. In 1995 Brian, who has no
knowledge of Sarah nor any causal interaction with her, picks up the <i>Poetics</i> and proceeds to read through
Aristotle’s entire works. Here, the intention and matching action have no
causal connection of any kind.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(2) Sarah forms the intention to read the complete works
of Aristotle. After a few months of failing to start reading Aristotle’s works,
Sarah relinquishes her intention. Dr. Megalos—a fanatical Aristotle
devotee—learns of Sarah’s giving up her intention. He can’t bear the thought of
this and so imprisons Sarah and coerces her into reading Aristotle on pain of
death.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I hold a modified version of the Conservative
Interpretation of the Widest Reductionist View (CIWR) for changing persons.
CIWR allows as genuine connections some that have indirect or abnormal causes.
The abnormal or indirect causes allowed by CIWR, however, are those (such as in
the transporter case) that underlie or support the typical functioning of
psychological characteristics—such as the way intentions motivate actions.
Neither of the present cases counts as an example of a true psychological
connection. In the first, there is no causal connection between intention and
later action, even though they match up. The later action cannot count as the
fulfillment of the earlier intention; the apparent match is merely accidental.
The second example also fails as a case of psychological connection in the
relevant sense, but it fails in a more interesting and informative way.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Here a causal connection <i>does</i> exist between Sarah’s original intention and her later action
that (in a neutral sense) fulfills it. Her intention, combined with the
peculiar psychology of the fanatical Dr. Megalos, was causally sufficient to
produce the behavior. On the Widest Reductionist View I cannot reject the case
as an instance of a true psychological connection between the earlier and later
Sarah-stages solely on the ground that the causal connection is an indirect or
abnormal one. It must be the specific kind of abnormal cause that is the
problem. I can reject the case because the resultant action is motivated <i>not</i> by the original intention but by the
insane desires of Dr. Megalos combined with Sarah’s desire to live. Neither of
these new desires have the same motivation as the original intention. The
original intention dissipated, later to be replaced by new motivations. There
is no psychologically coherent connection between, no integrated process or
mechanism by which, Sarah’s original intention causes her to take the action.
The real cause of her action is a desire of Dr. Megalos combined with her
desire to live. Her action is <i>motivated</i>
by her desire to live; it is only accidentally explained by her original,
abandoned intention.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The contribution of intentions to connectedness derives
from the significance of beliefs and desires. An intention to take some action
results from a desire to see a certain outcome eventuate (or to be the agent
responsible for some outcome) and a belief that the intended action will bring
about the outcome. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Dispositions: </b>This
term can plausibly cover a wide range of psychological traits and so assumes
much importance as a component of connectedness. Dispositions constitute a
large proportion of psychological traits that lead to action. We can define a
disposition as a propensity to behave in distinctive ways in certain standard
situations. Alternative ways of distinguishing various kinds of disposition are
possible. We could separate dispositions to act, to think, and to feel, though
these are so intertwined that such a set of distinctions will not be terribly
revealing. Rorty and Wong,<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
in setting out their schema for aspects of identity, divide dispositions into
(a) somatic, proprioceptive, and kinesthetic dispositions, and (b) central
temperamental or psychological traits.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Somatic, proprioceptive, and kinesthetic dispositions
include traits such as “deft or awkward, excitable or calm, muscularly strong
or weak, active or passive, quick or sluggish, slender or heavy, flexible or
stiff.” [21] These kinds of dispositions affect both the kinds of actions
characteristically taken by a person and the manner in which she executes them.
If a person is somatically awkward, for instance, she may be disposed to avoid
situations and tasks calling for deft, finely-controlled movements, especially
in public situations. Somatic dispositions, affecting posture and style of
movement, will modify any chosen action, making it graceful, slow, jerky, or
efficient. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Temperamental or psychological traits include those
characteristic behavior patterns that we call virtues and vices: Aggressiveness
or timidity or friendliness, cautiousness or impulsiveness, suspiciousness or
trustfulness, generosity or meanness, prudence or profligacy, industriousness
or indolence, optimism or pessimism. Two individuals may perform essentially
the same action, yet do so in differing ways due to their distinctive
temperamental dispositions. Both of them sweep and mop, but one does so
sullenly, the other cheerfully. This makes it clear why simple descriptions of
actions will be a poor way of assessing a person’s identity. A revealing
description of the action will refer to the disposition motivating the action.
In the household chore example, the first person cleans the floor resentfully
and slowly, the action motivated by a mean disposition that hopes to make other
members of the household feel guilty. The second person performs the same
action swiftly and buoyantly, taking pleasure in efficiently reducing household
entropy and benefiting everyone.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Basic temperamental dispositions commonly provoke regular
and identifiable responses from other people. Thus a hostile, suspicious
individual will typically encounter responses quite different from those
experienced by a trusting, friendly individual. Repeated exposure to these
standard responses to the person’s disposition will tend to generate further
beliefs and dispositions, forming a mutually reinforcing cluster. Our
suspicious and hostile individual will often spur others to back off, hold
back, and keep quiet, leading her to form reinforced beliefs about people’s
untrustworthiness while developing devious means of acquiring information about
recalcitrant persons.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Apart from a disposition’s generating new traits as a
result of other people’s responses, it will also directly lead a person to
develop particular kinds of beliefs, habits, and desires. Thus the pessimist
will develop self-defeating habits and predictable beliefs regarding the state
of the environment, the health of the economy, and their probability of dying
of heart disease.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Clearly dispositions constitute a considerable component
of our overall psychological identity. Accurately determining the relative
contribution of this component of connectedness is complicated by the intimate
causal interactions between dispositions and other psychological components
such as beliefs, values, abilities, desires, projects, and ideals. We will tend
to develop dispositions to action that will further our values and projects. The
dispositions we form will be selected by our beliefs and abilities: We will be
disposed to act in ways that we believe will produce desired results that we
see as within our abilities. The causation clearly goes in the other direction
too: Our temperamental and somatic dispositions affect the likelihood that we
will adopt particular values and projects. Someone of powerful physical makeup
and aggressive disposition will likely place higher value on physically
competitive games, and less on finer, more refined activities than will a
contrary type. Dispositions, being more enduring that most beliefs and simple
desires, will play a more significant role in maintaining connectedness over
long periods of time. Yet, as I will argue below, dispositions are far from the
most important component of diachronic identity.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Beliefs: </b>Ordinary
beliefs are a relatively insignificant component of psychological
connectedness, plausibly to be ranked above only memory (in its narrow sense).
A vast number of our everyday beliefs are transitory, formed specifically for
particular situations and events. Many others last beyond the moment but have
little implication for one’s identity. For example, I may believe that Seinfeld
is the cleverest comedian currently on television, or that Intel’s P6
microprocessors will support faster computation than the PowerPC 501. Although
these beliefs will have effects on my actions, in the absence of special
background conditions such beliefs will have only localized, superficial, and
weakly ramifying effects on my personality.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Another reason for giving the category of beliefs a low
connectedness weighting stems from the realization that many beliefs are
implicit and unarticulated, only becoming explicit when circumstances arise
requiring a stand or demanding some action. Then, the crystallization of an
explicit belief will be heavily filtered through our dispositions and values as
they interact with the particular circumstances. This process indicates that
originally implicit beliefs actually derive most of their importance for our
personality from other traits, traits that play a role in shaping them into
explicit form.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Beliefs can, of course, be far more significant than I
have so far allowed. Many beliefs are trivial, but others are profound; many
are transient, but others are enduring. Powerful beliefs may be simple in
structure but more often are complexes of other beliefs. Such central beliefs
or belief-systems we label with terms like ideology, religion, philosophy of
life (or eupraxophy), principle, and morality. To the extent that we believe in
an ideology or belief-system we will exhibit reasonably predictable
regularities in our behavior, our other beliefs, and our attitudes—all the more
so to the extent that we have ironed out personal inconsistencies and developed
the ability to act on principle and resist errant desires.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
A reservation regarding the degree of psychological
importance to assign to beliefs considered in isolation should arise when we
note that ideologies, religions, and moral systems are not only structured
clusters of beliefs; they also include values, desires, and dispositions. We
tend to talk of beliefs as though they can be cleanly distinguished from other
parts of our personalities because they have long been bestowed this status as
separately existing entities in folk psychology. Yet, typically, they may
actually be merely one <i>aspect</i> we <i>focus on</i> in a complex psychological
characteristic. Someone’s ‘belief’ that God is their savior cannot be
adequately analyzed as a straightforwardly factual belief like the belief that
Arnold Schwarzenegger has made millions of dollars acting in movies. The
religious belief might partly <i>consist</i>
in emotional dispositions such as a tendency to feel guilty, powerless, or
worthless, and in a temperamental trait of locating responsibility for their
life externally.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
So, while we should grant great psychological significance to certain kinds of
beliefs, we should bear in mind their complex interrelatedness with other
psychological components.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Abilities: </b>Oddly,
abilities have been ignored by most philosophers writing on identity (neither
Parfit nor Rorty and Wong include them in their lists of characteristics).
Physical, cognitive, and emotional abilities and skills play an undeniably
sizable role in personality, especially if we focus on the self-phase. Possibly
these writers intended to include abilities under the heading of dispositions.
To some degree this is defensible in that dispositions and abilities are
usually integrated. If I am disposed to do or think X, we would naturally
expect me to have the ability to do or think X: I will rarely be disposed to do
something that I am unable to do. Furthermore, many kinds of abilities are
partly constituted by the appropriate disposition. We may be reluctant, for
instance, to grant that someone has the ability to write a book unless she has
the relevant dispositions (such as a disposition to write for its own sake, or
in order to develop some urgent idea, or for rewards expected upon completion
of the work). Nevertheless, while some dispositions may themselves partially
constitute abilities, the latter class is not equivalent to the former: Many
abilities can exist without one being disposed to exercise them. Also, for any
ability, differing dispositions to exercise the ability can exist (since a
disposition is individuated by a description of beliefs and desires, and one
can want to exercise an ability for diverse reasons).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Not only should abilities be granted a status distinct
from that of dispositions, they frequently influence which desires and
dispositions we develop. We have already seen how this occurs naturally in the
case of somatic dispositions where possessing a particular physiological
constitution brings with it associated dispositions. This relation applies
beyond somatic dispositions: We tend to have desires to engage in those
activities at which we excel or find easy. Knowing that he is especially able
at something, such as understanding and composing music, a person will tend to develop
habits of awareness of opportunities for displaying and exercising his ability.
This heightened awareness of relevant opportunities may be combined with social
reinforcement and reward, turning the ability into a central personality trait,
a trait that organizes and explains much of a person’s activities.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Abilities will appear to be a tremendously important
psychological component, forcefully contributing to connectedness, if we focus
on the short-term of a self-phase. Switching to a focus on the components of
connectedness in changing persons over long stretches of time, this importance
will diminish somewhat, at least relative to other components yet to be
discussed (i.e., values and projects). Over time, old abilities may be weakened
or lost (perhaps deliberately neglected) and new ones acquired. The acquisition
of new abilities, while to some extent influenced by opportunity and
happenstance, will be shaped primarily by the agent’s values and life projects.
As with other components of personality, the causation will run in both
directions: One’s projects will sometimes, and to some extent, be determined by
the abilities one finds in oneself. In less reflective and ambitious persons
abilities may have as much influence on the formation of projects as vice
versa, but in highly reflective, imaginative, and ambitious persons (especially
those committed to personal transformation) projects and values will motivate
the extension of existing abilities, the neglect of irrelevant abilities, and
the development of abilities conducive to personal projects. Basic capacities
(approximate limits imposed by genetic, physiological, and neurological
constraints) will have more enduring but less specific effects than abilities
on the shape and development of personality, though even these can be modified
by projects and values. (In the next chapter, I explore some current and future
technological means that could allow changes even in basic capacities as we
currently conceive of them. Under such circumstances basic capacities can be
treated more like easily alterable abilities.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Desires and
Values: </b>I will consider desires and values together since I understand
values to be a particular type of desire (with important relations to beliefs).
Standard explanations of human behavior proceed in terms of an agent’s beliefs
and desires, so we should expect desires to be a crucial central component of
anyone’s psychology. Obviously not all desires are equal in their contribution
to someone’s identity, neither in their explanation of the behavior of a
self-phase nor in accounting for the character and development of the self. A
crude first attempt at distinguishing types of desires would divide <i>stronger</i> from <i>weaker</i>, <i>transient</i> from <i>enduring</i>, and <i>instrumental</i> from <i>noninstrumental</i>
desires. Stronger desires will dominate over weaker desires and so, other
things being equal, will have a greater effect on the agent’s action. Since the
<i>ceteris paribus</i> condition often will
not obtain, some weak desires may play a larger role in motivating action than
some strong desires. This may occur, for instance, if the weaker desire comes
into play in a more extensive range of situations. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Equally clearly, desires are more important the more
persistent or enduring they are. A desire flaming brightly, pushing all else
aside, on one occasion only to disappear after a moment will tell us less about
a personality than a milder desire whose soft glow persists over years, gently
influencing and moderating actions. The distinction between instrumental and
noninstrumental desires cleanly slices the category in two in a way that may be
implausible: A desire that is intrinsic in one context may be instrumental in
another, and one desire may simultaneously be both: I enjoy hiking up mountains
for its own sake and because it is an excellent form of exercise. Putting aside
these complications, we can say that an instrumental desire plays a lesser role
in our identity than an intrinsic desire in that the former is more a
reflection of circumstances than the latter.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Apart from the foregoing distinctions, we bestow the term
value only on a distinctive subset of our desires or wants. Economists say that
every desire has a value to us which is measured by the next most highly valued
thing we are willing to sacrifice for it (its ‘opportunity cost’). However,
though every desire we have is of value to us in this normatively neutral
sense, we do not and should not say that every desire is one of our values.
Thus, if someone asks me what are my values, they would be surprised and
puzzled if my answer were to begin “lemon meringue pie, a new novel by James P.
Hogan, a sound board for my computer…” These lack generality and multifarious
connections with other desires. An approach to the problem of distinguishing
values from other desires (that many have found intuitively appealing) consists
in a notion that our values are those of our desires with which we identify (in
more than the sense of agreeing that they are <i>our</i> desires). Probably the best known account of what it is to
identify with a desire is that developed by Harry G. Frankfurt.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Since I will be adopting a different, though related, approach to making the
desire/value distinction I will briefly explain why Frankfurt’s view is
inadequate. In doing so I follow Stephen White’s arguments.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Frankfurt classifies desires as first-order and second-
(or higher) order. A second order desire has another (first-order) desire as
its object. My desire to eat chocolate chip cookies is a first-order desire; my
desire that I not have or not act on this desire is a second-order desire.
Frankfurt refers to second-order desires as volitions and goes on to develop an
account of freedom of the will that need not concern us. What matters here is
to see why Frankfurt’s volitions are inadequate as an account of our values,
even though they seem to capture the intuitive notion that our values are those
of our desires that we desire to have. Briefly, here are two arguments against
Frankfurt’s view (I omit arguments showing that Frankfurt fails to solve the
problem of free will that originally motivated his account):<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(1) Frankfurt’s hierarchical view of desires involves an
infinite regress. Although this objection has been couched in terms of a
regress involving the condition for responsibility for acting on a first-order
desire, it will work just as well if we state it terms of making a desire into
a value, since both require identifying with the desire. The objection is that,
on a hierarchical view like Frankfurt’s, for a first order desire to be a value
it must be endorsed by a second-order volition. Suppose one does not have a
third-order volition that one act in accordance with the second-order volition.
In that case one has not identified with the second-order volition, leaving the
second-order volition incapable of identifying the person with the first-order
desire. One may even have a third-order desire that repudiates the second-order
volition; this would also prevent the second-order volition from constituting
an identification. Apparently, on hierarchical views, for one to identify with
(be responsible for, validate as a value) a first-order desire that moves one
to action, that desire must be endorsed at every level by a still higher-order
volition.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
An attempt might be made to avoid this difficulty by
giving this condition for a desire to be a value: P’s first-order desire D is
one of P’s values iff P has a second-order desire to have D <i>and</i> no third or higher-order desire not
to have D. This formally removes the threat of infinite regress. It does so,
however, only by removing much of the initial appeal of Frankfurt’s approach.
The first-order desire can now count as a value even though it has not been
endorsed in any strong sense. The first-order desire has been endorsed by
another desire, but the second-order desire itself may be trivial or, more
importantly, may stand in isolation from the person’s other desires. For a
desire to be a value requires more than it being supported by one other desire.
This account would allow a person to have many values, none of which supported
or cohered with one another. The resort to higher-order desires does not
adequately explain identification; we are still owed an explanation of what
does.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(2) In general our higher-order desires will be closer to
our true desires or values—closer to being desires with which we identify. This
is plausible because a second-order desire is less likely to be unreflectively
given. However, it is perfectly possible for a second-order volition to be as
estranged from our personality as a first-order desire. As White states, “Take
the second-order desire not to have or act on desires that were formed during a
period of one’s life from which one is now alienated (say because one held
religious views which one now repudiates), even when those desires would cohere
perfectly with one’s present desires. This is a desire that one might struggle
as hard to overcome as any of the first-order desires with which one fails to
identify.” [231] Another example would be a superstitious second-order desire
to refrain from making any decisions or take any chances after seeing a “bad
omen.” Though second-order, this desire may be experienced as alien (one may
have formed it in the past), having more in common with a compulsion or reflex
than with a value.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
What alternative is there to a hierarchical view of
identification? How <i>can</i> we
distinguish values from other desires? Stephen White provides an account that I
find more convincing than Frankfurt’s (or that of Charles Taylor). I will
therefore present and adopt White’s approach, modified by two reservations
regarding the details of his account. According to White, values are those of
our desires with which we identify, i.e., those desires that would survive in
“ideal reflective equilibrium” (IRE)—desires having many connections to other
desires, plus our unconditional desires (commitments). Having stated his
conclusion, let me begin an explanation with this quotation:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Quotations">
Suppose one had
complete control over one’s own noninstrumental desires. Suppose, for example,
one had a pill that allowed one to eliminate noninstrumental desires that one
preferred not to have, to add such desires that one wanted to have but lacked,
and to increase or decrease the strengths of the desires in the resulting
set... [L]et us call the set of desires that would emerge, given that one was
aware of the basic facts of one’s motivational makeup, one’s <i>ideal reflective equilibrium</i> (IRE)...
Let us say that the combination of access to the pill described and an
awareness of the basic facts of one’s emotional makeup constitute <i>conditions of</i> IRE. And when a desire is
in some subject’s IRE, I shall say that the desire is <i>in IRE</i> for that subject. [239]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It could only be one’s other desires that could motivate
one to add or subtract desires, or to alter their strengths. One could not
distance oneself from all of one’s desires and then make the decisions about
which to keep, for then one would have no motivation of any kind, no basis on
which to make any choices. Decisions about which desires to retain or eliminate
would be based on relations of support or conflict between desires (just as
some beliefs rationally are accepted or rejected as a result of their relations
of support with one another). When desires conflict they will each provide motivation
for the rejection of the other. A desire will be eliminated if it conflicts
with too many other desires while lacking sufficient support from other desires
for its retention.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It is not the strength of a desire that determines
whether it is eliminated or retained. Someone’s desire for alcohol might be
their single strongest desire in that it most strongly determined their actions
and dominated all other desires whenever they came into conflict, yet if it
conflicted with many other desires (such as desires to be healthy, retain a
job, sustain rewarding relationships) they would eliminate it. White
distinguishes <i>motivational strength</i>
from <i>evaluational strength</i>. In this
case, the desire for alcohol would have high motivational but low evaluational
strength. Not only is motivational strength irrelevant to the elimination or
retention of a desire in IRE, but so is whether the desire is of first or
higher order. Since support is a matter of coherence, there is nothing to
prevent first-order desires from eliminating second-order desires. Consider
again the superstitious second-order desire not to make decisions or take any
risks after seeing a supposedly bad omen. This second-order desire may conflict
with an enormous number of first-order desires and so be eliminated. This
coherentist account is far more plausible than supposing that in IRE we would
retain the second-order desire simply because it has other desires as its
objects.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
We identify with those of our desires that are in IRE,
that is, those of our desires from which we are not alienated. The desires with
which we identify are then those which have high evaluational support. This
account, so far, avoids the problems faced by hierarchical accounts, but needs
refinement before it can adequately make the distinction between desires and
values. Instances of desires that would exist in IRE yet which are not desires
for things we value are easy to find. Consider preferences for one taste over
another. As White states, “These are trivial desires in large part because they
are not connected by relations of support to a significant number of other
desires.” [244] One’s tastes would acquire a different status if they were tied
into a network of mutually supporting desires. “Imagine, for example, that a
taste for sweets, a preference for happy endings in fiction, and desires that
made one prone to sentimentality were all connected by strong relations of
mutual support. In this case it would be plausible to hold that a desire for
sweets, if it were part of some agent’s IRE and supported by desires of the
kind suggested, represented one of the agent’s values… Of course, this is
plausible because we think of desires that make one prone to sentimentality as
raising issues that engage our values.” [244]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In order to add a further refinement to his account,
White introduces a distinction between conditional and unconditional desires by
comparing a desire to pursue acting as a career with a desire to maintain one’s
artistic integrity. Imagine a person with a present desire to pursue an acting
career but who also believes that over most of the course of their life they
are likely to prefer a less risky career teaching. That person would be likely
be ready to change from acting to teaching at the point when her preference changed.
In the case of a desire for artistic integrity, by contrast, a person might
attach little importance to the belief that he might be made happier by money
and fame throughout most of his life, and he might even take steps to bind
himself from changing his mind in future. (White’s example brings to mind
Parfit’s case of the liberal young nobleman who takes steps to ensure that he
gives away his land to the peasants even if he should later become
conservative.) Artistic integrity in this example is an unconditional desire,
that is, a desire that some end be realized whether or not the desire persists.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Unconditional desires introduce a foundationalist element
in the otherwise coherentist system. In eliminating a conditional desire, the
fact that one will no longer feel the desire fully compensates for the fact
that the desire will not be satisfied. But, according to White, this is no
compensation if the desire we eliminate is an unconditional one. Eliminating an
unconditional desire, though one will feel no loss after the elimination, will
frustrate that desire (and supporting desires) since it was a desire that the
state of affairs that is its object obtain in the future regardless of the
existence of the desire. White concludes this means that in IRE conditional
desires will always be eliminated in favor of unconditional desires, producing
a two-tier system in which unconditional desires (<i>commitments</i>) can be thought of as foundational elements. “Within
each tier, a desire’s evaluational strength is a function of its holistic
support. But in cases of conflict between tiers, conditional desires are always
adjusted to support unconditional desires and not vice versa.” [246] White
refers to the unconditional desires in IRE as one’s <i>conative core</i>.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Our values, then consist of (a) those of our conditional,
non-instrumental desires connected to many other desires in a mutually
supportive network, and (b) our unconditional desires or commitments. I largely
agree with this picture, with a couple of reservations. My first reservation
concerns the conceptual device of ideal reflective equilibrium, especially
given White’s description of its conditions involving fantastic pills capable
of bestowing upon us perfect psychological self-constitution. If our values are
those of our desires that would exist in IRE, and IRE is a purely hypothetical
situation, how are we to discover our values in the real world? Do we really
want to demarcate our values by means of a device that is not available to us?
A slight reinterpretation of White’s use of IRE alleviates this concern. We can
regard IRE as an idealization of our actual value-forming and validation
processes, and allow that we can discover our values, with reasonable
reliability, without ever achieving IRE. Every actual human being falls
somewhere along a spectrum that stretches from IRE at one end to a totally
unreflective, schizophrenically unintegrated state at the other. People close
to the unintegrated extreme can be described as having many desires but few
real values. The most introspective and self-constituting persons will have
formed an extensive array of confidently held values, though they will always
be capable of adjusting their desires both as they acquire superior
self-knowledge through experience and as they form new desires needing to be
placed into their economy of preferences.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
My second reservation arises from doubts concerning the
defensibility of the clean, two-tiered system of conditional and unconditional
desires. Again, this seems to be an idealization of actual circumstances, in
this case generated by focusing on instances close to opposite ends of a
spectrum of conditionality. Is there really a sharp line between conditional
and unconditional desires? According to White’s description a desire either is
or is not unconditional; but are there any genuinely unconditional desires? And
if we do have unconditional desires, should that protect them from elimination?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Consider a commitment to never lie to my friends. When I
formed that desire I may have conceived of it as unconditional: I wanted to
always stick to that commitment regardless of whether I later wanted to take
the advantages of such lies. But now, reflecting on the desire in order to
bring about IRE, I may see that it conflicts with too many other desires
(including desires such as not to hurt my friend’s feelings through excessive
truthfulness<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>)
and so may eliminate (or more likely modify) the desire. Surely most of our
commitments are like this: Much less susceptible to modification or elimination
than other desires, but not completely immune. In general, further reflection
on one’s commitments can reveal them to be mistaken or oversimplified. Just as
a rational person will hold no belief as absolutely unrevisable,<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
there should (in IRE) be no absolutely unshakable commitments. When we first
form a desire that seems to be unconditional, it may be because at that time we
do not believe we could ever have a reason to question or reject that
commitment. If we have a strong commitment to rationality, then all commitments
will be conditional since they are open to changed conditions; they are
conditional on being reasonable. Our most unconditional commitments will be
those that we cannot imagine ever having good reason to abandon. If
conditionality is a matter of degree, we may hold onto our more conditional
desires at the expense of less conditional desires if the former turn out to be
better supported by our system of desires as a whole.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
If unconditionality is <i>not</i> a matter of degree, it won’t always be true that conditional
desires will be adjusted to accommodate unconditional desires regardless of
their relative degrees of systemic support. We may think of a desire as
unconditional when we form it, but later eliminate it in favor of conditional
desires when we come to see that the unconditional desire was based on
misunderstanding or conflicts with what we now want. Given this adjustment to
White’s picture, I will adopt the account as a plausible explanation of the
distinction between values and other desires. Knowing what should count as
values will be important in measuring connectedness, both because of the
central importance of our values in our psychology and because of their role in
the formation of personal projects.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Projects: </b>Projects
play a leading role in my account of psychological connectedness and
continuity. In addition to this section, I will discuss projects further
throughout the rest of the chapter, examining how they interrelate with our
ideal self, our life plans, our values, and our sense of significance or
meaning. We can begin to understand the nature and importance of projects by
starting with the following definition offered by Loren Lomasky (in the context
of developing a theory of the grounding of rights):<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Quotations">
Some ends are not once-and-for-all acknowledged and then
realized through the successful completion of one particular action. Rather,
they persist throughout large stretches of an individual’s life and continue to
elicit actions that establish a pattern coherent in views of the ends
subserved. Those which reach indefinitely into the future, play a central role
within the ongoing endeavors of the individual, and provide a significant
degree of structural stability to an individual’s life, I call <i>projects</i>.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Lomasky describes an “Indiscriminate Evaluator” as
someone who is open to motivation from one source at T<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">1</span> and from a wildly disparate source at T<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">2</span>. “Various
short stretches of his life, taken individually, would exhibit purposive
activity, but the life as a whole would exhibit no coherence of practical
activity... Being an Indiscriminate Evaluator would be like a heightened and
interminable adolescence.” [32] The possession of personal, life-shaping
projects is not a given feature of personal identity, unlike the possession of
desires, memories, or somatic dispositions, for instance. It is perfectly
possible to be an Indiscriminate Evaluator and, indeed, something very close to
this is a good description of most children and many adolescents. Whereas we
all have desires, memories, and various dispositions, being a purposive project
pursuer requires periods of reflection in which values are adopted and
means-ends reasoning undertaken. Just how far anyone goes in becoming a
purposive project pursuer is up to them; the spectrum ranges from the
diachronically chaotic behavior of the Indiscriminate Evaluator to the highly
structured life of one who holds unswervingly to projects, never forgetting her
plans nor acting inconsistently.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The project pursuer’s preferences not only reflect responses
to particular situations as they arise, but also the different kinds of lives
possible for her.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Because of our ability to conceive of our
existence over time, we are able to form preferences with a far wider scope
than can be satisfied by particular actions in individual situations. The
preferences with the broadest scope will be those for one sort of life over
another. For one who has formed projects, it will be impossible to explain much
of her behavior without first understanding her projects. Coming to understand
her projects will enable us to discover the order supervening on her actions
over time. Note the order of priority here in explaining a person’s behavior:
Projects are explanatorily prior to individual actions. We may be unable to fathom
the significance of a particular action to the agent until we discern the
project that motivated it. We can explain specific actions by referring to
projects, but we cannot understand someone’s projects simply by pointing to her
actions one at a time.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
What is the relationship between projects and values, as
I presented the latter in the previous section? Projects are plans that
structure activities taking place over stretches of time as long as a lifetime.
They consist of an interrelated and integrated cluster of desires and beliefs
concerned with effective means to the intermediate and final ends embodied in
the project. Given the characterization of values as desires that are
commitments or that have many relations of mutual support with other desires,
it will be clear that the connection between values and projects is an intimate
one. Other than for the simplest of projects (consisting of a minimal number of
desires), the nature of projects as clusters of integrated desires and beliefs
will suffice to ensure the desires involved will count as values. Projects of
any ambition require reflection and planning to construct,<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
necessitating both research and adjustment of desires to accommodate the
project. This kind of reflection and adjustment of desires is one of the
essential ways in which desires acquire the status of values. Some projects,
such as learning to juggle, may not involve commitments or values. Our more
significant projects (those I am concerned with here) typically will embody
those relatively unconditional desires that, following White, I am calling
commitments, or at least a well-integrated complex of values, desires, and
beliefs. Consider, for example, a person who organizes and encourages support
for private efforts to develop and construct space launch and habitation
systems. In addition to practical reasoning regarding how to excite more people
about the idea, how to generate funding, and which research to focus on, her
project may embody commitments to values such as political independence and
individual involvement, expansion of the human race beyond the confines of one
planet, exploration of new frontiers, and optimism.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In terms of their contributions to personal continuity,
are values primary and projects secondary, or vice versa? From one point of
view values appear to be primary in that projects are formed in order to put
values (especially commitments) to work. From this perspective, projects and
the activities they enjoin are explainable in terms of their constituent
values, giving values the greater significance in determining how a person
lives her life. However, the structuring of clusters of values to form projects
generates a supervenient order. (In the section focusing on life plans, I will
explore how this supervenient order adds “meaningfulness” to a person’s life.)
The economy of values essential to the formation of projects contributes
substantial purpose and direction to a life, shaping behavior over time in ways
that could not be explained by the individual values alone. Furthermore, once a
project has been formed and implemented, it can generate new desires and
values. New desires given birth by living the project may initially be
instrumental desires, but some will come to acquire intrinsic aspects. For
instance, someone whose project involves great physical effort may realize that
a stoic attitude towards discomfort and pain will advance her goals; once she
has internalized this realization, altering her self-conception, she may come
to regard stoic fortitude as a personal commitment, something intrinsically
valued.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Finally, I will make the obvious point that not all
projects are reasonable in the sense of being well-considered. Some, especially
weakly formed projects close to being mere fantasies or day-dreams, will consist
of a cluster of desires some number of which would not survive in IRE (or even
a little serious reflection). Such projects involve false beliefs and desires
that would be eliminated once their implications were understood. (A Monty
Python skit comes to mind, in which a mild-mannered accountant tells a
job-placement clerk, with great enthusiasm, “I want to be a lion-tamer!” When flashed a frightening image of an actual
lion, he recoils and abandons his wish. His delusion about the nature of lions
reveals his project to require unexpected courage in addition to the desired
excitement.) Even these unreasonable projects can play an important role in
shaping a person’s life, though we should expect projects whose constituent
desires (and beliefs) would survive in IRE (or extensive deliberation) to be
more enduring and less frustrated by conflicts (both internal and external to
the cluster), thereby having a more profound impact over the long term.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This completes my survey of the components of
connectedness. The preceding survey of the nature and relative importance of
the psychological components reveals that some kinds of connections are more
significant than others. I have isolated various aspects of personality to
determine their relative contribution to overall connectedness, but want to
note again here that, while conceptually distinguishable, in practice some
components will be hard to separate out. This interdependence and internal
relatedness was exemplified by values and projects, where the latter depends on
the former. We can count the weighting for projects to be their contribution to
continuity minus that of values, so long as we bear in mind that projects
cannot exist independently of values. In this section I have examined the
relative importance of the different <i>types</i>
of psychological attribute. A little way into the next section, I will look at
several ways of assessing the centrality of particular attributes within each
category.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="ExtendingPresent"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; text-transform: uppercase;">Part 2: normative Consequences<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">INTRODUCTION<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Up
to this point, in this chapter I have filled in Parfit’s account of
psychological connectedness by examining the relative importance of the various
components of connectedness and how they relate to one another. So far I have
supplemented and deepened Parfit’s metaphysical view rather than questioned it.
For the rest of the chapter I will make use of the elements of this expanded
metaphysical account to argue that Parfit draws mistaken normative conclusions
from his metaphysical account. I begin by questioning Parfit’s claim that once
we accept reductionism we will see that our lives are less “deep” or
significant. Then I define and argue for a view I call Transformationism.
Transformationism is not a version of psychological reductionism; it is an
account of the normative consequences of psychological reductionism.
Transformation diverges from many of the normative consequences Parfit draws
from the metaphysical view I share with him.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Depth"></a><b><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Reductionism
and the Depth of a Life<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit
makes some striking claims about the psychological consequences of believing
reductionism to be true. In the present section, I want to address the claim
that personal identity is seen to be “less deep” when reductionism is accepted.
According to this view, it follows from this that death is less bad and so we
rationally should care about it less. I deny that these consequences follow, or
need follow, from accepting reductionism. Death will normally be regarded as no
less an evil, and lives need be no less deep. Parfit explains that, in coming
to accept reductionism, he came to see death as less bad because his life is
less “deep.” Parfit presents this view as his personal response to
reductionism. He says that others may have a different response and he does not
say this his response is rationally required, or even rationally defensible.
Here are two versions of this view, with Parfit apparently holding the second,
weaker version.<o:p></o:p></div>
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(a)
Reductionism reveals that my life is less “deep” or significant, and rationally
requires me to see my death as mattering less.<o:p></o:p></div>
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(b)
Reductionism reveals that my life is less “deep” or significant, so that it is
rationally acceptable to see my death as mattering less.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
By
contrast, I will argue that (a) is false, and (b) is highly questionable. My
view is that:<o:p></o:p></div>
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(*)
Changing from a belief in Non-Reductionism (or essentialism) to a belief in
Reductionism should not lead me to believe that my life is less deep and should
not lead me to feel that my death is less bad than I had thought.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit
sets out his view in the following selections:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Quotations">
On the Reductionist View, my continued existence just involves
physical and psychological continuity. On the Non-Reductionist View, it
involves a further fact. It is natural to believe in this further fact, and to
believe that, compared with the continuities, it is a <i>deep</i> fact, and is the fact that really matters. When I fear that,
in Teletransportation, <i>I</i> shall not
get to Mars, my fear is that the abnormal cause may fail to produce this
further fact. As I have argued, there is no such fact. What I fear will not
happen, <i>never</i> happens. I want the
person on Mars to be me in a specially intimate way in which no future person
will ever be me. My continued existence never involves this deep further fact.
What I fear will be missing is <i>always</i>
missing.... When I come to see that my continued existence does not involve
this further fact, I lose my reason for preferring a space-ship journey. But,
judged from the standpoint of my earlier belief, this is not because
Teletransportation is about as good as ordinary survival. It is because
ordinary survival is about as bad as, or little better than,
Teletransportation. Ordinary survival is about as bad as being destroyed and
Replicated. [279-80]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Quotations">
When
I believed the Non-Reductionist View, I also cared more about my inevitable
death. After my death, there will be no one living who will be me. I can now
redescribe this fact. Though there will later be many experiences, none of
these experiences will be connected to my present experiences by chains of such
direct connections as those involved in experience-memory, or in the carrying
out of an earlier intention. Some of these future experiences may be related to
my present experiences in less direct ways. There will later be some memories
about my life. And there may later be thoughts that are influenced by mine, or
things done as a result of my advice. My death will break the more direct
relations between my present experiences and future experiences, but it will
not break various other relations. This is all there is to the fact that there
will be no one living who will be me. Now that I have seen this, my death seems
to me less bad.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Quotations">
Instead of saying, “I shall be dead”, I should say, “There
will be no future experiences that will be related, in certain ways, to these
present experiences.” Because it reminds me what this fact involves, this
redescription makes this fact less depressing. [281]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit
argues that when we fear that it will not be <i>us</i> who gets to Mars by Teletransportation, we are fearing the
absence of a deep further fact. When we come to accept, or remind ourselves of,
the truth of psychological reductionism, we see that our ordinary existence
never involves such a further fact. This removes any reason for preferring a
long spaceship journey over Teletransportation. However, it also means, Parfit
claims, that ordinary survival is about as bad as been destroyed and recreated.
I think this conclusion is mistaken. Coming to believe Reductionism does not
and should not diminish the importance of my life continuing, nor reduce the
badness of death. This is primarily because it seems to me that our concern for
our lives is not tied to particular metaphysical beliefs about personal
identity in the way Parfit’s argument requires. I will be brief here, since I will
focus on this point in a later section.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit’s hypothetical traveler to
Mars, upon realizing the truth of Reductionism, comes to devalue their ordinary
existence. Placing myself in that position, I find my response would differ:
Upon accepting, or reminding myself of the truth of Reductionism, I would
understand that I was mistaken to fear Teletransportation—in fact, having grown
up watching <i>Star Trek</i>, I find that I
have no fear of Teletransportation (except for the possibility of malfunction,
a danger that applies just as much to the lengthier spaceship voyage). Also, I
have found that, having accepted Reductionism and having thought about it for
many hundreds of hours, I value my existence and its continuation no less than
before. The appropriate response to realizing the falsity of Non-Reductionism
is not to devalue our existence but to realize that we had false metaphysical
beliefs about what our identity depended on. In the past, no one had much idea
of why children acquired many of the somatic and psychological characteristics
of their parents. Perhaps some thought it was due to God’s will, or to the
passage of a spiritual essence from parents to offspring. Now we explain these
similarities in terms of genetic transmission. What matters to parents is that
their children are offspring of them, not the particular underlying
metaphysical mechanism responsible. Or consider that it was once believed that
living creatures differed from the non-living by possessing a vital force. Now
we know there is no reason to believe in a vital force; life is explicable in
terms of self-regulating biochemical processes and systems. We did not conclude
that we were not really alive; we reinterpreted what it was to be alive, but
continued to find the important difference in the functional differences
between life and non-life. Similarly, in coming to accept Reductionism, we
should not devalue our existence nor see death as any less an evil. We are
concerned primarily with living and not with whether we are reducible rather
than irreducible.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Perhaps these analogies will stir
objections that personal identity is different from the value of children or
the nature of life. In the case of having children, changing our beliefs in the
underlying mechanism that produces children does not affect our attitudes
towards our children because what we care about is the characteristics of our
children and our relationships with them. These are not affected by the
discovery of an unexpected mechanism. But, the objection might go, a discovery
that our identity is not some further fact but is reducible to psychological
connectedness and continuity does matter because we have discovered that we are
not what we thought we were. In the children case, what mattered to us was
unaffected by the change in beliefs. In the identity case, what mattered most
to us (identity) turns out to be unlike what we had thought. Though the
children analogy might diverge in this way, it seems that the vitalism analogy
remains. For the objection to work it must have been rational to believe that
what really mattered was the unchanging ego or soul or self. Once we understand
the person as reducible to psychological connectedness and continuity we see
that what really mattered to us does not exist. Our lives now seem less
significant and death less bad.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This view strikes me as untenable.
Some changes of belief about ourselves will have normative implications, but
this one should not have the suggested consequences. What we really care about
in being who we are consists in our having a set of interests, desires, values,
beliefs, and goals. If these are thought to reside in and depend on a
nonmaterial essence, as in the Non-Reductionist view, then we can reasonably
attribute significance to this essence. If these elements of our existence are
actually separable from our essence, why would be attribute significance to the
essence? John Locke, who divided the person into three parts, body,
personality, and soul, understood this. He believed that if the three could be
separated we would be concerned with the personality rather than the vehicle of
the soul or essence. So if, as Non-Reductionists, we believed that the
nonmaterial essence was what gave life significance, we would be mistaken.
Perhaps we acquired the idea under the influence of a religion. When we become
Reductionists and we see that what really mattered to us all along was our
personal attributes, we will see that life has not lost significance nor has
death become less of an evil. How could it make sense to believe that what was
important in our survival was the existence of a nonmaterial essence unrelated
to our personalities, to our desires, values, and concerns?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit claims that “Even if we are
not aware of this, most of are Non-Reductionists. If we considered my imagined
cases, we would be strongly inclined to believe that our continued existence is
a deep further fact, distinct from physical and psychological continuity, and a
fact that must be all-or-nothing.” Although he does not explicitly say so, it
seems that this purported fact may be used to argue for the rationality of most
people responding to Reductionism by devaluing their lives and seeing death as
less of an evil. I believe that, to the extent that Parfit is right that most
of us are unreflectively Non-Reductionists, this supports my thesis that for
most people it is <i>not</i> rational to
devalue life and minimize the badness of death. Most people are inclined to
believe that they persist through imagined changes not because they believe
they are a thing entirely distinct from their personalities, but because they
do not cling to their current phase. In our unreflective way, most of us
believe we survive over the long term because we place high value on the
process of which we-now are a phase. That is, we value continuity more than
connectedness. When we come to understand and accept Reductionism, we realize
there is no further fact about our identity, but we also recognize that it
makes no sense to be concerned with the existence of such a further fact. What
most of us care about is living, not being all-or-nothing. Thus, becoming a
Reductionist does not, for most people, motivate a devaluation of our lives nor
a diminution in the badness of death. Coming to accept Reductionism will, of
course, have some effect on our concerns. If we believed that we survived the
death of our body, then we may now be <i>more</i>
concerned about death. While the loss of a belief in an after-life can
rationally motivate a change in our concerns about death (and the significance
of life), I do not see how we could reasonably be less concerned about death
simply because we now believe we are not an irreducible, unchanging entity.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
So, on becoming a Reductionist,
devaluing our lives and seeing death as less bad is not rationally required (as
Parfit seems to agree) and, if I am correct about the way most people see
themselves, most people will not have reason to respond in the way Parfit says
he responded to Reductionism. If this response is not rationally required, and
is not rationally motivated for most people, is it rational for anyone? Should
we say that Parfit’s response is a perfectly rational (but not required)
response to a new apprehension of the metaphysical facts, or should we take the
stronger line that this new apprehension cannot rationally motivate <i>anyone</i> to respond this way? I believe
that a good case can be made for the stronger line, but doing so would require
an extensive detour into ethics and metaethics. Rather than trying to establish
the strong position here, I will suggest what it depends on, state my view
about that, then let the matter rest.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit focuses on connectedness more
than continuity, and I the reverse. This is why he thinks the discovery that
there is no all-or-nothing, irreducible essence of self diminishes us and makes
death less bad. In caring about his self-stages to the extent that they are
connected, he expresses a overriding, highly conservative value. He is saying
that it would have better<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
to have turned out to be an irreducible, unchanging entity. The question of
whether Parfit’s response to reductionism is rational then comes down to the
question of the reasonableness of valuing stasis and metaphysical
irreducibility. If we have no reason to place our concern in such an entity,
then we cannot feel we have lost anything when we discover we are not such an
irreducible, static entity. The strong version of the view—(a) above—must claim
that this is the only rational value; thus the discovery that stasis and
irreducibility do not constitute us should lead us to see our lives as less
significant and death as less bad. The strong view requires that it is <i>irrational</i> to value development, growth,
progress, and new experiences. This should be sufficient to dispose of the
strong view. I do believe that rationality <i>requires</i>
these pro-developmental, dynamic values as opposed to the anti-change values
implied by Parfit’s view. That would mean that is <i>not</i> rational to see death as less bad and life as less deep in
coming to accept Reductionism. As I said, I will not take the long side-track
necessary to argue that pro-developmental, pro-transformation values are
rational whereas as pro-stasis, pro-irreducibility values are irrational. I
will not assert that Parfit’s view—view (b)—is wrong. I claim that (a) is definitely
wrong, and that (b) is questionable.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit, and others who share his
reaction to Reductionism, may cease to make long-term plans, engage in
long-term projects, and give up a conception of their life as a whole when they
come to accept Reductionism. If they choose to focus on their current phase
they will indeed care less about death and see their lives as less significant.
But they could have adopted this pattern of concern just as easily while still
Non-Reductionists. As Non-Reductionists we see ourselves as entirely distinct
from our values, desires, beliefs, etc. (not just distinct from our <i>current</i> characteristics). There seems to
be nothing in this belief that prevents anyone from being concerned with the
present rather than with their life as a whole. If a move from Non-Reductionism
to Reductionism does in fact sometimes lead to a devaluation of life and a
diminution in the perceived badness of death, it may be due to other changes in
belief (not necessarily rational changes) that accompany this one. For
instance, when we are Non-Reductionists we may also believe we have a place in
a divine plan and this imbues our life with significance. When we accept
Reductionism we may abandon this and other beliefs, reacting with
disappointment. We may not immediately (or ever) come to form an alternative
framework within which our lives continue to be as significant (or more
significant now that we are no longer mere tools of a cosmic plan). All the
reasons and factors explored in the next section, regarding concern for life as
a whole, or long stretches of a life, I believe rationally ground concern for
our life regardless of adoption of Reductionism.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br />
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Transformationism: Connectedness
vs. Continuity<o:p></o:p></span></b></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal">
When we consider our
future self-phases, when we consider how much of our current rewards and
opportunities to sacrifice for greater rewards and opportunities in the future,
on what basis are we to decide? Should our concern for our future self-phases
be proportionate to the degree of psychological connectedness between our
current and future phases? Are some connections more important to us than
others? Should we give weight to the fact of psychological continuity even when
we have few or no direct psychological connections to a distant future self? Or
should we, like Stephen Darwall and Parfit’s S-Theorists, give equal weight to
all of our future phases, regardless of connectedness? One might plausibly hold
any of the following four positions:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(a) A’s concern for (later phase) B
ought to vary directly according to the extent to which A and B are
psychologically connected (i.e., to the extent that A “survives in” B).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(b) A’s concern for (later phase) B
defensibly may be greater than the degree of psychological connectedness
between them so long as A and B are continuous, i.e., connected by a chain of
self-stages, adjacent pairs of which are strongly connected.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(c)
A’s concern for any (later phase) B (with whom A is psychologically continuous)
ought to be unaffected by the degree of connectedness between them.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit holds a position close to that of (a). He thinks
both connectedness and continuity matter, and says (p301) that he knows of no
argument to show that one is more important than the other: “I shall assume
that neither relation matters more than the other. This is not the assumption
that their importance is exactly equal. To a question like this there could not
be an exact answer.” [301] However, throughout his discussions and arguments
Parfit seems to put far more stress on connectedness than on continuity. He
cares less about his more distant self-stages and, more revealingly, cares no
more for a future self-stage with whom he is not directly connected than he
cares for another person. I will take this strong view as my foil, though
Parfit may hold the following weaker view:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(a*)
A’s concern for (later phase) B defensibly may vary directly according to the
extent to which A and B are psychologically connected (i.e., to the extent that
A “survives in” B).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I agree with Parfit in rejecting a position like (c),
according to which only psychological continuity matters, and loss of
connectedness matters not at all. As Parfit notes, “some reductions in
connectedness might be welcome, or be improvements. But we cannot plausibly
claim that it would not matter if there was no psychological connectedness.”
[301] Most of us would regret losing all our current memories, even if
continuity were maintained (two days from now I will remember only the
experiences I will have tomorrow). We would regret losing some of our desires,
intentions, and characteristics. So connectedness does matter apart from
continuity. Since Parfit does, at least in principle, allow that continuity
matters in itself, he could hold position (b), though his stress on
connectedness puts him closer to (a). If he holds (a*) he might hold (b),
though without emphasizing it.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Position (b) brings out the distinction between the
conditions necessary for a person to survive, i.e., for personal continuity,
and the conditions necessary for a person’s future self-phase to <i>matter</i> to them. Parfit’s own usage of
“what matters” suffers from an ambiguity: We could mean “what matters for us to
have survived or continued”, or “whether our survival matters to us.” Continuity suffices for us to say that
logically or numerically the same person has continued to exist through time.
But a person reasonably may not be concerned about a future self-stage if they
were to believe that their current and future stages would be completely
unconnected, or if they thought they would become someone very different from
their current phase – someone with conflicting and repulsive values. Consider
Parfit’s own example of the radical, revolutionary youth who fears he will
become corrupted into being a satisfied supporter of the status quo. The youth
might agree that he would have <i>become</i>
that later person because continuity would be maintained by a process of
gradual transformation, but his later phase would not have the qualities that
matter in the youthful radical’s survival.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The position expressed by (b) comes closest to my view.
According to (b), your degree of concern for your future self-phase need not be
tied to the degree of overall connectedness between phases and may greatly
exceed it. Going a little further: Depending on our values, many of us will
have positive reasons to have future-concern more than proportional to degree
of connectedness. I will call my account of the normative consequences of
Reductionism <i>Transformationism</i>. To
define this view more clearly, I will say I want Transformationism to express:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .2in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
Earlier
stage A may reasonably care about later stage B more than proportionally to the
degree of connectedness between them; i.e., continuity is significant, not just
connectedness. This is because:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .2in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(i) the person may value their life as a
whole (or long stretches of their life).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .2in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(ii) B may be closer to A’s conception of
an ideal self.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: .2in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(iii)
the person may hold self-transformation as a central goal.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
If connectedness is all
that matters to me then, so long as a high percentage of my current
characteristics exist in my future self-stage, I am not concerned if they
constitute a tiny proportion of that future self-stage. In fact, the longer I
want to live, and the more I want to grow, the smaller I will want the
proportion of my later phase constituted by my current self. My later
self-phase will continue to contain the characteristics of the earlier phase
but will add more and more new characteristics and abilities. So, I want
connectedness to be high, while being unconcerned about my future phase
possessing many qualities I now do not possess.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
On the other hand, if continuity were all that mattered
(or all that need matter), I would not care if connectedness moved towards
zero, so long as this reduction happened gradually and was not because my later
phase was degenerating or fading away. (This is not the only condition. In the
next chapter I will examine the importance of the source and degree of
integration of changes in connectedness. A series of changes in personality
forced upon someone has a different significance than a series of
transformations initiated or at least integrated by that person.) While
continuity alone may suffice for persistence of an individual, it will matter
to us that at least some of our current personality be exhibited by any later
phase (assuming we do not totally loathe ourselves!).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In fact, <i>both</i>
connectedness and continuity matter to me: I want as much of my current phase
to survive in later phases as is compatible with my progress. Though I will survive
if connectedness eventually falls to zero so long as continuity is maintained,
I would prefer some connectedness since I value many of my current
characteristics. If I liked everything about my current self-phase, the ideal
prospect would be where connectedness remains 100% yet my current
characteristics constitute a small part of my later phase because my later
phase is magnificently grander than me-now: My future phase has more memories,
additional experiences, greater wisdom, a wider range of abilities, stronger
virtues, and so on. Since there are aspects of myself I’d like to trim away,
I’d actually prefer connectedness to drop below 100%, but not much below. So
only continuity is <i>necessary</i> for me
to continue existing, but connectedness is desirable too.<o:p></o:p></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Disproportionality of
Connectedness and Concern<o:p></o:p></span></b></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
Before
arguing for the Transformationist normative claims, I will expand on the
metaphysics of Reductionism in a way that will affect the normative conclusions
we may draw. My claim is:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .2in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
Connectedness
often is higher than at first apparent (higher than Parfit’s view suggests)
because:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .2in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(i) some psychological connections are
more important than others.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: .2in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(ii)
some connections are instrumental to others, and behavior, being instrumental
to the satisfaction of intrinsic desires, beliefs, and projects, can change
enormously without much impact on connectedness.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
According to this claim,
connectedness often is higher than at first apparent. (So, to the extent that
degree of concern tracks connectedness, concern for future phases will be
higher than we might think prior to recognizing these points.) If we compared
earlier and later stages of a person, counting connections simply, we may
conclude that the stages are only weakly connected. The later stage, it may
appear, exhibits only a few attributes of the earlier stage. Two factors may
lead us to change our assessment of the extent of connectedness. The first
factor – one already familiar from earlier in this chapter – suggests we adjust
estimates of connectedness by <i>weighting</i>
the attributes being counted. The idea of weighting attributes incorporates
several adjustments: Some psychological features are experienced more intensely
than others; some types of attribute are more important than others, and within
any type some characteristics will be more central to behavior than others.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I will not spend much time explicating these three ways
of weighting connections since I have already covered them, except for
intensity. The intensity of an attribute obviously contributes something to the
attribute’s effect on personality. Intensity seems nevertheless to count for
relatively little of an attribute’s weighting. More important is whether a
characteristic persists over time (as I wrote earlier in the chapter). Under special
circumstances, we might argue, an
intense but short-lived desire might have a major impact on us. For instance,
if we acted on a fleeting impulse of anger, lashed out and harmed someone, the
consequent chain of events (guilt, unpopularity, imprisonment) could lead us to
develop quite differently than in an alternate future. Even such a case fails
to show that the intensity of the desire itself constituted a substantial part
of the individual’s personality. The psychological direction in which the perpetrator
develops as the consequences unfold will tell us far more about his other
attributes (dispositions, values, beliefs) and the choices they lead him to
than about the importance of the troublemaking desire. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The intensity of a belief will typically also show less
significance than the nature of the belief: A strongly held belief whose
subject matter is uncontroversial (e.g., a belief that air is predominantly
nitrogen) will typically have less effect on behavior and personality than a
personal and controversial belief (e.g., a belief that one’s duty is to
overthrow the government). <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Another way of weighting attributes involves adjusting
for the fact that some kinds are more
influential on a personality than others. Since I’ve already examined this in
the section “Measuring Psychological Connectedness” I won’t be detained by the
question here. I will simply restate my conclusions that memories and simple
beliefs as two classes of personal attribute will produce a less important
effect on a personality over time than will attributes in the class of values
and projects. Overall connectedness may be larger or small than we would
estimate if we counted each type of connection equally. If all a person’s
specific memories were lost in an accident, but all of his values, projects,
and basic dispositions were intact, we would far more easily recognize him as
the same person than if the latter attributes were destroyed while his
memories, simple beliefs, and standard desires were retained.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Even after adjusting our weighting to allow some types of
attribute to count more than others, we still need to allow for the completely
individual variations in the relative importance or centrality of specific
attributes <i>within</i> each category.
Obviously some desires, dispositions, and abilities contribute more to an
individual’s personality than others; some are more <i>central</i> than others. We get total connectedness by weighting each
type of attribute, then summing them. We can think of a similar process
resulting in each type of component. We can examine all the particular
psychological features for each component type (e.g., all the particular
abilities), assign each a weighting depending on its centrality to personality,
then sum them. On what basis can we assess a trait’s degree of centrality to a
person’s personality?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
No single standard of centrality of attributes will
suffice to guide us accurately. Five complementary standards come to mind:<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(1) The extent of its effects on other traits; the extent
to which dispositions, beliefs, desires, habits, attitudes, and actions are
dependent on it. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(2) The extent of its contextual effects, that is, the
extent to which a trait is operative in various spheres of life (such as work
and leisure, public and private life) and in differing kinds of relationship. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(3) Persistence: The degree to which it is ingrained in a
person’s character and resistant to change. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(4) The extent to which it dominates other traits when
they come into conflict. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
(5) Subjective or personal significance: The extent to
which the person regards herself as fundamentally changed if the trait ceases
or alters greatly. The person need not have succeeded in acting from it
habitually. The trait may seen as central despite such lack of success so long
as she struggles to develop the trait and she commits herself to changing into
someone for whom the trait is integral to action. These subjectively
significant traits frequently act as the basis for self-evaluation and
concomitant self-esteem.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
These measures of centrality of a trait will frequently
correlate, though this correlation is not essential. A trait may appear central
in one dimension but peripheral in another. A trait might have effects on many
other traits yet always yield to other traits when they conflict. It may
operate in many spheres of life and dominate when in conflict and yet be
regarded as unimportant by the person. This last type of centrality—subjective
or personal significance—stands apart from the rest in that the others may be
objectively assessed, at least in principle.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Some examples of how attributes differ in various ways in
their degree of centrality: A memory of triumphing over an enduring barrier may
be more central than a memory of a visit to the beach. The ability to compose
music may be more central in its effects on our personality than an ability to
stand on one leg for a long time. A disposition to critically analyze one’s
behavior and personality will have far more widely ramifying effects than a
disposition with a more narrowly bounded object. A value of doing good work in
return for the pay may be an important value yet be less significant than a
value that applies in a broader range of contexts, such as a value of honesty
and openness. Projects of narrow scope, such as cataloguing a book collection,
will involve fewer abilities, desires, and values and have far less significant
effects than a project involving the writing of a book or planning on entering
a new career.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
After weighting attributes in these ways, we still need
to take into account the second factor affecting estimates of connectedness.
This involves distinguishing between features of a person that are intrinsic
and those that are instrumental. The intrinsic/instrumental distinction can
influence in two ways our estimate of the actual rather than superficially
apparent extent of connectedness. First, our intrinsic attributes (desires,
beliefs, values, etc.) lead us to take various actions when we believe them to
be instrumentally effective in expressing the attribute. These instrumental
behaviors may change, perhaps drastically, while the motivating attributes
behind the scenes persist largely unchanged. Second, some of our values,
beliefs, and projects may form part of us only tentatively, in so far as they
further other, intrinsically significant, attributes. This means that a
substantial proportion of a person’s attributes might change without a
resulting significant reduction in connectedness, if change is limited to the
instrumental attributes.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
According to the first point, a large change in behavior
does not necessarily indicate notable change in connectedness. As we change our
beliefs about which actions, habits, and practices effectively move us toward
our goals, our behavior will change. Observed changes in behavior of apparently
similar scope can indicate different actual changes in connectedness. Suppose
Bill leaves his job as a computer analyst for the CIA and takes a job lobbying
Congress for changes in the educational system. Bill’s daily activities will
now be quite different. He will make many phone calls and write letters rather
than being hunched over his keyboard. He may dress more smartly. He may travel
more, sleep different hours, and talk about improving education rather than
about how his software will track down foreign infiltrators and “unAmerican”
citizens. We might interpret these changes in behavior to indicate a
substantial reduction in connectedness between his CIA-phase and his
lobbyist-phase. A superficial assessment of the degree of connectedness between
these phases, an assessment that assumes behavioral change must be proportional
to underlying change in attributes, could turn out far from the truth. If we
understand Bob better we might reach different conclusions: Both Bob the
CIA-analyst and Bob the lobbyist display an abiding and deeply felt fear of the
corruption of some ideal conception they have of American society. As a CIA
analyst, Bob thought he was in a good position to help crush activities he
believed to threaten the established order. Later, he came to doubt the
effectiveness of his work, perhaps because he found his tasks too difficult to
complete, or because of bureaucratic barriers to the implementation of his
work. After much thought, with no diminution in the depth or intensity of his
values, dispositions, and ideology, he concludes that he can better promote his
goals if he can change the ideas inculcated in state schools.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
According to the second point, a substantial proportion
of a person’s attributes (not merely their behavior) might change without a
resulting significant reduction in connectedness, if change is limited to the
instrumental attributes. Suppose that Susan, throughout the first 25 years of
her life, holds honesty to others as a value. Suppose she not only claims she
holds honesty as a value but also acts on it with admirable consistency.
Observing her at the age of 26 or 27 we might find her lying, distorting truth,
and covering up on quite a few occasions. It <i>could</i> be that her intrinsic values have changed. She might have
held honesty as an intrinsic value until she was 25 but abandoned it after
that. Still, we cannot infer such a change in intrinsic attributes simply from
her changed behavior. Perhaps Susan never valued honesty in itself. She may
have previously professed and practiced honesty because she thought honesty was
an effective way to show her benevolence, and because she believed that her
desires that others like her and give her breaks for her shortcomings were more
likely to be fulfilled with this policy. She might later have decided that
cautious deceit brought benefits overweighing the risks and that the nature of
her job (giving care to the terminally ill, for instance) required judicious
deceit if she were act benevolently.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The foregoing example involved instrumental values. Since
values form a subset of desires, we can expect that desires generally may be
held instrumentally. If we give up an instrumental desire but retain the
intrinsic desire which motivated it, again we may discount the reduction in
connectedness. Some projects may be instrumental to the achievement of
intrinsic desires, values, and other broader, deeper projects. Even some
beliefs may be held instrumentally. A change in belief may not, in itself,
indicate any significant change in psychology. It seems that holding a belief
in order to achieve some other intrinsically desired end or to maintain some
other important belief has to happen largely unconsciously: It would be hard to
maintain belief in something when you are fully aware that you believe it only
because you find it useful. Yet instances of this suggest themselves readily. A
devout Christian, who tenaciously values faith and obedience to religious
authorities, might adopt a belief (perhaps concerning the age of the Earth or
the authenticity of the Shroud of Turin) because it supported or was required
by her central religious beliefs. The Eurocommunist Marxists of the Stalin era<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
under orders from the Soviet Union frequently made themselves believe the
contrary of what they had been told to believe before. A tricky doublethink
allowed them to believe whatever they believed it their duty to believe,
whatever would bring on the revolution.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Accurate assessments, then, of changes in connectedness,
require us to allow for differential weighting of attributes, and to
distinguish the intrinsic from the instrumental features of a person. These
observations mesh with what I have previously written and have yet to write
concerning the primary importance of projects, commitments, and basic enduring
values in unifying a self. I will note here that sometimes we hold actions and
personal attributes to be of symbolic significance. These seem to fit into the
intrinsic/instrumental distinction rather uncomfortably. We could say symbolic actions
have instrumental importance because they are means of expressing and affirming
particular values and beliefs. Yet such actions often come to acquire intrinsic
importance after a long association with the thing symbolized. <o:p></o:p></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<h2 style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Transformationism"></a><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Transformationism<o:p></o:p></span></b></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal">
My account of the
normative consequences of psychological reductionism—Transformationism—states:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 3.0pt; margin-left: .2in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
Earlier stage A may reasonably
care about later stage B more than proportionally to the degree of
connectedness between them. This is because:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 3.0pt; margin-left: .2in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(i)
the person may value their life as a whole (or long stretches of their life),
that is, they may value continuity as much as or more than connectedness. (They
value being a person and not just being a person-phase.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 3.0pt; margin-left: .2in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(ii)
B may be closer to A’s conception of an ideal self.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: .2in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(iii)
the person may hold transformation (development, growth), as a central goal.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
On the first part of
this view, I will argue that we have practical reasons for concerning ourselves
with our life as a whole: The Self-Interest Theory (S), at least as Parfit
defines it, contends that it would be irrational for me to care less about my
more temporally distant (and so less connected) self-phase. I side with Parfit
in rejecting this view. S holds that continuity is everything and connectedness
nothing in a rational determination of our future-concern. From all of the
preceding discussion it will be clear that I agree with Parfit in holding that
it can be perfectly rational to care less about those future self-phases
sufficiently differing from our current phase.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
However, I concur with Adams<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
when he claims that we can reasonably have a pattern of concern in which we
care about our farther future phases just as much (or nearly as much)<span style="color: magenta;"> </span>as our nearer future phases. That is, our degree
of interest in and concern for our future stages need not vary according to the
degree of connectedness, within the normal variations that occur in human life.
Such a pattern of concern, partially uncoupled from variations in
connectedness, need not depend in any way on nonreductionist beliefs. The
position I support, then, disagrees not only with S, but also with the view
that it is irrational to care more than proportionally to connectedness. This
latter position may be Parfit’s, though it seems more likely that his position
is the weaker one that: it is rationally defensible to care only in proportion
to connectedness. I will take the stronger position as my foil.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This result comes about partly because variations in
connectedness over a life may be less than supposed once we allow for the lower
weighting and instrumental status of many attributes. Even after adjusting for
these factors, we can rationally hold concern for our future phases more than
proportionally to the degree of connectedness. We can reasonably concern
ourselves with our future without close attention to the extent of
connectedness (though an anticipated massive break in connectedness might make
it impossible for us to relate to our future). In fact practically everyone
does this. In practice, we do not know how we will turn out, or what might
happen to us to alter our direction. Regardless, most adult persons (at least
some of the time) show strong concern for their future. Without this, no one
would buy life insurance nor plan their finances for the further future,
including preparing for retirement.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Pointing out how people actually act, a critic might
respond, cannot establish the reasonableness of such action. After all, most
people also believe in astrology, gods, and other superstitions. Most people
have not read Parfit and probably have never considered the rationality of
their pattern of future-concern. This response, perhaps controversially, puts
the burden of establishing rationality on the defender of the standard
practice. We might reply that the burden of proof lies on those who claim the
irrationality of an almost universal practice. But we can do better than this;
we can adduce positive considerations in favor of concern with life as a whole.
This will allow us to proclaim the reasonableness of this pattern of concern
until and unless the critic can refute these considerations.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
To some extent we have to take as given the things that
we care about in a human life. Much of what matters to us about our lives
cannot be found in any single experience nor in a short phase of a life.
Parfit’s view implies that we should care less about persons or lives as such
and more about experiences. It is the nature of the experience that Parfit
stresses, not the life within which it occurs. Susan Wolf suggests that <span style="color: maroon;"> </span>“If the reason
we care about persons is that persons are able to live interesting, admirable,
and rewarding lives,” Wolf argues, “we may answer that time slices of persons,
much less experiences of time slices, are incapable of living lives at all.”
Apart from the experiences we are having right now, it seems that most of our
interest in the quality of experiences is due to our interest in the persons
whose experiences they are or will be. Implicit in Parfit’s arguments appears
to be the belief that we would or rationally should lose no interest in the
quality of experiences if we lost interest in lives as wholes.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
We have practical reasons to concern ourselves with our
lives as a whole (or long stretches of them) rather than with the experiences
of our current phase (and phases closely connected with it). Adopting my life
as a whole as a project allows me to engage in activities and achieve rewarding
results that would otherwise be closed to me. If I concern myself with my life
as a whole I will be able to commit myself to a scholarly or commercial
enterprise that may take many years to complete. If I do not regard the person
who will complete the enterprise as me, I will be unable to take satisfaction
in my tasks since they will lack the significance of being an integral part of
the grand scheme. By focusing on myself as a person rather than myself as a
phase, I gain satisfaction from knowing that I will complete the project and
enjoy the rewards, even though my current phase will not. Similarly, having
taken my life as my project I am able to take on the responsibility of
long-term commitments such as marriage, raising children, and long-term loans.
I can also commit myself to personal growth and development even in directions
I cannot foresee, and I can take an interest in the congruence and meaning of
my life as a whole. I can choose and evaluate my actions in terms of their
place in my life in addition to their effects on the way I feel right now. The
significance of self-concern (rather than self-phase or experience-concern)
will emerge further in the subsection Structuring a Meaningful Life.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Might not Parfit reply that he <i>does</i> concern himself with life as a whole. He merely determines the
limits of a life differently, so that <i>a</i>
life is bounded by the limits of connectedness. This reply cannot work,
however. Parfit does understand identity as connectedness and continuity, so
that a life remains the life of <i>one</i>
person so long as there is psychological continuity. The bounds of a life, for
Parfit, are determined by continuity, while the extent of concern is determined
by connectedness. Parfit therefore concerns himself with person-phases rather
than with a person and their life as a whole.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
For the sake of consistency, I should note here that
although I talk of concern with one’s life as a whole, in common with Wolf’s
mode of expression, I believe these considerations do not necessarily move us
all the way from concern with current experiences to concern with our entire
lives. Long stretches of a life (between the extremes of which there are few
psychological connections) can manifest qualities of consistency,
responsibility, virtue, vice, and significance. In the case of an expected life
of great longevity (especially if we find a cure for aging), it may make little
sense to try to value your life as a whole. You may be unable to conceive of
what you will become or want to achieve in the distant future, other than
perhaps continuing to hold certain open-ended values and tendencies like
self-transformation and self-improvement. In the case of lives of great
longevity, we can interpret “concern with a whole life” to actually mean
concern with the longest stretch of a life within our current experience as
humans.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Parfit<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
criticizes Wolf’s argument from two angles: He doubts some of the undesirable
consequences (such as shallower relationships) would follow from caring about
psychological connections rather than persons. He also argues that it cannot be
rational to adopt a pattern of concern simply on the basis that it would have
good effects. From the foregoing it will be clear that I agree with much of
what Wolf claim about the benefits of relating to our own and other persons’
lives as a whole (or long stretches of lives). Nevertheless I accept some of
Parfit’s criticism of the supposed <i>disadvantages</i>
of caring about people as R-related beings. Concern for people tied to their
characteristics may lead to shorter relationships (if those involved change in
different directions) but this does not mean the relationships will be any
shallower while they exist. As Parfit says “Though such changes may remove the
causes of this love, they do not affect what these causes are.” Parfit goes too
far with this point, however. While relationships may not become shallower, we
can gain other kinds of rewards from the more enduring relationships not
strictly tied to connectedness. We may learn more about people and come to have
a broader concern for our fellow persons.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
More significant is Parfit’s objection that, even if
caring about lives as a whole rather than about R-relatedness has desirable
effects, this cannot show such a pattern of concern to be rational: “It would
be irrational, for example, not to care about future Tuesdays. If something
will happen on a Tuesday, this is no reason for caring about it less. But, if
we shall have to endure weekly ordeals, and could schedule these for Tuesdays,
it might be better for us if we had this pattern of concern. This would give us
a reason to try to become in this respect irrational… On her [Wolf’s] view, the
rationality of this attitude depends entirely on its effects. I agree that, if
some attitude has good effects, we have a reason to try to have this attitude.
But Consequentialism is not the whole truth about rationality. Whatever the
effects, it would be irrational not to care about future Tuesdays.” [832-3]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I do not want to become mired in a lengthy analysis of
theoretical and practical rationality, nor do I think it necessary to defend
Wolf from Parfit. Since I take rationality to essentially involve a concern for
the truth, I accept Parfit’s comments about future Tuesdays. What I dispute is
his application of the idea. To make explicit my view of the relation between
theoretical and practical rationality I will affirm the following statement
from Nozick:<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[16]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
“Two principles govern rational (even apparently purely theoretical) belief,
dissolving the dualism between the theoretical and the practical: do not
believe any statement less credible than some incompatible alternative—the
intellectual component—but then believe a statement only if the expected
utility of doing so is greater than that of not believing it—the practical
component.” It cannot be rational to
believe a false thing because it will make life better. In terms of the
rationality of concern and action, it cannot be rational to hold a pattern of
concern based on a falsity because it will make life better. Does Wolf’s view
require us to do this?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Wolf would fall afoul of the constraints of rationality
if, in order to produce beneficial effects, she were asking us to disbelieve
that the R-relation underlies persons. Fortunately, this is <i>not</i> her argument. What Wolf suggests is
that we care about ourselves seen as persons rather than R-related beings
because this will improve our lives. That is, we focus more on our continuity
with our more remotely-connected phases rather than predominantly on our
closely-connected phases. No denial of the R-relation is needed here. All that
is needed is a denial that rationality requires a pattern of concern directly
proportional to the degree of R-relatedness. Wolf holds that our pattern of
concern, rationally, does not depend on the metaphysical facts (within a broad
range).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
In equating Wolf’s suggestion about
our pattern of concern with not caring about future Tuesdays, Parfit fails to
make a convincing argument. Someone who cares nothing about what will happen on
future Tuesdays seems clearly irrational: We can point out that a frustration,
an injury, a reward, or a pleasure on a future Tuesday will feel just as good
or bad as on any other day. If the person has motivations and concerns remotely
like those of other persons, our points will provide sound reasons for them not
to treat future Tuesdays differently. Continuing to treat future Tuesdays differently
simply because they are future Tuesdays will be irrational, because such a
pattern of concern would be completely insensitive to reasons (based in the
person’s own desires and beliefs). Concern for persons disproportional to
connectedness is not similarly irrational. Why is this?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Our patterns of concern are <i>prima facie</i> rational. We can choose, within broad limits, how to
apportion our concern given the metaphysical facts about personal identity.
Obviously apportioning one’s concern according to how closely a person’s face
resembles a dog’s face will (in the absence of a special story) be irrational.
Although desires are prima facie rational (or not irrational), this pattern of
concern could not stand up to criticism based on the other desires and beliefs
of the person. The pattern of concern defended by Wolf, and practiced by most
people to varying degrees, <i>can</i> stand
up to criticism, and can therefore be rational: It is difficult to see what
kind of serious criticism could be made of allotting concern more than
proportionally to connectedness. The critic might argue this pattern of concern
to be irrational on the grounds that we ought to care about our future stages
only to the extent that they are like our current stage; caring about out
interests means caring about the interests of ourselves as we are right now.
This attempted criticism, however, simply begs the question. In addition, there
are several positive reasons to maintain or form a disproportional pattern of
future-concern.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
A reduction in R-relatedness often gives us some reason
to be less concerned about a future stage, but there are (or may be)
countervailing considerations that can more than outweigh this. I have already
covered some of these and will present another immediately below (in the
discussion of Whiting). To summarize some of these considerations: <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .2in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(1) As
I will argue in the next section, we may care more about our less connected
future stage if we believe we will develop into a better person (according to
our present values).<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[17]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
(Parfit briefly even grants this, but doesn’t dwell on it.) <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .2in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(2) We
can choose to make our less-connected future phases a project of ours, i.e.,
make them of great concern to us. This especially makes sense when we realize
we-now have considerable influence on the way our future phase turns out.
Choosing this as a project cannot be irrational if it does not deny any truths.
(See below on this.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: .2in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
(3) We
can rationally be concerned to grow and change. That implies that connectedness
will fall. We can rationally want to grow into a stage weakly connected with
our current stage. It cannot plausibly be argued that this desire is irrational
while a desire to remain the same (strongly connected) is rational.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Jennifer Whiting<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[18]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
suggests a way in which we come rationally to be concerned with our future
stages more than proportionally to the initial degree of connectedness. By
coming to have this concern we increase the connectedness between our current
and future stages. Whiting suggests a parallel between making friends and
making future self-phases. We care about our future phases, and regard benefits
to them as compensating for burdens on us, in the same way as we care about
friends and benefits to them. When we meet someone and learn a little about
them, we often form primitive concerns that they do or experience something. We
may want them to succeed in writing their book or in resolving a dispute. In
the same way, we have primitive forms of self-concern. We want our future
self-phases to do or experience various things. We may be concerned about a
future phase because of psychological attributes that we believe we will have
in common, or simply because our current actions and decisions will affect the
situation and possibilities of that future stage. We do not really need any
reason at all to form such concerns, just as we do not need a reason to form
desires about other persons. Once some concerns for our future phase have been
formed, we may develop stronger, deeper, and broader concern for that phase,
without necessarily coming to believe that we are more connected with the phase
than we had thought. “We do not ordinarily come to have desires that others do
and experience certain things as a result of having a general concern for their
welfare. Usually it is the other way around; our general concern for a person
grows out of primitive concerns that she do and experience particular things…
My current suggestion is that general concern for my future selves can, in much
the same way, grow out of primitive concerns that they do and experience
particular things.” [Whiting: 565]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Part of what makes our future phase <i>our</i> phase is the intention-connectedness between it and our current
phase. Coming to hold primitive forms of self-concern which then expand to
become a more generalized concern increases that intention-connectedness. As in
the case of concern for friends, “we will think that concern for our future
selves is reasonable if we happen to have it, but not something we are
rationally required to have.” [573] So, while we may not be rationally required
to have concern for our lives as a whole, or for future phases, to the extent
that we have it we will be more connected over time. This result means a
revision in what I said above. As I said there, generally the metaphysical
facts about identity (i.e., the extent of connectedness) is one thing, and our
pattern of concern another. Within a broad range we can decide on our pattern
of concern in light of the facts. However, insofar as that part of our
connectedness constituted by intention-connectedness results from primitive
forms of self-concern and the more general concern that grows from it, the
distinction between the relationship between present and future phases on the
one hand, and our concern for them on the other, will wane.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The second element of Transformationism says that we may
reasonably care about our later phases more than proportionately to
connectedness when our later phase is closer to our conception of an ideal
self. The concept of an ideal self or ideal identity is itself an idealization.
Most of us have at least a few wishes about the kind of person we wish we were
or want to become. Fewer of us have a thoroughly developed idea of exactly
which current attributes we want to throw off, modify, or acquire. Practically
every thinking person has constructed at least a sketch of their ideal self.
This need not be any kind of moral ideal: While one person may seek to become
more empathic another may dream of becoming more destructive or intimidating.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Since “ideal identity” has recently been used in a sense
differing from mine in a recent paper by Rorty and Wong<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[19]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>,
I will first clarify my meaning by contrasting it with an alternative. Rorty
and Wong note that “A person’s ideal
identity sets directions for the development of central traits. Sometimes this
involves imitating an idealized figure—an Eleanor Roosevelt or a Mahatma
Gandhi. Sometimes it is envisioned from the acceptance of moral principles or
ideology.” [23] So far our usage agrees, but then they write: “Of course, a
person can appropriate many different, sometimes conflicting ideals, she need
not always be aware of her operative ideal identifications, and need not always
approve of those that are actually functioning.” [24] According to this usage,
we may hold an ideal or be influenced by an ideal even though we do not or
would not evaluate that ideal positively. Ideal, in this sense, refers to an
effective template or model of behavior, a model that we may be unaware of and
may not have chosen. I have no objection to this usage but restrict my own use
of “ideal identity” to models of personality of which the individual approves.
(You need not be aware of how you acquired the ideal, and might even doubt or
relinquish the ideal if you were to realize how you absorbed it.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Making use of a device from earlier in this chapter, we
might say that a person’s ideal identity or ideal self would have all and only
those desires that they would retain in Ideal Reflective Equilibrium—those
desires that are our values plus any other desires not conflicting with them.
In addition to these desires, an ideal self would have those additional
abilities and dispositions we desire. Our ideal identity affects the direction
of development of our central personality traits. An ideal self need be no more
than the sum of a person’s specific ideals. The ideal self is what that person
would be like if they were to realize each of their ideals. Such a person may
not explicitly have an overall conception of an ideal self, or regard the shaping
of an ideal self as a project. In this case, the ideal self is constructed from
the projects and other attributes one has, rather than the other way around.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Others may have an ideal self in a stronger sense.
Actualizing our ideal self may be one of our projects. The project of becoming
our ideal self will encompass more specific projects and other personal
characteristics. As a project in itself, it will act as a filter on what other
projects we pursue. The relationship between the ideal self-project and other
projects is not a simple superordinate/subordinate one, since the latter will
have a major role in determining the shape of the ideal self. However, an ideal
self as a project, rather than merely the sum of specific ideals, will have
some independent shaping power. It will at least tend to seek coherence and
congruence between our specific ideals. It may even lead to us creating or
realizing new ideals, or to modifying or abolishing existing ones. The project
of becoming our ideal self, in so far as we have such a project, contributes to
our interest in long stretches of our life. Becoming our ideal is likely to be
a project to occupy us over many years. In struggling to succeed in this
project our ideal identity will affect both the kinds of actions we perform and
the way in which we perform them. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Many people, having formed an image of an ideal self,
fantasize about it without seriously attempting to forge themselves into that
ideal. In these cases, the ideal self will have little or no effect on the
direction in which we change, nor on how much we change. Even if we commit
ourselves to transforming into our ideal we may find we are unable to fully
realize it because the attributes it requires cannot be integrated with the
rest of our character. The impossibility or great difficulty of making
ourselves into our ideal still leaves it as a powerful contributor to our
identity. Our sense of ourselves can still be strongly influenced by our
continual striving toward our ideal. An ideal of great wisdom, for example, can
show itself in efforts taken to learn from experience, to broaden experience,
to develop listening skills, and so on.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
To whatever extent we have formed an
ideal self-conception, we will have another reason for apportioning our
future-concern disproportionally to the expected degree of psychological
connectedness. Tying concern tightly to connectedness would promote stagnation
and passivity. In Parfit’s thought experiments, the individuals facing
decisions about how much to sacrifice for their future phases seem always to be
passive subjects being acted on by other people. In actuality, an agent is not
just an integrated grouping of psychological features but an active chooser and
self-creator. Parfit, true to his utilitarian tendencies, appears much more
interested in an agent’s experiences rather than in their active aspect which
forms ideals and seeks change and growth. If we have some conception of an
ideal self and believe we shall move towards that ideal, we can reasonably more
than proportionally be concerned with our future, more ideal self-phases. The
reverse is also true:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Imagine two scenarios for your
future self of several decades in the future. In both cases let us say that you
have undergone many changes, maintaining 40% of your current attributes (after
weighting). In the first scenario, you improve greatly over the years, shedding
characteristics you find ignoble or incongruent while acquiring many of the
dispositions, abilities, and characteristics that you desire. In the second
scenario, you go into a decline, gradually losing much of your good nature,
many of your abilities atrophying through neglect, while developing qualities
the thought of which now makes you shudder. In both cases your current and
later stages share 40% of their attributes. Nevertheless, it seems clear that
you will feel far more willing to restrict current consumption and invest in
yourself if you believe the first scenario rather than the second will become
actual. So, depending on whether we believe ourselves to be getting stronger
and better, or weaker and more corrupt, we will be more or less concerned with
protecting the interests of our future selves than would be suggested by
concern proportional to connectedness.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
To head off a possible misinterpretation
of my position I will clarify a point: Valuing attribute A and disvaluing
attribute B does not, in itself, make A’s continuation in me a greater
contributor to my connectedness. The degree of connectedness of my phases is an
objective matter. The future stage that you dislike is just as much a stage of
you as the one you like; the difference affects the degree to which you will
reasonably feel concern for a future stage, and not how connected your present
and future stages are. The disvalued trait still has its effects on my actions,
constraining or encouraging other attributes with which it interacts. Each of
my attributes contributes to me identity: those I approve of, those I
disapprove of, and those about which I am indifferent or unaware. Disvaluing B
does mean that I will care less about losing it than if I were to lose A. So,
while the extent to which I value or disvalue an attribute does not, in itself,
affect its contribution to connectedness, it does affect the extent to which I
see a given degree of reduction in connectedness as a loss or as reducing my
future-concern.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Despite this, there <i>is</i> a sense in which disvaluing an
attribute can reduce its contribution to connectedness. An attribute that I
disvalue will presumably conflict with many other characteristics of myself,
whereas an attribute that I favor will cohere with many other values and
beliefs. These desires, beliefs, and values may frequently be expressed
together in a mutually reinforcing complex. Thus the disvalued attribute, though
equal to a valued attribute in terms of intensity, may have less effect on my
life because its effects are damped by countervailing actions resulting from
opposing beliefs and values. These other beliefs, desires, and values may
motivate me to block actions based on the unwanted attribute, avoid situations
that encourage its manifestation, and search out ways of extirpating it. So
long as and to the extent that an unwanted attribute is part of my personality
it is an element of connectedness. We cannot discount that contribution simply
because we disvalue it, though our disapprobation will tend to motivate us to
reduce its effect on our personality over time.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
A third way in which concern for future stages may be
more than proportional to connectedness arises when we hold transformation of
self as an ideal. Desiring self-transformation, or holding it as a project, can
allow us to undergo more extensive change while preserving what matters to us.
Though positive self-transformation will move us towards our ideal identity,
the effects of valuing self-transformation go beyond those considered in my
discussion of ideal identity above. The major point about losing connectedness
as we move towards our ideal identity was that we may maintain a high degree of
concern for our weakly-connected, but more ideal, future phases. Perhaps we
have a definite view about the kind of person we will become. If we believe we
will come to develop specific desirable new traits, or strengthen desirable
existing traits, our future-concern will be affected little if at all by
recognizing the fairly weak connection between our current and future phases.
On the other hand, we may have little idea of the direction of our future
development. We may believe we will change in ways not now foreseeable, on the
basis of experiences new to us. Our projection of a more ideal self may lack
specifics and be based solely or primarily on our confidence that we will
continue to remedy our faults and weaknesses and seek out new and better ways
of being. In this case we are not maintaining our future-concern in the face of
reduced connectedness as a result of expecting to become the kind of person who
better exemplifies the values we <i>now</i>
hold. Rather, we value the process of self-transformation, partly tying our
concern to the process. We maintain strong concern for our future phases,
despite lack of knowledge or belief about their particular nature, because we
value a progressive pattern for our life as a whole and not just particular
attributes. We value (positively) transforming, not just becoming a particular
kind of person. The more strongly we value self-transformation compared to
valuing specific attributes, the more we are likely to maintain our
future-concern in the face of substantial anticipated reduction in
connectedness.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
“Valuing self-transformation” might mean two things
which, though they overlap, will have different effects. We can take that
phrase to mean that we simply desire self-transformation; the prospect is
pleasing. Or we can take it to mean we hold self-transformation as a personal
project, a process we engage in, and whose effects ramify throughout our
activities. Merely desiring self-transformation passively will be sufficient
for us to hold strong concern for future phases which we believe will be more
developed.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[20]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Such a desire will still promote change by making us more aware of alternative
behaviors and attributes. We will identify less with our current attitudes.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Here"></a> Adopting personal transformation as
a project goes well beyond this. It means not only looking forward to positive
change and being willing to recognize the desirability of new ways of being. It
means actively designing a plan of personal growth, actively seeking out
unknown and untried personal attributes, and exerting oneself to implement and
integrate these discoveries. Self-transformation will lead to more personal
change and so may cause a faster reduction in connectedness (if attributes are
being changed, not just supplemented). Of course, the project of self-transformation
itself is an element of connectedness, so its own existence will partly
compensate for the reduction in other connections it causes. However, it seems
reasonable to expect such a project to lead to a greater overall decline in
connectedness compared with a situation where self-transformation is not a
project for someone. The more heavily we weight self-transformation as a
value/project, the more its persistence will compensate for the weakening of
other connections it results in. We might begin to estimate
self-transformation’s contribution to connectedness by breaking it down into
its component attributes. Self-transformation as a value/project is composed of
other attributes, such as inquisitiveness, a disposition towards novelty, a
valuing of growth and improvement, a preference for progress over stagnation,
and a tolerance of uncertainty rather than a desire for the security of the
familiar. (Here I’m obviously only talking about self-transformation motivated
by constructive values. Self-transformation may also be motivated by
self-loathing and a desire to <i>escape</i>
from one’s current personality.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Though connectedness between current and future phases
will be lower if self-transformation is held as a project (compared to having
it merely as a desire or not being interested in it at all), our concern for
our future stages, and interest in our lives as a whole, will be higher.
Holding self-transformation as a central project will lead us to assign a more
tentative importance to the persistence of most of our attributes. By this, I
do not mean we will necessarily think our current attributes less important or
real. Rather, we will be ready to reevaluate them and to relinquish or modify
them. Incorporating into our lives a commitment to positive self-transformation
means we will more readily recognize other valuable attributes we don’t yet
possess; we will seek out and welcome improvements in our character and
capabilities; we will tend to be more constructively critical in evaluating our
current attributes. This project, in making us more self-aware and
self-critical of our current phase, encourages us to apportion our concern less
according to our current constitution and more based on our life as a whole as
it exhibits the process of development, maturation, improvement, and
exploration. This leads me to a consideration of the relationships between how
we structure our lives over the long term with projects, principles, and
values, and how this structuring allows our lives to cohere as a meaningful whole,
rather than as a meaningless succession of experiences.<o:p></o:p></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto; text-transform: uppercase;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="MeaningfulLife"></a><b><span style="font-size: 16.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; text-transform: uppercase;">Continuity and Structuring a Life<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Life Plans<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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Earlier,
I addressed Parfit’s claim that Reductionism makes us see human lives as less
deep. His claim might be taken in another way: to imply that life is less
meaningful than on a Non-Reductionist view. Parfit believes our lives to have
less depth and death to be less bad according to Reductionism. If
meaningfulness were unaffected by Reductionism, we should expect life to retain
its depth and death its full measure of evil. In addressing the issue of
meaningfulness I am showing, in another way, how my interpretation of
Psychological Reductionism differs from Parfit’s. Another reason for looking at
the issue of meaning is that it illuminates further, according to
Transformationism, the relation between our choices, the structure of our
diachronic identity, and our pattern of concern for our selves over time. The
account of meaningfulness presented here will cohere effectively with my
emphasis on a more dynamic conception of the self than has typically been
suggested by Reductionists. Part of my account in this section owes a great
deal to Robert Nozick’s treatment in <i>Philosophical
Explanations</i>. I will begin with his summary of some conditions for a life
to be meaningful:<o:p></o:p></div>
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“This is recognizable
as what some have meant by a meaningful life (1) a life organized according to
a plan and hierarchy of goals that integrates and directs the life, (2) having
certain features of structure, pattern, and detail that the person intends his
life to have (3) and show forth; he lives transparently so others can see the
life plan his life is based upon (4) and thereby learn a lesson from his life,
(5) a lesson involving a positive evaluation of these weighty and intended features
in the life plan he transparently lives. In sum, the pattern he transparently
exemplifies provides a positive lesson.”<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[21]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
[578]<o:p></o:p></div>
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The
first characteristic we are likely to expect to see in a meaningful life is
some kind of order, structure, or coherence. By this I intend a degree of order
or structure beyond the minimum sufficient to allow psychological continuity.
Consider a person with memories, desires, beliefs, and values, but no real
long-term projects, no conception of an ideal self, and little or no concern
for the future or for goals beyond the most narrowly personal. Such a person
might retain much the same personality throughout their life, or they might
gradually change in a way that preserves continuity. While sufficient for
continuity, such a life would lack much meaning or significance. This person
does not conceive of an ideal self or make its creation a project, and the
changes or lack of changes in their personality are accidental. They do not
organize their life or give it integrated form. They follow their desires in
the situations they face, without any plan or scheme. In terms of the shape of
their life and the directions they take, they are reacting to circumstances
rather than seeking out, choosing, channeling, and controlling change (or
stability).<o:p></o:p></div>
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Meaningful lives result, in part,
from a self-conscious ordering of ourselves and our activities. Some
philosophers have written of “unified
agency”,<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[22]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
which they contrast with a mere bundle of individual desires or preferences.
Meaningfulness requires a reasonable degree of unified agency, though it may
not be as highly developed as expressed by Rawls’ conception of a rational life
plan. A unified agent is one who has been able to examine conflicting
individual preferences dispassionately and come to an all-things-considered
preference. The person who plans their life not only deliberates on various
considerations as they arise in particular situations, but also considers the
differing kinds of lives possible for them. As Darwall notes, “As beings who
can reflect on ourselves as perduring through time, we form preferences with
much wider scope than those we are likely to be able to satisfy by specific
actions in specific situations. In the limiting case we may prefer to lead one
kind of life rather than another. When such preferences are informed and
all-things-considered preferences, they provide a rational framework within
which we may pursue our lives in various situations as they arise.” [104]<o:p></o:p></div>
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As I noted, Rawls’ conception of a
rational life plan is an idealization, yet his view is an ideal form of the
process undergone by people with meaningful lives. (I will explain below why a
rational life plan is not <i>sufficient</i>
for meaningfulness.) Rawls conception of a rational life plan has two general
conditions: (1) A plan requires not only a preference ordering of the ends to
be achieved but also an idea of how those ends are to be achieved. Means and
ends must be rationally related so that one plan is preferred to another if it
achieves more ends, at less cost, more quickly. (2) A rational life plan is one
for which the person would have an informed, all-things-considered preference.
That is, a plan chosen bearing in mind relevant facts and considering
consequences so far as they are foreseeable. A rational life plan will mitigate
conflict between our preferences and foster preferences that are mutually
supporting and reinforcing. The plan will rule out intransitivity of
preferences as well avoiding inconsistencies such as when someone approves of
an activity because it embodies characteristic C while disapproving of another
activity embodying C.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Intrinsic preferences may cohere not
just by avoiding incoherence, but positively by complementing or mutually
supporting each other. One way for this to happen is when something is
preferred both intrinsically and instrumentally, such as when we work both
because of the pay and because we enjoy the activity. Darwall (p.109) suggests
another kind of mutual support: “two intrinsic preferences may support each
other if what one finds intrinsically desirable about both are the same or
similar aspects. One obvious case of this is when one thing is intrinsically
preferred because it has properties that specify more general aspects that one
finds intrinsically desirable. An example would be specific individual
preferences for distance running and cross-country skiing, both of which
specify and support a preference for moving through nature in an autonomous and
self-propelled way. The more specific and general preferences support each
other in the sense that finding the more specific activities intrinsically
desirable supports one’s sense that the general sort of activity is, and
conversely.”<o:p></o:p></div>
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It is worth noting, given the
perhaps rationalistic sound of this discussion, that life plans need not be
sensible or based on true or even rational beliefs in order to support a sense
of meaning in a life. Many people find their lives meaningful despite basing or
filtering much of their activity on a religious or otherwise delusive system.
Of course, grounding the meaning of one’s life on a belief that one is the
servant of Jehovah or Allah, or part of a cosmic process of a divine
reawakening, runs the risk that reality will intrude and demolish the
foundation of meaningfulness.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Reality-based or not, life plans
consist of an ordered group of projects, desires, principles, and actions. To
the extent we adopt such a plan we are actively considering ourselves less as
person-stages and more as enduring selves. Persisting memories, disposition,
desires, and beliefs may suffice for us to feel concern for our future
self-stages, but our future-concern will be stronger when we focus on the shape
of our life as a whole (or long stretches of our life). By developing a life
plan and ordering our activities according to it, we are partially creating the
structured self persisting over time. By focusing on the shape of our life we
not only come to be more concerned with our future stages but also create a
more structured relation between stages. Another way of adding structure to a
life, (perhaps as part of a plan) is to adopt principles.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Principles:<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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Adherence to principles
constitutes another way of structuring oneself over time. Principles provide a
means of defining ourselves, of being able to answer the question: “Who are
you?” We can answer: “I am a person who embodies forthrightness,
reasonableness, inventiveness, justice…” Principles, by marking boundaries,
serve an invaluable function if we want to be a certain kind of person. Situations
often admit of many possible responses, a range of which we may find
acceptable. Without principles we can easily slide, bit by bit, from acceptable
actions to unacceptable actions because there is no obvious stopping point.
Well-considered principles allow us to draw a line across the path of a gradual
slope of possible actions. Even if, prior to committing to a principle, there <i>is</i> an obvious stopping point, we may
believe ourselves unable to draw a line there. For instance, if we think it
impossible to <i>never be late</i>, we may
instead create a principle <i>if I’m late on one occasion I’ll be early
the next time</i>.<o:p></o:p></div>
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In this section I will mostly discuss principle as a
structuring factor independently of the other elements of a life plan. Clearly,
though, living by principles may be part of a life plan. Interwoven with and
partially shaping a person’s projects are principles of thought and action.
Principles can provide a framework around which to build a life plan, or a
filter for evaluating the acceptability of alternative life plans.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Principles both restrict the ways in which a project can
be implemented, and open up new avenues for project pursuit. On the restrictive
side, principles act as regulators or governors, ruling out certain ways of
tackling a goal or project. Suppose someone dedicates a stretch of their life
to promoting environmental responsibility. Some people, seeing this as a
supremely important goal, might tackle it by any means possible, including
exaggerating or lying about the magnitude of actual environmental challenges. A
more principled environmental activist will seek to increase environmental
awareness and responsibility without resorting to dishonesty or scare tactics.<o:p></o:p></div>
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This may make it appear that principles only restrict our
options, acting as a burden and adding barriers to the achievement of our
goals. However, by shaping our personality principles also enable us to do
things and enter relationships otherwise difficult or unavailable to us. For an
obvious example of this effect, consider someone who adheres to a policy of
truthfulness and honest disclosure. As others come to recognize this
characteristic in the person they will feel more secure in trusting them, in
relying on their word, and in making agreements to mutual benefit. An elegant
demonstration of the effectiveness of constraining one’s actions by
well-selected principles has been provided by Axelrod (1984) and subsequent
work. In a series of tournaments for computer programs embodying various
principles, Tit-For-Tat (or sometimes Tit-For-Two-Tats) persistently emerged
victorious. TFT adhered to principles of transparency and simplicity (its
actions were easily comprehensible), retaliation (it immediately retaliated
against players who “defected”), and niceness (it didn’t hold grudges). David
Gauthier’s work develops the idea of constrained maximization and the
advantages it produces for the agent over straight maximization.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[23]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
A further illustration of the enabling effect of adopting principles (rights in
this case) recently has been provided by John Tomasi:<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[24]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
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Instead of asserting
your claim against me, your right-claim entitles you to choose voluntarily and
knowingly <i>not</i> to assert it. If you
and I are friends, and you know that I am embarrassed by my continuing
financial difficulties, when we meet on Saturday you can use your right –
especially in light of my recognition that you do have such a right – to
express your concern for me by <i>withholding</i>
your claim. Rights provide opportunities for community members to act
virtuously toward one another. For one way that I can recognize that your
action toward me is, for example, “generous” is by first knowing what strict
observance of the principles of justice requires – that is, by knowing that
what you are sacrificing for me was in fact yours to sacrifice or claim.
[Tomasi, 1994]<o:p></o:p></div>
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Principles, then, by
binding us in some ways can multiply other options available to us. Principles
allow aspects of our selves to be revealed and developed in relationships and
activities that would not be possible without this self-binding.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Should we view principles as straightforwardly part of
our identity, or rather as external constraints on a separable identity? A
dualistic view would represent principles as constraints imposed on a separable
personality constituted by desires, beliefs, and goals. Principles, especially
moral principles, sometimes are presented as distinct, higher, purer restraints
on our base personalities. In contrast to that view, I suggest the following
account: Principles partially constitute our identity or personality just as
much as do our desires and goals. Indeed, given my earlier account of values as
a special kind of desire, and recognizing principles as formalized kinds of
values, we can see that principles should be regarded as part of us, not as
some kind of non-natural straightjacket on a separable self. At the same time
we can grant that principles may be more or less constitutive of a person. The
acceptance and integration of principles into our selves forms a spectrum from
peripheral to fully integrated. With regard to any principles, we may progress
along the spectrum or stop at any point. Initially when we claim to hold a
principle we may recognize it as a desirable way to be. It then becomes part of
our ideal identity, though it may initially have a minor effect on behavior. We
struggle to live by a new principle as we consider how to implement and apply
it while attempting to restrain or defeat conflicting desires. This early part
of the spectrum most closely resembles the dualist picture. We experience the
principle as a restraint, holding us back from actions and thoughts that have
come naturally to us. The picture at this stage resembles a Kantian view of the
moral law, where worth derives from adhering to principles in the face of our
impulses.<o:p></o:p></div>
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If we continue to move along the spectrum we see a more
Aristotelian picture: As we persist at living on principle, we gradually form
new habits, while weakening, extinguishing or avoiding the activation of
contrary desires. We adjust other beliefs, goals, and even relationships,
bringing them into line with the principle. Through this process, principles
become increasing constitutive rather than legislative. As we integrate
principles into our personality, living according to them starts to flow more
effortlessly. They will become “second nature.” Another way of putting it is to
say a principle will have become a <i>virtue</i>.
<o:p></o:p></div>
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Why define oneself in terms of principles rather than
just in terms of goals? How does the acceptance and integration of principles
affect the meaningfulness of one’s life? The answers to these two questions are
closely related. Although goals, especially when grouped into projects, can
powerfully shape our lives, principles guide more generally than goals: Principles
help us select goals and subgoals and shape the manner in which we pursue them.
A principle of modesty may favor a career as an anonymous functionary over that
of actor or politician. By shaping the pursuit of a goal, principles partly
define goals. Someone might have a goal of
becoming a millionaire by age 35 and the ability to achieve this in a
variety of ways. If they hold a principle of giving value for money received,
they may select a specific goal of selling a product that fills an important
need no one else is filling adequately. <o:p></o:p></div>
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This is not to say that principles can be simply placed
ahead of goals in terms of significance in their contribution to personality.
Goals and projects can be powerfully life-shaping apart from principles, even
if usually in a more restricted domain. Goals and principles interact, mutually
influencing one another. While principles shape and select goals, our goals can
motivate us to accept or reject principles. When Gauguin left his family to
paint in Tahiti he may have rejected principles of primary responsibility to
his family because of his overriding goal. If we have a deeply desired goal in
life, we will tend to ignore principles that make the goal harder to achieve
and more likely to be aware of and receptive to principles that complement and
further it. Overall, though, principles—being more abstract than goals—will
apply over a broader range of our activities and relationships.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Meaning requires order and structure throughout a life,
both across different activities in any given period of a life, and across
periods of a life. Meaning requires a plan and an ordering of desires and
actions integrate a person. This ordering allows a life to have a point. If we
see this point or lesson or example as having value, we are able to perceive
our life as meaningful. Principles play a vital role in making a life
meaningful. They provide the strength and focus (in combination with major
goals and projects) to be steadfast in the pursuit of our life plans in the face
of distractions and difficulties. Being applicable to any number of situations
in numerous areas of life (far more so than goals), principles integrate the
diverse aspects of our life and personality. When principles are securely
integrated into our personalities, they imbue us with confidence as we approach
novel situations and relationships. Whereas desires can be frustrated, projects
can fall apart, and relationships can wither, principles form a solid core of
self, always being there to guide and sustain us.<o:p></o:p></div>
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In order to form a distinct personality or identity, we
need to be able to keep commitments and follow up on decisions. Without this
ability we will find ourselves pushed around by external pressures. Lacking a
strong inner direction we will find little coherence in our behavior over time
and so will tend to care less about our future self-stages. Adopting principles
provides us with a means of adhering to our planned course of action.
Principles do this by making some actions stand for others. Imagine the fabled
potential movie star who has the option of having sex with a big-name producer
in exchange for being cast in a major movie. In considering the situation and
the avenues open to him, the actor realizes a principle is at stake: “Success
in an artistic career should be sought only by appropriate means such as the
display of skills, and not by letting myself be used in irrelevant and
disrespectful ways.” Recognizing this principle, the actor may see this
instance of exchanging sex for career advancement as one instance of a general
principle conflicting with his integrity principle. Wanting the self-respect of
being the kind of person who adheres to the principle, he may gather the
strength to refuse the offer. Seeing an action on its own, without any relation
to principles, may make it easier to give up our integrity. Our actions will
then lack the significance attaching to ordered, chosen, consistent behavior
over time. When we hold something as a principle, we increase the costs of
behaving contrary to it and increase the rewards of adhering to it. By
affecting costs and benefits in this way principles encourage us to undertake
projects with more reassurance that we will keep with them until we have
achieved the desired end. As a result, our lives will be more ordered,
significant, and meaningful.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Living by principles, then, increases our long-term
personality coherence, enabling us to care more about our future self-stages.
If Reductionism is to provide a useful, accurate, and comprehensive account of
personal identity, and is accurately to inform our normative inferences about
future self-concern, it needs to incorporate these psychological
considerations.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<b><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Conclusion<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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High-level
projects, life plans, and transformations prompted by our pursuit of
meaningfulness give us a dynamic structure over time, generating reasonable
concerns for our future self-stages despite the likelihood of great change and
reduction in connectedness. These considerations show that psychological
reductionism need not lead to the view, found in Parfit, that we have no
particular reason to be concerned with our weakly-connected future self-stages.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The prospect of certain kinds of
change in our constitution <i>will</i> give
us grounds for thinking of future stages as distinct from us to the extent that
they might as well be another individual. In the final chapter I will examine
various changes in our basic constitution and consider whether we should regard
them as disruptive of our identity over time.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><br clear="all" />
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<!--[endif]-->
<div id="ftn1">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>In
the case of a declarative memory, I <i>remember
that</i> something happened; in the case of a procedural memory, I <i>remember how</i> to do something.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Rorty
and Wong (1990), “Aspects of Identity and Agency” in Flanagan and Rorty (1990).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn3">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>I
do not intend a noncognitivist view of religious language. My view is that the
emotional response and the religious belief are sometimes inseparable in a
person’s psychology. Nevertheless, contrary to noncognitivism, we can
analytically separate the emotive and cognitive components, and evaluate the
beliefs according to evidence.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn4">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Frankfurt
(1971). “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.”<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn5">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Stephen
L. White (1991). <i>The Unity of the Self</i>,
pp.230-31.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn6">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Annette
C. Baier, in “Why Honesty is a Hard Virtue” in Flanagan and Rorty (1990),
provides a fascinating and illuminating analysis of why the virtue of veracity
does not require anything close to the Kantian extreme in truth-telling.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Except,
perhaps, for the core rules of logic. A discussion of the revisability of logic
from a nonjustificationist epistemology of “pancritical rationalism” is
provided by W. W. Bartley, III in Appendix 5 of <i>The Retreat to Commitment</i> (1984).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn8">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Lomasky
(1987), p.26.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Stephen
L. Darwall, in the context of developing a theory of rational preference,
considers the choice of possible lives and how this is essential to the
formation of what Rawls terms a rational life plan. See Darwall (1983).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn10">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>This
is one way in which they differ from fantasies or dreams which can consist of
vague longings with little or no practical reasoning.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Though
he would have more reason to see death as an evil.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn12">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>My
list draws on that of Rorty and Wong (1990) in Flanagan and Rorty (1990), p.20.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn13">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>As
told by Arthur Koestler in <i>The Richard
Crossman Diaries</i>, and as parodied by George Orwell in <i>1984</i>.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn14">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Adams
(1989), “Should Ethics be More Impersonal?”<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn15">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Parfit
(1986): 832-837.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn16">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[16]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Nozick
(1993), 175-6.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[17]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>To
anticipate a question: As I argue later, that the expected direction of change
is positive does <i>not</i> in itself
increase connectedness. (If it did, then this factor would not provide a
rationale for concern for superior future stages more than proportional to
connectedness.)<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn18">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[18]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Whiting
(1986).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn19">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[19]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Amelie
Oksenberg Rorty and David Wong (1990)<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn20">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[20]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>By
“more developed” I mean more developed in terms of one’s current values—if we
are talking about one’s abilities and motivational tendencies are. The
situation with one’s values themselves is more complicated: I recognize that
some of my current values and desires may be based on a false or partial
understanding of the facts about the world or about myself. I may come to see
things differently and so relinquish or revise some of my existing values, and
form new ones. So, my values will be more developed in the sense that they will
evolve from my current values in conjunction with an improving understanding of
the world.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn21">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[21]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Nozick
(1981), p.578.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn22">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[22]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>For
instance, Darwall (1983), Korsgaard (1989).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn23">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[23]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Gauthier
(1986).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn24">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/3.DOC#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[24]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Tomasi
(1991 & 1994).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
</div>
Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-33290046547467294752014-08-26T16:30:00.000-05:002014-08-26T16:30:40.679-05:00The Diachronic Self, chapter 2: The Terminus of the Self<div class="chapterhead" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Chapter 2<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="chapterhead">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">The Terminus of the Self<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="New" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="newplan"></a><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Introduction<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In the previous chapter I developed
an account of the causal conditions necessary for continuation of the
self. In this chapter, starting from a
position of psychological reductionism, I want to view the question from a
different angle: At what point, or under
what conditions, do you cease to exist?
Looking at the question this way will yield some new and surprising
ideas. Given the earlier account of
psychological reductionism, I will not be detained for long defending a view of
death as termination of personality rather than critical damage to some or all
of the body.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Noting
an ambiguity in the idea of what it is to be <i>dead</i> will lead me to critically analyze the neocortical criterion
for death. The result of this line of
thinking will be a disjunctive criterion for death, allowing for the ambiguous
standard idea of death, but where one disjunct is a universally applicable
conception of death for persons. The
neocortical criterion will turn out to be, at best, adequate only for a
temporary stage in history. My universal
conception of death will both explain the contemporary plausibility of the
neocortical criterion and reveal its shortcomings if proposed as a permanently
valid criterion. After distinguishing
the ambiguous from the strict notion of death I will argue that we need a new
category <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
in addition to those of life and
death, that of <i>deanimate</i>. I will conclude by demonstrating that the new
category is practically important and not merely a theoretical curiosity.<o:p></o:p></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<div class="New" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Bodily Death and Personal Death<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="personbody"></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Concepts
of and criteria for death have changed throughout history. A concept of death purports to tell us what
death is, while a criterion for the occurrence of death is the sign or signs by
which we determine that a person has reached a state of death. The traditional concept of death was left
vague until recently, its criteria involving cardiac and/or respiratory
function but without explicit distinction between criteria and concept. More recently, the concept underlying the
cardio-pulmonary criterion has been defined as the loss of integrated organic
functioning of the body.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> In the current century there has been a
partial shift to a brain criterion, though this is usually added to the
cardio-pulmonary criterion rather than replacing it. Death is now often supposed to be determined
by the death of the whole brain, or the brainstem, which is responsible for
maintaining integrated organic functioning.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
A
more recent proposal for a brain-criterion is the neocortical criterion.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> As Karen Gervais argues, the neocortical
criterion marks a clear shift to a different <i>concept</i> of death. The
neocortical criterion (and, more controversially, other brain criteria) moves
us from a cardiac-centered to a consciousness-centered concept. According to this new definition of death, a
person is dead only when their capacity for conscious thought, for the
functioning and expression of their personality, has been lost. Defined this way, it will be clear that the
death of part or all of the body is only instrumental and not intrinsic to the
death of the person. I accept this new
conception of death and will analyze it further, but will modify the
neocortical criterion proposed by Gervais.
I will argue that this may not always be an adequate criterion even
today, and may frequently be insufficient in the reasonably foreseeable
future. The need for the category of
deanimate will emerge when I consider cases for which the neocortical criterion
is inadequate. Some of these cases will
be familiar from the personal identity literature.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Proponents
of the neocortical criterion and I agree that a proper understanding of death
requires a distinction between the human organism and the person. Death of the body or parts of the body
concern us only in so far as they bring about the death of our selves. Our selves die when we lose the capacity for
conscious thought, i.e., when we can no longer think, feel and express
emotions, have desires, form plans, and further our projects. I won’t argue this point further here, since
it surely follows straightforwardly from a psychological reductionist view of
the self and from my discussion, in Chapter 5, of intrinsic vs. instrumental
bodily continuity. The terminus of the
self, then, is the point at which the R-relation terminates.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
An
initial example of how personal death can diverge from bodily death is in order
here: There are cases where a human body
is alive and functioning, meeting the criterion of integrated organic
functioning, but where the person is dead.
This is the situation in which the neurons of the higher brain have been
destroyed (neocortical death) thereby removing the possibility of conscious
thought, while the brainstem and perhaps the cerebellum, thalamus, and basal
ganglia continue to function along with the rest of the body.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Where
I differ from Gervais is in my understanding of the conditions essential for
the loss of the capacity for consciousness and personality. Gervais expresses her particular conception
this way: “[H]uman death, understood as
the death of a person, is a state in which the function of consciousness has
been irreversibly lost as a result of one of several possible combinations of
damage to the brain substratum” [150]. A
second statement contends that “[T]he individual’s essence consists in the
possession of a conscious, yet not necessarily continuous, mental life; if all
mental life ceases, the person ceases to exist; when the person ceases to
exist, the person has died” [157-58].
While I agree with these statements, I don’t think that they lead us to
a neocortical criterion for all cases.
This is because I understand the irreversible loss of the capacity for
consciousness to require the irretrievable loss of personal identity-critical
information, and this need not follow from irreversible loss of neocortical
function. I will explain this claim in
detail below, but will first try to head off possible confusion by exposing an
ambiguity in the meaning of ‘dead’.<o:p></o:p></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<div class="New" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Two Meanings of ‘Dead’<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="twomeanings"></a>The
everyday concept of death, as well as some more refined theoretical concepts,
harbor an ambiguity. Failure to
recognize this ambiguity leads both to indeterminate concepts of death and
mistaken criteria for the occurrence of death.
Whether applied to a person or a biological organism as a whole, or to a
part, we can distinguish dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">1</span> (functionally dead, non-functional) from dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">2 </span>(irreversibly
dead). Dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">1</span> means “absence of function” and an assertion
that X is dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">1</span> is equivalent to the denial that X is ‘alive’
or ‘living’. Life is a certain kind of
dynamic, functional process; if that process ceases then the entity is dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">1</span>. This is the straightforward sense in which
you might say “My car is dead,” or “My computer just died.” This has no implication that your car will
never work again. Perhaps a spark plug
needs replacing, or a connection to your computer’s power source is loose.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Dead
in the second sense, dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">2</span>, has a stronger implication:
It requires <i>irreversible</i> loss
of function. Suppose that at about the
time your car stops running you become rich.
You might decide to junk the car rather than have it repaired. You watch as your ex-vehicle is crushed into
a thin slab of metal. Now, if you
declare “My car is dead,” you mean that it is dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">2</span>, i.e., the same car cannot be
returned to you. There is not enough
left of the structure of the car to repair it and make it functional. At best, some of the metal could be used to
build a new car of the same model. But
that would a <i>different</i> car.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Since
most people are religious, the common conception of death has been influenced
by religious myths of an afterlife. This
is another source of ambiguity. The very
term ‘afterlife’ hints at the ambiguous notions of life and death inherent in
religious dogma. ‘Afterlife’ suggests a
time or place that is not life, yet neither is it death. In the Christian tradition, stories are told
of Jesus resurrecting the dead, and reincarnationists talk of people dying and
then being reincarnated. These examples
support the idea that the common notion of death, of being dead, is not
entirely a notion of irreversible cessation of consciousness. If religious people understood death as
irreversible loss of consciousness, they would describe paradigmatic cases of
death as continuing life in another form, and would deny that the person had
really died.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
I
don’t want to rely too heavily on religious usage in making a case for the
ambiguity of the common concept of death.
We could rescue the religious notion (if not its users) from ambiguity
if we took statements such as “He’s dead” to mean only “He’s dead to this
world,” or “He’s physically dead, but truly lives on in Heaven.” On the other hand, most religious people have
not thought this through to the point of disambiguating their usage. To the extent that the meaning of a term is
determined by usage, the unreflective religious use of ‘death’ does contribute
to the ambiguity of the common conception of death. The concept’s use even by many non-religious
people will reflect the same ambiguity.
While the finality of death is reflected in the use of phrases like
“Dead and buried,” we also see pervasive use of the idea of people dying and
then being brought back to life, especially in fiction, whether it be
traditional tales such as Dracula, or recent movies such as <i>Flatliners</i>.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">2</span> – irreversible loss of function – is
synonymous with the final state of death.
Due to the contexts in which it is used, ‘death’ apparently lacks some
of the ambiguity inherent in ‘dead’.
Death has more of a ring of finality and irreversibility. Some thing, or part of a thing, can be dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">1</span> but not have reached a state of death. When it is dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">2</span> then we can also say that it has reached
death. Throughout this paper, when I use
the term dead without a qualifier I will mean dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">2 </span>– irreversibly or informationally
dead. In a later section I will propose
a term for dead<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">1</span> so that the distinction will be clearly
reflected in the terms we use. This
distinction has been recognized by some writers on death, such as Byrne at al
(1979) who objects to brain-related criteria on the ground that loss of brain function is not synonymous with
destruction of the brain. While
destruction is irreversible, loss of function may sometimes be reversible: <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Quotes">
There is no evident contradiction in supposing the existence of
permanent synaptic barriers, permanent analogs of botulinus toxin or morphine,
or yet other mechanisms that would block all brain-functioning while leaving
the brain’s neuronal structure intact and ready for action (at least until such
time as the effects of this non-function on the rest of the body might react
back on the brain in a destructive manner).
Therefore there is no reason to think that cessation of function, whether
reversible or irreversible, necessarily implies total or even partial
destruction of the brain; still less death of the person. [p.1987]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Quotes" style="line-height: 24.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 6.0pt;">
These two ideas have not always been
clearly separated. Distinguishing the
two senses of ‘dead’ will allow me to reveal a vagueness in the notion of
neocortical death. But I will argue that
even a clarified notion of neocortical death is inadequate, since it fails
essentially to mark the boundary of irreversible loss of personality. Supporting this claim requires a precise
explication of various types of continuity and of the relevant notion of
irreversible loss of continuity that will follow. First, I will reveal a second indeterminacy
in the usual notion of death, and distinguish this notion from my stricter, stipulative
notion of death. My claims about the
correct view of continuity in a condition of irreversibility will apply to the
stipulative definition, but not necessarily to the indeterminate notion.<o:p></o:p></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<div class="New" style="margin-bottom: 24.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Permanence vs. Irreversibility: Permanent and Theoretical Death<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In addition to failing to distinguish
loss of function from irreversible loss of consciousness, standard conceptions
of death contain a further indeterminacy: A failure to disentangle the idea of
permanent absence or loss of consciousness from the idea of irreversible loss
of consciousness. Permanence and
irreversibility are distinct and separable since cessation of consciousness
might be permanent yet reversible. Every
day, patients are “no-coded” by doctors and declared dead. In no-coding a patient, the attending
physician is saying that though the patient could be resuscitated (by CPR or
defibrillation), this is not to be done, since the patient’s restored life will
be brief and unpleasant. Where a no-code
instruction has been issued, cardiac arrest entails permanent loss of
consciousness. Yet it might be quite
easy to resuscitate the patient, at least temporarily. Since the standard notion does not sharply
distinguish permanence and irreversibility, we can set out a disjunctive
conception of the occurrence of death:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 6.0pt;">
Death of a person
occurs when<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 6.0pt;">
<b>(a) Irreversibility condition:</b> There is
a sufficient degree of destruction or dissolution of the brain (or other medium
for support of consciousness);<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 6.0pt;">
<b>(b) Permanence condition:</b> The capacity
for consciousness is lost and no attempt will ever be made to revive or repair
the patient.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 24.0pt; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
We
need not hold that only the irreversibility condition is correct, although I
will argue that it is more fundamental.
Instead we can distinguish two senses of the term ‘death’ and give them
each labels. This will allow me to
provide a theory of the type of continuity necessarily involved in the
irreversibility condition while granting a role in the standard concept to the
permanence condition.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 6.0pt;">
A person is <b>theoretically dead</b> if they meet the
irreversibility condition.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 6.0pt;">
A person is <b>permanently dead</b> if they meet the
permanence condition, whether or not they also meet the irreversibility
condition.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Permanent
death occurs when a person is permanently lacking in consciousness. Such an assessment need not coincide with
irreversible loss of consciousness. In
many instances the two do not coincide, as in the no-coding case above, as well
as in more speculative cases such as biostasis.
Some individuals, following clinical death, have been placed into
biostasis (specifically) cryonic suspension in the belief that they might be
resuscitated in the future by more advanced medical technologies. Suppose that this procedure does preserve a
person sufficiently well, and that the necessary future repair technologies
will be developed. Now, suppose someone
had a heart attack and became clinically dead, i.e., their cardiac and
respiratory functions ceased, but the decision had been made not to place them
into biostasis. Then we could say,
immediately after the coronary, that the person had permanently lost
consciousness even though they had not lost consciousness irreversibly.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
So,
there are a range of situations in which permanent and irreversible loss of
consciousness are not identical.
Permanent death is partly determined by the decisions we make and the
actions we perform. This means that
permanent death is not fully objective in the way that theoretical death is
objective (i.e., independent of decisions and actions). Irreversibility, in the sense I am using it,
refers to loss of the capacity for consciousness that cannot be reversed even
in principle. No matter how much
technology may advance, and no matter how different the medium for support of
consciousness may become (embodied in computers, for example), theoretical death
refers to a state beyond any possible capability to reverse.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Permanent
loss of the capacity for consciousness may appear to be an objective matter
also: Either someone will be returned to
consciousness at some point or they will not.
Our beliefs regarding the probability of resuscitation are subjective,
just as are our beliefs about reversibility, but surely the permanence of lack
of awareness is an objective matter? Not
if by ‘objective’ we mean “independent of human action and decision.” Suppose cardiac and respiratory function
cease in Smith. To an uninvolved third
party the permanence or lack of permanence may be a factual, objective
matter. Either Smith’s bodily functions
will restart spontaneously or they will not, and either someone else will
successfully intervene with CPR or defibrillation or they will not.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
However,
from the point of view of someone in a position to medically intervene (call
her Robinson), the permanence of Smith’s condition cannot be regarded as
determined independently of the intervener’s decisions and actions. (This is assuming that intervention has a
more than zero probability of success, otherwise intervention is futile even if
Robinson believes otherwise.) Robinson
cannot regard her own actions as already determined; she has a genuine decision
to make. To Robinson then, if not to an
uninvolved observer, the permanence or transience of Smith’s loss of
consciousness is not fully objective.
The same point can be made using Byrne’s example above, in which the
brain’s capacity to function has been blocked.
In that case, the permanence of the condition may depend on the
decisions and actions of researchers and medical personnel to take steps to
reverse the condition. Finally, in the
cases of persons placed in biostasis for possible future repair and
resuscitation, the permanence or transience of their condition may depend on
the actions of those maintaining them in suspension, on researchers seeking to
develop repair technologies, and on legislators who may choose to prevent such
research or the revival of the biostatic persons.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Permanent
death and theoretical death both may involve a shift in our attitudes toward
the person. A belief in the person’s
permanent or irreversible loss means that we will no longer think of the person
interacting with us in the future, or having further experiences. We will no longer include them in our
plans. This shift in attitudes will be
reflected in our customs and in the law.
The rights and status of the deceased person will change: They can no longer be rewarded or punished,
cannot make contracts, and will not be considered in our plans for the
future. However, these attitudinal
changes are more closely tied to permanent than theoretical death since they
will occur once we have decided that absence of consciousness is permanent even
though we may know that consciousness could be restored. That is, attitudes will not shift if we do
not believe them to be permanently gone, but attitudes will shift if we believe
them to be permanently though not irreversibly gone. The fact of theoretical reversibility will
not affect our attitudes once we are certain that the theoretical possibility
will never be acted upon.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Irreversibility
has (or should have) priority over permanence in determining our
attitudes: An assessment of irreversible
loss of consciousness ought to lead us to an assessment of permanent loss of
consciousness. But the reverse is not
true; a belief in someone’s permanent lack of consciousness need not require us
to believe that they irreversibly lack consciousness. We would only believe “if permanently then
irreversibly nonconscious” if the two were identical in a particular instance,
as when a person’s brain is instantly destroyed. Since decisions to allow reversible cessation
of consciousness to continue should be founded on our beliefs about possible
reversibility of nonconsciousness, the reversibility condition is the more
fundamental to us as agents. This makes
it important to be very clear about the limits on reversibility. If we misunderstand these limits, and believe
loss of consciousness to be irreversible when it is not, then we risk acting,
or failing to act, in such a way that we cause someone to become permanently
dead unnecessarily (by burying or burning them rather then treating or
maintaining them).<o:p></o:p></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<div class="New" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Irreversible Cessation and Types of
Continuity<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Having distinguished the permanence
and irreversibility conditions, I can now focus on the universally applicable
irreversibility condition. Various types
of irreversible cessation of consciousness might be thought essential to
theoretical death. I will argue that the
correct condition is irreversible loss of <i>informational</i>
continuity. In defending this condition
I will deny the universal applicability of the neocortical criterion, even if
it embodies the irreversibility condition rather than the permanence condition,
and even if it embodies destruction of the neocortex rather than loss of
function.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt;">
Gervais’ reason for proffering the
neocortical criterion for death is clear enough: “…destruction of the neocortex has been shown
to produce permanent unconsciousness and to be an empirically verifiable
pattern of brain destruction prior to the failure of the organism as a whole. Since human death is the death of the person,
and the death of the person occurs with permanent loss of consciousness,
neocortical death is an adequate criterion for declaring death” [150-51]. And, a few pages later: “[T]he individual’s essence consists in the
possession of a conscious, yet not necessarily continuous, mental life; if all
mental life ceases, the person ceases to exist; when the person ceases to
exist, the person has died. Upper brain
death destroys all capacity for a conscious mental life, and it is therefore
the death of the person.” (pp.157-58.) I
will agree that the neocortical criterion, when carefully stated, is an
adequate criterion for present day conditions, but will argue that it will not serve
as a universally valid criterion. To
establish this, I need to show that persons can continue to exist despite being
neocortically dead (in either sense). To
this end I will distinguish different types of continuity and evaluate their
relative importance for the continuation of the self.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: .25in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 6.0pt; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL 183 \f "Symbol" \s 10
\h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Structural
Continuity: </b> Atoms or molecules may
gradually be replaced, but the arrangement of the parts of the body or brain
persists. That is, the physical
structure is maintained even though there may be a gradual turnover in the
material of which it is composed.
Structural continuity is static when two temporal stages of the system
are qualitatively identical, and dynamic when the later stage has resulted from
the earlier stage by a sufficiently gradual process involving no spatiotemporal
discontinuity.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Functional Continuity: </b> (a) Bodily functional continuity: The body and (perhaps) the brain continue to
function (either autonomously or with mechanical support). Functional continuity may be maintained
despite a serious loss of structural continuity. Replacement of the heart with a mechanical
heart may maintain the original function despite the two organs having entirely
different structures. (b) Psychological
functional continuity: Personality
continues to operate and act; consciousness (or the capacity for consciousness)
is maintained. This may occur despite a
radical change in the structure of the physical organ making consciousness
possible. Loss of functional continuity
may be (i) reversible or irreversible by current means, or (ii) reversible or
irreversible by any empirically possible future technology.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: .25in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL 183 \f "Symbol" \s 10
\h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Informational
Continuity:</b> Physical structure may
be destroyed, but all the information necessary potentially to allow
reconstruction of the brain (or other consciousness-support structure) and thus
restoration of its function persists.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The
neocortical criterion is not a universally applicable criterion of death. Gervais would probably agree with this, since
she is open to further refinements in our criteria,<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
and she accepts that a person embodied in something other than a human body
could be the same person. As I will show
below, this means a person might survive the destruction of their brain. The neocortical criterion is merely a
normally reliable criterion—in 1995—for diagnosing death or for making a
prognosis of death (depending on whether neocortical death is taken to mean
loss of function or destruction). A
presumption of universal applicability would be acceptable if it were
impossible for a person to survive neocortical death. However this is not necessarily the
case. Whether we are to understand
“neocortically dead” to mean permanent loss of neocortical function or
destruction of the neocortex, selves may perdure regardless. I will examine both senses in which someone
might be said to be neocortically dead and show that neither are acceptable
criteria.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Loss of neocortical function:</b> To say that someone is neocortically dead, or
that they have lost the capacity for consciousness, might mean that the
neocortex has ceased functioning and it cannot be restarted with available
technology; or it might mean that the neurons of the neocortex and their
patterns of interconnectivity have either decayed or been destroyed so that no
empirically possible future technology could repair them. Which of these Gervais is using is hard to
determine since she never actually gives her own definition of neocortical
death; she cites definitions found in the literature, without pointing out that
they are not equivalent. (She also
appears to use permanent cessation and irreversible cessation interchangeably.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>) Two prominent definitions cited on pages
11-12 involve <i>destruction</i> of
neocortical or apallic neurons; but the definition quoted from J.B. Brierley
(p.13) is a function-based definition.
Brierley states that neocortical death “implies a persistently
isoelectric EEG and the absence of sensory evoked responses in the neocortex,
together with the resumption of spontaneous respiration and of certain
brainstem reflexes.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Of course, given today’s standard practices, a
patient who is <i>neocortically
non-functional</i> will eventually become <i>neocortically
destroyed</i>, though this may take hours or days, even without cooling to slow
enzymatic degradation.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> But this is no reason to conflate the two, as
Gervais clearly recognizes in the context of a parallel criticism of Lamb: Lamb claims that “the death of the brainstem
is the necessary and sufficient condition for the death of the brain as a
whole—and that brainstem death is therefore itself synonymous with the death of
the individual.” Gervais correctly argues against Lamb that “To say that the
loss of integration becomes irreversible is not to say that the loss has
occurred.” (Gervais, p.148) Irreversibility of a function that leads to brain
death is prognostic, not diagnostic of brain death. Now, under standard conditions (in the past
and present) cessation of neocortical function is prognostic of personal death,
but it is not diagnostic unless accompanied by neocortical destruction. If death is an irreversible state, then
cessation of neocortical function that is irreversible by <i>current</i> medical technology is no more the point at which death
occurs than was cessation of heart beat in the past. If we were to find a way of restoring a
“dead” (non-functional) neocortex to function, then we would have to say that
the person had not been dead.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
So
long as the necessary neuronal structures persist we cannot say that the
capacity for consciousness is irreversibly gone. Cessation of neocortical function need not
imply loss of critical structure or information: Sufficient structural and chemical clues may
remain to allow restoration and revitalization of neocortical function and
neuronal interconnections. Full
structural continuity of the cells is unnecessary for the possibility of repair
of the neocortex since the desired structure and function of the neurons may be
inferred from residual chemical clues, or it may only be necessary to repair
membranes, open ion channels, restore synapses, or replace organelles such as
ribosomes.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
An
objection might be raised to the effect that “capacity for a conscious, but not
necessarily continuous, mental life” means that the neocortex can support
consciousness given the appropriate stimuli and that these stimuli should be
defined in terms of current technology.
An analogy might be given as follows:<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> If we say that a car has the capacity to move
at 110mph, we mean that it is currently in a state such that, given appropriate
stimuli (such as gas, a foot on the accelerator, etc.) it will achieve
110mph. The objection claims that we do
not mean that the car could achieve 110mph given available technology, and we
do not mean that, given some empirically possible but non-actual technology,
the car could achieve 110mph. The
problem with the objection lies in the fuzziness of the terms ‘capacity’ and
‘appropriate stimuli.’ Does the car have
the capacity to move at 110mph if a wire has been loosened? In that case it does not have the capacity
immediately, given only the normal stimuli.
However, there is a perfectly reasonable sense in which it does have
such a capacity: The car has the
capacity to move at 110mph if we reconnect the wire. If someone were to say, before reconnecting
the wire, that the car could not go 110mph, the statement would be misleading
in that we might be led to think that this <i>kind</i>
of car does not have that capacity. The
car will not function normally without that repair, but so long as the repair
can be effected there is an important sense in which the car does have that
capacity.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Suppose
the car has suffered some form of damage to its components so that it cannot
move, and currently no way exists to replace or repair the components to
restore function. Further suppose that
the manufacturer tells you that they are working on a new repair process that
will restore function, a process that should be available a month from
now. We will probably want to say that
the car does not have the capacity to move at 110mph, but that it can
potentially regain that capacity. If we
say this, it follows that loss of (current) capacity to function does not imply
irreversible loss of function. If asked
whether our car is dead, in the sense that it can never function normally
again, we should reply in the negative.
The car analogy, then, supports rather than undermines the case for
basing a criterion for death on irreversible loss of capacity rather than <i>currently</i> irreversible loss of capacity.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In
the neocortical case, if Gervais’s criterion for death is loss of the capacity
for consciousness (due to loss of neocortical function), then we can see that
her criterion is not equivalent to the irreversible loss of the capacity for
consciousness. Loss of neocortical
function may be currently irreversible, just as loss of cardiac output once was
irreversible with existing technology, but death does not occur (at least)
until the neocortex has been destroyed, or degenerated beyond any empirically
possible means of repair. For Gervais to
deny this would also require her, contrary to her stated view, to claim someone
to be dead as soon as their heart has stopped beating (and consciousness has
been lost) if there is no available (or known) means of restoring cardiac
function. If the neocortical criterion
is to serve as an accurate criterion in the present, it must therefore be
interpreted as neocortical destruction rather than currently irreversible loss
of neocortical function. With this
condition specified, and with the exceptions discussed below (in the Deanimate
section), I can accept the neocortical criterion as an adequate criterion for
death in 1995 and the near future.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="neofunction"></a> The period between cessation of
neocortical function and true neocortical death (loss of structure) might seem
to be of merely theoretical interest but of no contemporary practical
significance since we cannot <i>now</i>
restore neocortical function, just as pre-20th Century it might have been
claimed that there was no practical significance to the fact that a person with
a still heart was not yet dead. Such a
claim would be mistaken. Attending to
the difference between <i>currently</i>
irreversible loss of function and true neocortical death will encourage the
search for means of preventing neocortical decay by preserving the neocortex in
an unchanging state, and for means of repairing the neocortex and restoring its
function. (Again, see the section on
Deanimate below.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Neocortical destruction:</b> By neocortical death, Gervais might mean not
loss of function but decay or destruction of the neurons of the neocortex and
their patterns of interconnectivity so that no empirically possible future
technology could repair them. (This is
unlikely to be Gervais’ intended meaning, if we interpret “the <i>capacity</i> for consciousness” to mean that
consciousness can be restored with currently available means only.) This is less parochial than the loss of
function definition and is acceptable as a historically temporary criterion
(i.e. <i>given current technology</i>), but it still fails to provide a
transhistorical, universally applicable criterion. Locking the criterion of death into
neocortical destruction is mistaken since, as I have argued in earlier
chapters, our continuity is essentially psychological continuity and
connectedness – the R-relation – and not physical continuity. We might say that we are software and not
hardware;<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
the psychological relations that are me are currently instantiated in <i>this</i> neocortex, but I am not <i>essentially</i> this neocortex nor even
(more controversially) any neocortex. We
can conceive of personal continuation despite neocortical death, and this may
even become technologically possible in the future. Here are a couple of ways in which
neocortical death and personal death could come apart:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 6.0pt;">
<b>Brain
Scanning and Replacement:</b> Suppose that, at some time in the future, some
extremely powerful scanner were available, the descendants of today’s MRI, NMR,
PET, SQUID, SPECT and CAT scanners.
These scanners might be used to scan a brain so completely that the
resulting data specified the entire neuronal structure, including neuronal
interconnections, electrical charges, spiking potentials, and levels of all
neurotransmitters and hormones. Suppose
that your brain was then destroyed (or is destroyed layer by layer as the
scanner does its work). A new brain is
then built according to the information gathered from the scan, it is implanted
in the original body, and all necessary connections are restored. We should say that this brain is a <i>new</i> brain, for a brain is a physical
object and spatiotemporal continuity is a necessary condition for physical
objects. (If we were to destroy and
replace only a small fraction of the original brain at any one time we would
probably say that the <i>same</i> brain
remained throughout.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Despite
the spatiotemporal discontinuity and the destruction of one brain and its
replacement by another, the same person remains throughout the procedure. Though there is an interval during which
there is no structural or functional continuity, there is always informational
continuity. The new brain is structured
the way it is, and functions the way it does, because of the structure and
function of the original brain. In terms
of the argument of Chapter 2, the same person persists through this procedure
according to the Wide Psychological Criterion.
(We need not go so far as the either of the Widest Psychological
Criteria to reach this conclusion since a causal connection is maintained
between the earlier and later brains.)
We may be puzzled by how to describe the condition of the person during
the interval between the destruction of their original brain and their revival
in the new brain. They are not dead, but
we may not want to say that they are <i>alive</i>. I will return to this issue in the next
section.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-top: 6.0pt;">
<b>Uploading:</b>
In the second kind of case, I can survive the loss of my brain even though it
is <i>never</i> replaced by another
biological brain. If what matters in my
survival is my psychological continuity, then I will continue to exist so long
as my consciousness, my psychological features, are maintained in hardware that
is functionally equivalent at the necessary level.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> This hardware may be nonbiological, perhaps
an appropriately-configured parallel-processing computer constructed according
to the information gained from the destructive scanning of my brain. The transfer of a person’s consciousness from
their brain to a computer is referred to as “uploading” and has been described
both in fiction and nonfiction.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> This informationalist conception of personal
continuity is expressed by Daniel Dennett:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Quotes">
If you think of yourself as a center of narrative gravity, on
the other hand, your existence depends on the persistence of that narrative
(rather like the Thousand and One Arabian Nights, but all a single tale), which
could theoretically survive indefinitely many switches of medium, be teleported
as readily (in principle) as the evening news, and stored indefinitely as sheer
information. If what you are is that
organization of information that has structured your body’s control system (or,
to put it in its more usual provocative form, if what you are is the program
that runs on your brain’s computer), then you could in principle survive the
death of your body as intact as a program that can survive the destruction of
the computer on which it was created and first run. [Dennett (1991) p.430]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Quotes" style="line-height: 24.0pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In
the brain scanning and replacement and uploading cases the later person-stage
is psychologically continuous with the earlier person-stage. If personal continuity is psychological
continuity then we cannot say, in these cases, that someone has died and been
replaced by another person. The very
same person remains throughout, despite the discarding of the hardware that
previously embodied their capacity for consciousness. To someone who wasn’t aware that our subject
had received a new brain, or had a silicon or optical brain-replacement in
their skull, no difference would be detectable, making it absurd to think that
the original person had died. I will not
belabor this point, having already set out my view regarding continuity in the
previous chapter.<o:p></o:p></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<div class="New" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Deanimate<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="deanimate"></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
We have seen that a person is not
dead immediately following cessation of whole brain or neocortical
function. Now I will argue that a person
is not properly described as dead, at least in the theoretical sense, while
they are incapable of consciousness but where their brain (or replacement
hardware) retains the structure allowing possible restoration of that
capacity. Going a step further, I will
show that a person is not dead while they exist only in the form of information
lacking a functioning embodiment. Though
they are not dead, we may not be comfortable describing them as <i>alive</i>.
Indeed, it would be inaccurate to describe them as alive. We need a new category to describe these
cases – that of <i>deanimate</i>; I will
divide this category into the subcategories <i>deteriorating</i>,
<i>biostatic</i> and <i>inactivate</i>.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
On
the theoretical view, and more ambiguously on the standard view, absence of
life is not co-extensive with death. We
can see this by attending to the differing ideas of continuity defined above
and by a better understanding of the nature of life and death. By ‘death’ I mean the end point of the
gradual dissolution of a living system.
Dying is the process that takes an organism from life to death, from a <i>process</i> of living to a <i>state</i> of death. We should reserve the term ‘death’ for the <i>result</i> of the process of dying,
otherwise we will have no term to make that reference. If we were to say that death had claimed someone
as soon as their heart stopped beating, or their brain ceased functioning, we
would no longer be able to clearly differentiate very different conditions -
those of various kinds of biological and neurological cessation of function
from those of loss of any present or future possibilities for restoring
function. Death is therefore the state a
person is in when they are theoretically dead.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Almost
no one seems to willing to venture a definition of life. According to Prigogine and Stengers,<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
a living organism is an open system in which matter and energy are exchanged
with the environment. A living organism
is a dissipative structure: a dynamic state of matter which originates in
far-from equilibrium conditions and involves a close association between order
and structure on one hand and dissipation or waste on the other. Living creatures keep internal entropy at
bay.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
When they fail to do this they cease coherent functioning and proceed down the
necrotic path of increasing dissolution.
Death is the end result of this entropic process. This dying process may be arrested and
reversed at some stages; how far along the process arrest and reversal can be
achieved depends both on how much critical information remains or can be
reconstructed and on the level of technology.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Since
there is a large gap between cessation of function (whether cardiac or
neurological) and loss of all structure and structure-critical information, we
need a term to refer to that part of the spectrum in which the person
potentially is fully or mostly recoverable.<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
<i>Deanimate</i> can fulfill this need. It connotes absence of movement, cessation of
life, leaving us the term “dead” (in our theoretical sense) to exclusively
refer to an organism that has reached a state of death, without connoting
further decay. When someone’s heart
stops beating, or their brainstem ceases to integrate bodily functions, that
person becomes deanimate. They lose
consciousness and cannot spontaneously recover.
When they become deanimate, the dying process will continue until they
are dead, unless other persons intervene.
Such intervention may consist of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, if
deanimation has occurred in the last few seconds up to something under an hour,<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
or it may take the form of biostasis (cryonics, vitrification, or advanced
suspended animation).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In
the case of biostasis, the deanimate person’s physical embodiment is
stabilized, by locking their constituent molecules in place at extremely low
temperatures or by chemical fixation.
Biostasis is thus a sub-category of deanimate; biostatic persons are
deanimate persons whose dissolution has been arrested (before reaching a
critical stage). If the technology
becomes available to repair the life-threatening condition causing deanimation,
and to reverse the changes caused by the biostasis technique (which may itself
add further injury), the biostatic-deanimate person may be restored to life.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Both
biostatic and inactivate fall under the category of deanimate but they may
usefully be distinguished. In the
previous section I described a hypothetical scanning procedure that gathers
thorough structural information about the brain. This information might be stored on an
inactive, non-biological medium for a period prior to reembodiment of the
information in a working brain. In that
case, the person would be deanimate and inactivate but not biostatic. Inactivate persons will be thought of as further
from being alive than will biostatic persons.
There are two related reasons for this:
First, while both biostatic and inactivate persons lack the capacity for
consciousness, the former exist in their standard embodiment, though in static
form. But inactivate persons persist
only as information instantiated in a form radically different from that of
their standard body. Technology capable
of resuscitating biostatic individuals probably is less remote than technology
capable of re-embodying an individual from their identity-critical information. Second, these differences in form and
temporal remoteness are likely to generate differing attitudes in us. On the permanence view of death, we are more
likely to regard an inactivate person as dead than a biostatic person. We will find it harder to regard someone as
not dead who persists only as nonbiologically-embodied information, and whose
revival we think only remotely likely.
This different makes it worthwhile distinguishing biostatic from
inactivate within the general category of deanimate.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
We
can apply the category of deanimate on both the theoretical or the permanence
views of death, though its extension will differ between the two. On the theoretical view, when a person ceases
living and loses the spontaneous capacity for consciousness, they become
deanimate. They will continue to die
until they are dead, unless they are put into biostasis or otherwise
preserved. So, on this view the person
is first alive, then deanimate and degenerating, then deanimate and static, and
later, possibly, alive again. The
permanence view differs in that when life ends, if we believe the person will
never be returned to life, then we will say that the person goes immediately
from being alive to being dead. This
allows no room for a period describable as deanimate. The permanence view will agree with the
theoretical view in allowing for a period of deanimation only where we believe
that the person will eventually be restored to life. So, deanimation is compatible with the
permanence view but only where cessation of life is thought to be temporary.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
For
some, it will be difficult to shake the feeling that someone who remains only
as inactively stored information is dead.
I think the feeling of oddness felt by some in thinking of an inactivate
person as not dead is largely generated by the entrenched standard belief that
not-dead = alive. Since an inactivate
person, even more than a biostatic person, is far from alive, the temptation to
think of them as dead can be strong. The
feeling of oddness should be dispelled by keeping the third category of
deanimate in mind. With that category in
place, it will seem even more odd to think of inactivate persons as dead. Inactivate persons and dead (ex-) persons
differ in important ways. In the former
case, a great deal about the living person is being preserved; all the
information specifying their psychology and its physical embodiment persists,
and <i>ex hypothesi</i> that information
could eventually be used to restore the person to life. All the knowledge and experience of the
original person remains, though as potentiality rather than actuality. The fact that the person experiences a break
in continuity of consciousness is not a reason to say that they died and
will be replaced by a different person
if the information is re-embodied. If we
were to say this, we would also have to say that persons who go into a coma and
later are revived have died and been replaced.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Why
not think of the situation as the person’s death and replacement? First, we need to remember that if we believe
someone to be inactivate it means that we believe it to be empirically
possible, now or in the future, to restore them to consciousness. Regarding them as dead has a number of
effects: We will cease to think of them
as involved in our lives in the future.
We will make no efforts to return them to life, instead treating their
inactivate form as equivalent to the ashes of cremation. We will withdraw all their rights and
disregard their interests in continuing life in the future. The pre-inactivate person may have made plans
for the post-reactivation stage of their life, but our regarding them as dead
will destroy their plans far more completely than if someone were to destroy
all of another person’s assets. There is
no obvious difference between treating an inactivate person this way and
disconnecting a comatose patient from life support when it is believed that
they could be brought out of the coma with treatments to become available in
the future.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
If
we believe that the inactivate person will never be restored to life, perhaps
because they did not provide the funding to do so and no one else will be
willing to bear the expense, then we will correctly regard the person as
permanently dead, even though their condition is potentially reversible and so
they are not theoretically dead. This
kind of situation helps to explain intuitions to the effect that inactivate
persons are dead. Inactivate persons who
will never again be alive can indeed be regarded as dead – as permanently but
not theoretically dead. Maintaining the
distinction between the theoretical/reversible and permanence conditions will
distinguish the two classes of inactivate persons, those who are dead in the
permanent sense and those who are not dead in either sense, and thereby helps
dissolve any intuitions about the deadness of inactivate persons as a class.<o:p></o:p></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<div class="New" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Partial Death<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Although the concept of death has
now been defined more precisely by distinguishing it from deanimation, an
indeterminacy remains due to the psychological reductionist theory underlying
these distinctions. We may expect it
always to be simple to tell when someone is dead, at least in principle. If death is put in the context of
psychological reductionism, this clarity evaporates as soon as we realize that
such continuity is a matter of degree.
The R-relation includes both psychological continuity and
connectedness. The same person continues
only if a person-stage has enough psychological connections to the preceding
person-stage. There is psychological
continuity between person-stages, i.e., the person survives, if those stages
are strongly connected. Parfit
stipulates that strong connectedness requires the persistence of at least 50%
of the usual number of psychological connections over the course of a day.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
However,
as Parfit notes, this limit is entirely arbitrary, adopted only for the sake of
convenience. We could just as easily
claim that 60% connectedness over a day (or a week) meant that the original
person has been destroyed and replaced by a new person. The fact is that the previous person-stage
has 60% survived over the specified interval.
Beyond that fact it is a matter of decision and linguistic convention
whether we say the same person continues, or whether the original person
retains their identity. Our decision
will be influenced by the personal, legal, and cultural consequences of placing
the strong connectedness requirement at a particular level. This indeterminacy is worsened by the
problems involved in trying to weigh the relative contributions of different
components of psychological connectedness.
Are memories more or less important than skills? Are dispositions more
or less important than intentions?<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> Exactly what kinds and degrees of
psychological changes would add up to a 40% or 50% reduction in connectedness?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
We
can accurately say that someone – some person-stage – suffering significant
brain damage has partly died. This is
just to say that the remaining person-stage has a significantly reduced degree
of psychological connectedness with the previous person-stage associated with
that body. Speaking of a person’s
partial death is not merely a manner of speaking; it is a reflection of a real
weakening in the strands that constitute the continuity of the person. The more of these strands that are removed at
a time, the less of the pre-existing person who continues. We may usefully think of a person’s survival
or continuity this way: If my friend
came out of a car accident with brain damage resulting in loss of some of his
personality or with alteration in personality, I would mourn for the loss of part
of the person he was. I would miss the
person-stage whom I knew and would have to acquaint myself with the new
person-stage. At the same time, I am
sorry for what has happened to my friend, the same person who continues to
exist. So long as the damage done to him
does not exceed the critical threshold beyond which strong psychological
connectedness is lost (wherever we set that threshold) he is the same person,
not qualitatively, but in the logical sense of personal identity. The same person persists, though a new
person-stage has peremptorily replaced the former stage of the person.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Though
we can think of death as a matter of degree, the legal system is not good at
handling spectra. The law regards
persons as either dead or alive – or at least alive or dead or deanimate – just
as it regards people as either above or below an age of consent. It may therefore be practically necessary to
decide on an line – arbitrary within broad limits – sorting cases of damage to
a person that result in their death from those that do not. If someone is <i>too</i> damaged then, although their body may continue to function and
some behaviors or responses may persist, we can say that the person has died,
changing their legal status, and setting in motion activities such as disposal
of the body and distribution of the estate.
(The body would not be disposed of if the person to whom it had belonged
had signed a living will directing that their body be maintained in such a
situation, and had provided funding for this purpose.) A plausible candidate for the standard of
being <i>too</i> damaged is the point (or
range) where someone loses the characteristics of personhood. These characteristics include the capacity
for consciousness and self-awareness, rationality, responsibility, and an
ability to communicate. These
characteristics are, to be sure, a matter of degree, but there will be some
cases where it is clear that personhood has been lost.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Let
us imagine a man, Jones, who is a normal, adult human being, possessing all the
familiar characteristics of personhood, displaying a robust intelligence, and
enjoying diverse relationships. One
unfortunate day, Jones is involved in a serious auto accident. His friends and family, gathering at the
hospital, are told that Jones has suffered a devastating head injury, but that
he will live. However, though he
breathes unaided and shows some awareness of the environment – moving away from
loud noises and towards the smell of food – he cannot recognize anyone. Despite repeated attempts no one is able to
evoke any sign of recognition from him.
Let us call this individual Jones-B, and the pre-accident person
Jones-A. Jones-B has not only lost his
memories of Jones-A’s life, he displays none of Jones-A’s wittiness,
insightfulness, ability to form complex and satisfying relationships, nor can
he even carry out a conversation. His
brain has been damaged to such an extent that he has to be fed, he does not
recognize friends and relatives of the past, and he cannot engage in any of the
activities that Jones-A could. On any
remotely plausible measure of connectedness, the remaining psychological links
between Jones-B and Jones-A are too tenuous to amount to strong connectedness:
Jones-A and Jones-B are not psychologically continuous. I hold that Jones-B is not the same person as
Jones-A; the two together do not form one longer lived individual, though they
consecutively share a single continuous body; Jones-A no longer exists; Jones-A
is dead.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In
cases like that of Jones, we can say that a normal person, who is suddenly
damaged so badly that they lose the qualities of personhood, ceases to
exist. The massive and <i>discontinuous</i> loss of psychological
connectedness means that personal continuity has been broken, and that person’s
life has been terminated. If the damage
is less, we will say that the same person lives on, though diminished, even if
many of their memories are gone, their personality undergoes some changes, and
their cognitive and communicative abilities are lessened. The point here is not that personhood is
essential to a person’s remaining alive; personhood is simply a plausible
marker for the minimum retention of connectedness required for a person’s
survival. My underlying claim, based on
psychological reductionism, is that death of a person necessarily results from
an excessive severing of connectedness; it is <i>not</i> that loss of personhood necessarily results in the death of a
human in all cases. We can see the
distinctness of these claims by considering a different kind of case.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Smith
is a healthy woman, her cognitive and communicative abilities, her capacity to
form relationships, and her ability to reason and to take responsibility being
comparable to those of Jones-A in my former example. Smith starts off in a condition much like
that of Jones-A, and she ends up as diminished as Jones-B, but she goes from
one state to the other differently.
Whereas Jones-A was replaced discontinuously and immediately by Jones-B,
Smith undergoes a gradual, years-long deterioration resulting from (let us
posit) the growth of inoperable cancer in her brain. Comparing Smith at an advanced stage of her
deterioration with her former healthy self, we see few psychological
connections – as few as connected Jones-A and Jones-B. Smith differs from Jones in that at no time
do we find a discontinuity remotely like that resulting from Jones’
accident. Comparing her condition
between any two adjacent days, or even months, we find only minor changes. Month by month her memories slowly fade, her
concentration weakens and dissolves, her confusion increases, and her capacity
to reason, communicate, and engage in complex behavior attenuates. Since Smith’s loss of connectedness is
cumulative rather than acute, psychological continuity is maintained. Even though the deterioration eventually robs
her of the characteristics of personhood, the gradualness of the loss means
that, unlike Jones-A, she has not perished.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
As
it stands, the law holds that a person, after falling below the threshold for
personhood, has not died regardless of whether this occurred gradually or
discontinuously. Despite her defense of
the neocortical criterion, Gervais appears to agree with the current legal
view. <a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="here"></a>According to
Gervais, a person (and not just a biological organism) continues to exist –
personal identity is maintained – despite total loss of personality, so long as
the capacity for consciousness remains.
We can agree in Smith’s case, where I also hold that Smith survives past
the loss of personhood. We can also
agree in the case of Jones-B; though not a person, Jones-B possesses a capacity
for consciousness of a limited kind and survives so long as that
continues. However, we differ in the
case of Jones-A where, according to Gervais, Jones-A continues to live after
the accident (being identical with Jones-B).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In
criticizing the view of Green and Wikler who, like me, employ a psychological
continuity conception of death, Gervais raises anencephalic infants as
supposedly being a problem. Gervais
thinks that the cases of anencephalic infants and cases like Jones should be
treated alike: “If the anencephalic are
obviously not dead, then Jones is obviously not dead either.” [140] If Jones, lacking sufficient neocortical
function to support personhood, is dead even though he has a living body, then
a baby born without neocortical function must also be dead.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Having
distinguished Gervais’ Jones into two individuals, Jones-A and Jones-B, my
response to Gervais is unproblematic: It is true that the anencephalic are
obviously not dead. But neither is
Jones-B dead. On the psychological
continuity view, Jones-A is dead, but there now exists a distinct individual,
Jones-B, who lives. Jones-A, in losing
personhood, lost so much connectedness that he ceased to exist. His body lived on, forming, along with the
remaining mentality, the new individual, Jones-B. Jones-B has suffered no loss of
connectedness, and so is clearly alive.
His case is therefore parallel with that of anencephalic infants, for
they – born without the capacity for consciousness – have never lost
connectedness.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In
considering a possible response to her objection from Green and Wikler, Gervais
complains that granting that the anencephalic baby is alive while the
brain-damaged ex-person is dead will lead to two identity criteria: “In the
anencephalic case, identity criteria and conditions of life and existence do
not overlap. It is confusing to speak of
alive bodies and dead persons, since a similar distinction could be drawn
across the board, even in brain-death cases.” (141) Her response is unconvincing; I see no reason
<i>not</i> to make a similar distinction
across the board, including brain-death cases.
Refraining from distinguishing conditions for life and death of bodies
and persons, Gervais will be forced to say that someone survives even if
practically everything that made them who they were is destroyed. She will have to claim that the bare capacity
for consciousness is most of what makes someone who they are. Furthermore, Gervais’ charge of inconsistency
against Green and Wikler can be applied to her own position because her own
criterion of upper brain death makes it possible to talk of alive bodies and
dead persons. In attacking the
whole-brain death criterion, Gervais made it clear that a person dies along
with their upper brain, even if the lower brain continues to maintain the body.<i><o:p></o:p></i></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span>
<br />
<div class="New" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Declaring Death and Deanimation<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Declare"></a><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
When should a declaration of <i>deanimation</i> be made? A person should be
declared deanimate (or be said to have deanimated) when it is judged impossible
or pointless<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
to revive them given the available medical technology; that is, when conscious
activity: (i) has ceased, (ii) will not restart spontaneously, and (iii) cannot
immediately be restored artificially.
The third condition is optional: I include it because if the capacity
for consciousness can (and will) be restored immediately (e.g., by
defibrillation) probably we will want to regard them as alive rather than
deanimate in order to maintain all their rights as living persons. We could refer to persons who meet the first
two conditions, but not the third, as <i>dormant</i>. Deanimation might be declared on the same
grounds that death is now declared:
Cardiac and respiratory arrest, or lower brainstem dysfunction or
destruction, or loss of neocortical function.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
When
should a declaration of <i>death</i> be
made? An individual will be theoretically dead and can be so declared if their
neocortex has been destroyed. On the
theoretical view, death should not be declared on cessation of cardiac or
respiratory function, nor upon brain dysfunction. However, though irreversibility provides a
deeper criterion of death, the permanence view may better suited to <i>declaring</i> death. A declaration of death is as much a legal and
social act as a medical act, marking a point where our attitudes toward the
person shift. We will no longer expect
to see them again; we will not think of them acting and living in the future;
we will not make plans for them; we will no longer take into account their
interests (except residual interests in the disposition of their former
property). <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The
patient might be declared dead when heart-beat and respiration or brain
functions cease. A declaration of death
would then mean that the (theoretically) deanimate person was to be allowed to
continue moving toward death without intervention. This would amount to a declaration that those
involved regard the person as having permanently lost consciousness even if
they are not irreversibly nonconscious.
The patient may have stated that they wish to be regarded as dead when
they deanimate, either because they believe their reanimated quality of life
will be unacceptable, or because they believe that reversal of their
deanimation is not now and never will be possible.<o:p></o:p></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<div class="New" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Practical Importance of the
Deanimation Category<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Embodying the category of deanimate
in the law would have several beneficial results. Recognizing the category of deanimate
persons, and the potential for expanding that category, would spur research in
neocortical preservation and repair. Common
practice would gradually move from disposal and dissolution of persons when
they are not theoretically dead to a situation where the possibilities for
maintenance and revival were affirmed and acted upon. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Understanding
the difference between deanimate and dead will help us to clarify the moral
status of comatose persons. I cannot
examine this issue here, except to note that the differential condition of
deanimate and dead persons should be accompanied by differing rights and
obligations. Deanimate persons should
have rights more extensive than dead persons but weaker than those of living
persons. When a person deanimates, they
will lose rights which depend on awareness, such as being bound by new
contracts, but will maintain rights against being harmed in various ways
(including being killed), and some control over their finances (through agents
chosen pre-deanimation or else appointed post-deanimation).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
As
matters stand now, families suffer distress and heavy costs because persons who
are either truly dead or else irretrievable with current techniques must be
maintained on life support equipment. On
the informational criterion for death, more patients will be recognized as dead
and so released from pointless support.
In addition, some of those who would not be dead on the new criterion
could be disconnected from life support in order to place them in biostasis
instead of leaving them on a downward spiral.
Setting conditions for transferring patients from mechanical functional
support to stable biostasis is already needed due to the practice of cryonics
and would be facilitated by a broader understanding of the deanimate/dead
distinction.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Law
and medical practice should allow a patient to be declared deanimate before the
patient is fully brain dead (or neocortically dead), in order to allow
biostatic preservation of the brain in good condition. This will give the patient more choice over
what happens to them: Estimates of the possibility, probability, and
desirability of eventual reanimation will vary greatly between persons. Recognizing this as rightfully the patient’s
choice (perhaps with consultation) would be another benefit of introducing the
category of deanimate.<o:p></o:p></div>
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span></b>
<br />
<div class="New" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Glossary<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="glossary"></a><!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:
field-begin'></span>SYMBOL 183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Apallic Syndrome:</b> Essentially the same as neocortical
death. Results from destruction of the
pallium, that is, the neocortical structures of the cerebrum.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Biostasis:</b> Similar to the older term “suspended
animation.” A state in which a patient
is maintained without biological activity, thereby preventing decay. Currently this is practiced in the
unperfected form of cryonic suspension, in which the patient is frozen and
stored at -196<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
176 \f "Symbol"<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]-->C. Biostasis might take at least two other
forms: Vitrification, in which low-temperature storage is achieved without ice
crystallization; or chemical methods for locking all reactive molecules into
place.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Brain Death:</b> Death of the entire brain. (Taken to be indicated by either a flat EEG
or lack of cerebral blood flow.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Dead-1:</b> Synonymous with “deanimate.” Not currently functioning (in the manner
appropriate to that kind of entity), as in “my car is dead.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Dead-2:</b> Permanently non-functional. This second sense is synonymous with death.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Deanimate:</b> Synonymous with dead-1. The absence of function critical to
maintenance of consciousness. Includes
persons who are “clinically dead” and deteriorating, persons in biostasis, and
persons who are inactivate.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Death:</b> The final destination of the dying
process. A state in which nothing actual
or potential remains of the person. The
death of the person may occur before or after the death of the person’s body or
brain.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Dormant:</b> A state in which the <i>capacity</i> for consciousness persists (the neo-cortex is intact) and
where the body and lower brainstem are functioning but there is no
consciousness. (As in certain kinds of
coma, where administration of a drug can restore the person to consciousness.)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Dying:</b> A process leading from deanimation to death.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Inactivate:</b> Stable persistence of identity-critical
structure or information in the absence of life functions. While biostasis preserves a person’s original
physical form in a static state, being inactivate involves someone persisting
in the form of stored information specifying the structure of the person’s body
(or just their brain) without that body persisting.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Neocortical Death:</b> Destruction or (currently) irreversible
cessation of function of the higher brainstem, so that the capacity for
consciousness is terminated. Deep
structures of the cerebral hemispheres such as the thalamus and basal ganglia
may be intact, in addition to the cerebellum.
Neocortically dead individuals may open their eyes periodically, show
sleep-wake periods, yawning, chewing or spontaneous swallowing.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Persistent Vegetative
State:</b> The permanent absence of
consciousness. Neocortical death is one
criterion for this. (Also called
“persistent noncognitive state.”)<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Permanent Death:</b> Permanent absence of consciousness, whether
or not the person could be returned to consciousness.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .25in; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
183 \f "Symbol" \s 10 \h<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> <b>Theoretical Death:</b> Irreversible absence of consciousness.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>For
instance, Lamb (1985).<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>See
Gervais (1986).<o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>See
p.182. However, she seems to be thinking
of these only as refinements resulting from a better understanding of the
neurological causes of persistent vegetative states and so is still tieing
personal death to some form of brain death criterion.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div id="ftn4">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>See,
for example, p.159, lines 3-4 and line14.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div id="ftn5">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Studies
have shown that dopamine uptake by synaptosomes could still achieve 55% of the
values of fresh brains even 24 hours after “death.” Schwarcz (1981) subjected rat brains to
post-mortem conditions comparable to those typically experienced by
humans: Four hours of room temperature
followed by 24 hours at 4 <!--[if supportFields]><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL
176 \f "Symbol"<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]-->C followed by brain isolation
and freezing of brain regions by placement in a -80 <!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-begin'></span>SYMBOL 176 \f "Symbol"<![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]-->C freezer for five days. Glutamate uptake by striatal synaptosomes
prepared from striata frozen this way amounted to 26% of control uptake by
fresh tissue synaptosomes. Morrison and
Griffith (1981) isolated undegraded messenger RNA from human brains after 4 or
16 hours of death, with or without freezing in liquid nitrogen. The mRNA was used to direct protein synthesis
in vitro. Normal protein populations were
observed, leading them to conclude “that post-mortem storage for 4 to 16 hours
at room temperature had little effect on the spectrum of isolated mRNAs.” There are many such reports to be found in
the literature. A final example: Tower at all. (1973a), (1973b), (1976) showed
preservation of oxygen consumption and enzyme activities in brains of many
species, including whales subject to many hours of warm ischemia, after
isolation from the dead animal and freezing.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div id="ftn6">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>This
objection was raised by Kadri Vivhelin.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn7">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Though
this shouldn’t be taken to imply any simple two-level view. At one level we might say that a
psychological function is software written in a language of thought where the
hardware is a region of the brain. At a
deeper level the the functioning of the brain region could be described as
software and the hardware identified as the neurons composing the region. Deeper again, the individual neurons could be
functionally described, with the hardware level being identified with
organelles, membranes, neurotransmitters, and so on. See William G. Lycan's discussion of “The
Continuity of Levels of Nature” in Lycan (1987).<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div id="ftn8">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>A
behaviorist will say that a machine that behaves just as I would is thereby
functionally equivalent at the appropriate level. This is the methodological assumption behind
the Turing Test for machine consciousness or intelligence. Others who think about the possibility of
uploading consciousness or building conscious machines hold that the hardware
must be isomorphic to ours at some deeper level. Some will argue that a serial
processor is sufficient because any parallel processor can be implemented in a
Turing-equivalent serial processor.
Others hold that some degree of parallelism will be necessary to produce
genuine consciousness, intentionality, or qualia.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>See
Dyson (1988), Moravec (1988) and the SF novel by Rucker (1982). Uploading cases have been used in the
philosophical literature: See, for
example, the machine tape case in Veatch (1975), which reappears in Gervais
(1986) and Green and Wikler (1980).<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div id="ftn10">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Prigogine
and Stengers (1984). Dawkins (1976, 2nd
ed. 1989).<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn11">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>This
characteristic may be shared by non-biological entities, or “artificial
life.” A-Life researchers therefore
suggest that we understand life in terms of certain formal characteristics
rather than as essentially carbon-based chemistry. This way of conceiving of life clearly accords
with functionalist views of mental states.
For an overview of current work in A-Life see Kelly (1991).<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div id="ftn12">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>See
next section for cases where someone might be said to be <i>partially</i> dead.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div id="ftn13">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>The
3-5 minutes rule for “brain-death” is no longer an impenetrable barrier. People have been recovered from many minutes
of ischemia at low temperatures with the help of calcium channel blocking
drugs.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div id="ftn14">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>I
will discuss this issue in Chapter 6.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/2.DOC#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>Pointless
because, if revived, they would live only in great pain or with severe
disability, or would deanimate again within minutes, hours or days. A decision not to revive a temporarily
revivable patient is “no-coding.”<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
</div>
Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-6196799329987833102014-08-26T16:29:00.002-05:002014-08-26T16:30:25.352-05:00The Diachronic Self, Chapter 1: Causal Conditions for Continuity<div align="left" class="chapterhead">
<b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 18pt;">PART 1: REDUCTIONISM, CAUSE, AND IDENTITY<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">Chapter 1<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">CAUSAL CONDITIONS FOR CONTINUITY<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">INTRODUCTION<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">For the purposes of this chapter I am assuming
reductionism to have been established as a component of a theory of personal
identity or survival. This chapter will examine differing accounts of causal
conditions for personal continuity or identity and argue for one of them.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
assumption of reductionism throughout the following can summarized as this: My
identity, survival, or continuity can be understood as reducible to certain
other facts; these are facts about psychological connectedness and continuity.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Parfit refers to these facts as the “R-relation.” I
am not something ontologically separable from the R-relation. The Reductionist
claim is: “A person’s existence just consists in the existence of a brain and
body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental
events.” (Parfit, 1984, p.211.)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Even
if we agree on Reductionism there are still a number of differing views of
personal identity available. I will set out these views in descending order of
how restrictive is the causal condition each one specifies. To clarify the
differences between the possible views I will provide five thought experiments
and will show the differential response of the theories to these cases. Further
clarification will come from setting out the different types of cause that can
support continuity of the R-relation and examining what assumptions each theory
makes about the various types of cause.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Finally,
I will provide several arguments in favor of the Conservative Interpretation of
the Widest Reductionist View (CIWR).<span style="color: magenta;"> </span>My
conclusion will be that personal identity can survive the absence of normal,
reliable, or direct causal connections between one stage of a person and a
continuer. <i>Some</i> kind of causal
connection between stages of a person is required for them to count as stages
of a single individual. This chapter will provide a foundation for later
chapters of the dissertation which will examine transformation of self, i.e.,
various ways in which a self can change over time and the significance of these
changes, and how they may be assimilated into the self.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="DiachronicIdentity"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">DIACHRONIC IDENTITY<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The
conception of the self being developed here Armstrong has called a relational
view (or what has been called a perdurance view), as opposed to an identity
view (or endurance view).</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> We can look at a person who persists over time and
divide up their life into any number of non-overlapping temporal stages or
phases. An identity view, in Armstrong’s sense, would hold that these phases
are identical with one another in some numerical sense. The identity view
treats temporal parts differently from spatial parts of a thing: Spatial parts
are clearly different parts of a particular, P; they are obviously not
identical with one another. (The asymmetry between the identity view’s
treatment of spatial and temporal parts provides grounds for an objection to
that view, according to Armstrong.) The relational view, by contrast, treats
spatial and temporal parts symmetrically. On the relational view,
non-overlapping phases of some perduring particular, P, are not identical in
any sense. These phases are simply different parts of the same thing. That
thing is <i>constituted</i> by those
temporal parts and their relations to each other and to other particulars. The
account of personal identity or continuity presented here is relational in this
sense. The self—the diachronic, continuant self—consists of its temporal stages
or phases and the relations between them. The particular relation, in this
case, is what Parfit calls the R-relation: Psychological connectedness and
continuity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> At this point it would be sensible
to explicitly stipulate how I shall be using the term “self”, before confusion
arises. Some people use the term to refer to the temporal phases or
person-stages of the continuant person. Others use it to refer to the
diachronic particular constituted by its phases and their relations. It is
especially important to define my usage since I am building on Parfit’s theory
of psychological reductionism, and so might be assumed to be following his
usage. Parfit sometimes presents his discussion of personal identity or
survival in terms of successive selves.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Looked at this way, the continuant person is made
up of, or can be regarded as, a series of successive selves. Any two temporally
contiguous selves are highly psychologically connected, whereas widely
temporally separated selves may be only very weakly connected. However, I will
not adopt this usage. <b>I will use “self”
to refer to the continuant, perduring, diachronic individual</b>. Its
constituent temporal parts I will refer to as person-stages, person-phases, or
phases of the self.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Perduring, continuant, diachronic person = SELF<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Transient, temporal part of person =
PERSON/SELF-STAGE or PHASE<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">My
reason for preferring this usage will become more obvious as this chapter
proceeds. Essentially, I believe that the contrary usage—using “self” to refer
to the temporal phases—reflects and encourages too heavy a weighting of the
significance of these phases, and devalues the importance of the continuant
self. This difference in emphasis between my transformationist interpretation
of psychological reductionism and Parfit’s version will show up in the sections
on the importance of projects and values to the continuity of the person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Apart from the unwanted emphasis on
the short term resulting from equating self with person-phase, such an equation
can easily give the misleading impression that there really are relatively
distinct selves. We may talk of the infant self, the child self, the adolescent
self, and the adult self, and think of the continuant self as the temporal
concatenation of these distinct and successive selves. Nevertheless, this
obscures the fact that we rarely find anything resembling a clear line or
sudden transition from one such ‘self’ to another. Those four terms are merely
loose references to person-phases; the borders they draw can be arbitrarily
moved around with some latitude. For instance, we may draw the line marking the
change from the adolescent self to the adult self at 13 years (as do Jews and
some other cultures), or at 16, or 18, or 21, or the age (whatever it turns out
to be) when some specified qualities have been developed. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Instead of talking in terms of
successive selves, I shall stick with the more basic language of degrees or
extent of psychological connectedness. If I need to refer to earlier or later
instances of a person, I will also use the terms self-stage or self-phase (or person-phase).
In other words, I will replace a series of successive selves with a spectrum of
connectedness. Connectedness can be measured in two ways giving different
answers though, in common with everyone else, I will use the first way. The two
ways differ in what to use as the standard of connectedness degree. The first
and obvious way is to ask how much of the earlier phase (A) survives or
continues on in the later phase (B). (Rather than earlier and later phases, A
and B could be original and duplicate selves.) Take the case (illustrated in
Figure 3 below) where half of A’s characteristics are shared by B. B, in
addition, has a great many characteristics not shared by A. According to the
first way of measuring connectedness, A and B are 50% connected (or A is 50%
connected to B). Another way to say this is that 50% of A is subsumed in B. The
second way measures connectedness in terms of B. We would then describe Figure
3 as a case where connectedness was very low (say 1%) because A has only 1% of
B’s characteristics. When A and B represent earlier and later selves (as they
will throughout this chapter), only the first way of measuring seems useful.
However, If A and B are taken to be an original self and a copy, the second way
will be useful, especially when B thinks about the situation. Henceforth, I
shall be assuming connectedness is measured the first way, in terms of the
earlier self.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; font-variant: small-caps; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Determining the degree of connectedness will not
suffice to tell us all that we need to know about our earlier and later phases
if we (earlier phase) are to make sensible decisions about allocating present
vs. future costs and benefits. The same degree of connectedness may attach to
situations that are not equally desirable. Knowing only that self-phases A and
B are 50% connected (for example) leaves out much information about our
relation to the later phase. The statement that A and B <br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 48.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">DIAGRAM
HERE<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
</span>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">are
50% psychologically connected could represent any one of three possible
propositions (each of which are represented in the diagrams):<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> (1) B has 50% of A’s
characteristics, but no characteristics that A doesn’t have, i.e. B is a subset
of A. (Figure 1)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> (2) B has 50% of A’s
characteristics, and 50% of B’s characteristics are not shared by A. (Figure 2)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> (3) B has 50% of A’s
characteristics, and only a small fraction of B’s characteristics are shared by
A. (Figure 3)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> We can use set diagrams to clarify
the ways in which two individuals may be psychologically connected. A and B may
stand for the earlier and later person-stages of a continuant individual (and
this is the interpretation I will be using). However, A and B could also
represent two individuals, each of whom is a survivor of the original. B could
be a copy of A—a copy of more or less fidelity, or who has psychologically
diverged over time from A.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> In Figure 1 the earlier self-phase,
A, possesses all the characteristics of the later phase, B, but B has only 50%
of the characteristics of A. In this case, the later self-phase is a degenerate
continuer of A. B has learned nothing new, acquired no new memories, formed no
new intentions or dispositions, and values only what A valued, yet has lost
half of what made A who he was. In Figure 2, the later self-phase retains 50%
of A’s characteristics, but also has about as many new characteristics. In
Figure 3, the later self-phase retains 50% of A’s characteristics, but these
are now an insignificant fraction of B’s total psychological features. This
situation might be realized if A is an infant and B an adult self, or if A is any
person of today and B a person who, due to advances in gerontology, has lived
for many centuries (or their subjective equivalent</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">). B has added many new experiences and memories,
and acquired additional dispositions, abilities, and values.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Each of these three represents a
case of 50% connectedness. Nevertheless practically all of us would prefer our
future to turn out more like the situation in Figure 2 than in Figure 1, and
most of us would prefer Figure 3 to Figure 2. Many accounts of psychological reductionism
suggest or imply that it makes most sense to allocate our concern for our
future self-phases proportionally to the degree of connectedness. The three
cases just described show this to be implausible. The same degree of
connectedness may be arrived at in differing ways, and we will prefer some of
these to others. The relationship between the metaphysical degree of
connectedness and the normative degree of reasonable concern for later stages
is thus not a straightforward one. In the later chapter on “A Transformationist
Account of Continuity” I will propose several reasons for concerning ourselves
with our future phases more than proportionally to the degree of connectedness.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%;"> Having
clarified what I mean by connectedness, I will now set out several versions of
Psychological Reductionism and explore how they differ in regard to the causal
conditions they assume. Without an account of the causal conditions necessary,
we will not know when to say that a psychological connection has endured at
all.</span><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="FourTheories"></a><b>FOUR THEORIES<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The four theories explained here can be thought of
as placed along a spectrum of restrictiveness with regard to required causal
conditions. The first theory requires the cause of psychological continuity to
be a normal one, other theories relax this restriction, and the fourth theory
denies the need for any causal connection between a self and its continuer.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> All
four Reductionist theories accept the Psychological Criterion. In order to
define this, let us review its components. <i>Psychological
connectedness</i> is the holding of particular direct psychological connections
such as memory links, the connection between intention and action, and enduring
dispositions. <i>Psychological continuity</i>
is the holding of overlapping chains of <i>strong</i>
connectedness.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Strong connectedness holds when “the number of
connections, over any day, is at least half the number of direct connections
that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.” (206)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <i>The Psychological Criterion</i>: (1) There
is psychological continuity if and only if there are overlapping chains of
strong connectedness. X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time
if and only if (2) X is psychologically continuous with Y, (3) this continuity
has the right kind of cause, and (4) there does not exist a different person
who is also psychologically continuous with Y. (5) Personal identity over time
just consists in the holding of facts like (2) to (4).</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">THE NARROW REDUCTIONIST VIEW: We might also call
this the “Spatiotemporal Continuity view.” The Narrow Reductionist accepts the
Psychological Criterion but construes condition (3) narrowly. On this view, the
right kind of cause is the normal cause. The normal cause is the continued
existence of the brain since our psychological features depend on our brain
states. The Narrow Psychological Criterion virtually always coincides with
another reductionist view—that of the Physical Criterion. The Physical
Criterion says that “a person continues to exist if and only if (a) there
continues to exist <i>enough</i> of this
person’s brain so that it remains the brain of a living person, and (b) no
different person ever has enough of this person’s brain.”</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The Narrow Psychological Criterion and the Physical
Criterion differ in principle in that the former requires, in addition to the
two conditions of the Physical Criterion, that there is psychological
continuity, that it has its normal cause, and that no one else is
psychologically continuous with the person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">THE WIDE REDUCTIONIST VIEW: (Or “Closest Functional
Continuer with a Reliable Cause.”) This also accepts the Psychological
Criterion but holds that the “right cause” is any reliable cause and not
necessarily the normal one. If the memories, intentions, and dispositions that
together comprise the R-relation were to be sustained by some reliable process
other than the normal activity of the brain, the Wide View would say that
identity had been preserved. For example, memory could be preserved on this
view by substituting a mechanical replacement for a collection of neurons so
long as no change in function occurred. Or, an example from Nozick:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Quotations" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">As you are dying, your brain
patterns are transferred to another (blank) brain in another body, perhaps one
cloned from yours. The patterns in the new brain are produced by some analogue
process that simultaneously removes these patterns from the old one… On
completion of the transfer, the old body expires.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Here there is no physical continuity of the brain
and an abnormal cause is operating to sustain R-relatedness. The Narrow
Reductionist View would say the later individual was not the same person as the
original, whereas the Wide View says that they are the same.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Nozick’s
Closest Continuer Theory can be seen as a variant on the Wide Reductionist
View.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The Closest Continuer theory says that something at
t<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">2</span> is the same entity as X at t<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">1</span> only if it is X’s closest continuer, is a
close <i>enough</i> continuer and is enough
closer than any other continuer. The only significant difference between the
Closest Continuer View and the Wide Reductionist View concerns Parfit’s fourth
condition for the Psychological Criterion. This said that “there does not exist
a separate person who is psychologically continuous with Y.” This is included
to rule out cases which violate the condition for transitivity of identity. If
person X at t<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">1</span> is R-related to both Y and Z at some later
time t<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">2</span>,
then, according to Parfit’s account of the Psychological Criterion, X cannot be
identical to either Y or Z even if, at a still later time t<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">3</span> there is only one person R-related to X.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
Closest Continuer theory, by contrast, might allow Z to be identical to X
despite there having been a period in which both Y and Z were continuers of X.
Nozick’s example is as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Quotations" style="margin-bottom: 6.0pt; mso-pagination: widow-orphan;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Half of an ill person’s brain is
removed and transplanted into another body, but the original body plus
half-brain does not expire when this is being done; it lingers on for one hour,
or two days, or two weeks. Had this died immediately, the original person would
survive in the new body, via the transplanted half-brain which carries with it
psychological similarity and continuity. However, in the intervening hour or
days or weeks, the old body lives on, perhaps unconscious or perhaps in full
consciousness, alongside the newly implanted body.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">If the old body had died simultaneously with the
transplantation, the new body plus half-brain would be the closest continuer.
However, so long as the original body plus half-brain remains alive <i>it</i> is the closest continuer. After it
dies, the new body plus half-brain becomes the closest continuer. As Nozick
asks, “Can its [the old body] lingering on during the smallest overlapping time
interval, when the lingerer is the closest continuer, mean the end of the
person, while if there was no such lingerer, no temporal overlap, the person
would live on. It seems so unfair for a person to be doomed by an echo of his
former self.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Nozick
then offers several possibilities, one of which is that the person moves from
the original body to the new body not when the transplant occurs but when the
old body dies. (The reasonableness of this view is supported by Nozick’s
previous examination and rejection of condition that the identity of Y at t<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">2</span> with X at t<span style="mso-text-raise: -3.0pt; position: relative; top: 3.0pt;">1</span> depends only on the properties and relations
of X and Y and not also on whether there exists a Z which more closely
continues X.) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Nozick
does not conclude that this is the right answer; rather he claims that a
certain indeterminacy is inherent in identity ascriptions. Our choice in this
case depends on whether we structure the concept of identity locally or
globally. We needn’t be concerned here with these complications. We can simply
note that a Closest Continuer view might allow identity to continue despite
some temporal overlap during which there are two close continuers. Of course,
if the old body lingered for several years before expiring we would not say
that the new body plus half-brain was a close enough continuer (since it would
have been going its own way for too long). There seems to be no clear way of
saying how long of an overlap is just too much for the new body plus half-brain
to count as identical with X. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> If
the Closest Continuer theory is taken to allow some degree of temporal overlap
then this will conflict with Parfit’s fourth condition for the Psychological
Criterion which disallowed any separate person to also be psychologically
continuous with the original person. With this one difference however, the
Closest Continuer theory and the Wide Reductionist view can be made compatible.
If both theories accept a psychological criterion then, with the possible
exception of the overlap case, they will come to the same.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">THE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE WIDEST
REDUCTIONIST VIEW (CIWR): (Or: “Closest Functional Continuer with an Indirect
or Unreliable Cause.”) The Widest Reductionist View interprets the “right
cause” third clause of the Psychological Criterion as allowing <i>any</i> cause. So long as the later
continuer is caused to occur in some way, and the earlier stage of the person
plays a crucial role, even if indirect and unreliable, then the continuer
counts as the same person as the earlier person. An example will be given below
to illustrate what this might mean.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">THE EXTREME INTERPRETATION OF THE WIDEST
REDUCTIONIST VIEW (EIWR): (Or: “Closest Functional Continuer with No Cause.”)
This actually subsumes two theories, the distinction between which will be
illustrated by the fourth and fifth cases below. The two possibilities depend
on what “No cause” is taken to mean. What they both have in common is that they
allow identity to continue even though the earlier stage plays no causal role
at all in the creation of the qualitatively identical later entity. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> “No
cause” might mean (a) as just stated, that the earlier entity in no way causes
its qualitatively identical successor; however, the successor is caused to
exist by something, albeit something unrelated to the earlier entity; (b) the
most radical interpretation of the Extreme Interpretation of the Widest View
holds that Y can be identical to X so long as Y is qualitatively identical to
X, even though (i) X played no causal role in bringing about Y; and (ii) <i>nothing</i> caused Y to come into existence,
i.e., Y came about purely randomly. Though these two variants of the Extreme
Interpretation differ in principle, they are extremely unlikely to ever differ
in practice, and just about everyone will have the same intuitive responses to
both. I include both variants for the sake of completeness.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Cases"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">CASES<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The following five cases or thought experiments are
intended to illustrate the differences between the theories and between
different views of the role of causation in the criteria of personal identity.
I will refer to them throughout the remainder of the paper, sometimes by their
abbreviations: 1:MBT; 2:TT; 3:AHR 4:OPR; 5:LPU.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">1: <b><i>My Brain Transplant</i></b>: My life is
threatened with an as-yet incurable disease. My doctor advises me to have a
brain transplant. Cell samples are taken and a decerebrated clone grown at an
accelerated pace. My brain is transplanted to the new body and hooked up to it.
I am soon walking around in a healthy new body, free of the disease.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">2: <b><i>The Transporter</i></b>: I step into a
We-Beam-U-Quick booth in Los Angeles. My body is scanned and the position and
velocity of all my constituent atoms and molecules determined and recorded. The
material of my body is atomized—far too rapidly for me to feel anything—and the
information specifying the structure of my body is transmitted to Tokyo. A
similar booth in Tokyo receives this information and constructs a body exactly
like the old one, except that new atoms (but of the same elements) are used. I
walk out of the booth happy to have made it so quickly to Japan, avoiding the
crush at the airports still used by conservative folk afraid of temporary
disintegration.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">3: <b><i>A Heroic Reconstruction</i></b>: In 2330AD a
group calling itself the Order of Universal Immortalism (OUI) declares that its
centuries old ambition is finally realizable. Technology has rendered death a
matter of choice. Yet, they claim, the death of people in past centuries is
still a tragedy that ought to be remedied. Fortunately Personality Tracking and
Reconstruction Technology has matured to the point where it is now possible to
reconstruct their personalities. Into a Super-Reconstructor Computer is fed
information gleaned from the brains of people who knew the unfortunate persons,
in addition to the results of extremely complex tracing of causal connections
back in time. The 22nd century overthrow of quantum mechanics with its
uncertainty principle and replacement by Quantum Super-Determinacy, has allowed
(with the aid of vast computational power) the precise determination of the
state of the universe at all past times. OUI scientists recently successfully
reconstructed the information uniquely specifying the personality of a
previously deceased person and embodied that information in a living body. The
reconstructed person, Francis Bacon II, expressed surprise at finding himself
in the 24th century, but was pleased to see that his scientific method had been
able to accomplish so much.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">4: <b><i>Omega Point Resurrection</i></b>: As
proposed by Frank Tipler,</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> at some vastly distant time in the future, our
distant descendents, now in control of all matter and energy in the universe,
set about resurrecting the dead. To ensure reconstruction of everyone who ever
lived, despite the loss of traces of most of them, they create duplicates of <i>every possible</i> person. One of these
duplicates is exactly like Francis Bacon, all the way down to his quantum
states, as he was shortly before he died.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">5: <b><i>The Luckiest Person in the Universe</i></b>:
From our Los Angeles correspondent: They say that L.A. is the city where dreams
come true. But even hardened Angeleno’s were stunned by what happened today in
front of City Hall during a press conference. In plain view of a crowd of
people, and recorded by numerous cameras, a man identifying himself as Francis
Bacon, materialized out of nothing. Investigators have ruled out any trickery
and have been unable to explain this man’s appearance. “Bacon” has an appearance
in keeping with historical records and has offered details of the historical
character’s life and many detailed historical facts which have impressed
historians specializing in the area. One physicist has suggested that, although
such an event is extremely unlikely to occur even once in billions of years, it
is possible that Mr Bacon is the outcome of a completely random and <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">acausal quantum process. Atoms in the area might
have just happened to have simultaneously randomly changed state in such a way
as to produce this mysterious man.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="CasesAndTheories"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">CASES AND THEORIES<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The four theories outlined above can be
distinguished more clearly by showing how they handle these five cases. The
Narrow Reductionist View will allow that there is continuity of personal
identity in <i>My Brain Transplant</i>, but
in no other case. Continuity of the brain is the normal cause of psychological
continuity and a brain transplant preserves the brain. In the other four cases,
the brain—as a physically continuous entity—does not endure.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
Wide Reductionist View would agree that identity survives the brain transplant,
but would go further in making the same judgement in <i>The Transporter</i> case. In this second case, the R‑relation is
preserved by an abnormal though reliable cause. The brain structures embodying
personality are transferred to a newly constructed brain by means of an
automatic process that reliably preserves the original patterns. (If this were
to become common practice, would the Narrow View come to regard it as a normal
means of continuity? If so, does that mean that transporters, when uncommon,
fail to preserve identity but do preserve it once they are used regularly?) The
Closest Continuer version of the Wide View might allow identity to have
continued even if the old brain had not been disassembled immediately upon
creation of the new brain at the remote location.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
Wide Reductionist would describe the case of <i>A Heroic Reconstruction</i> as one where Francis Bacon ceased existing,
and later a different person just like him appeared. The Wide Reductionist
requires a <i>reliable</i> cause to operate
in maintaining R‑relatedness. As discussed below, this third case involves
decisions being made by other people such that the continuation of R‑relatedness
is precarious and is not governed by a reliable process. The fourth and fifth
cases go further in the direction of unreliability and so would not be accepted
as instances of the persistence of personal identity by the Wide Reductionist.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
Conservative Interpretation of the Widest Reductionist View (CIWR) would hold
that personal identity had continued in the first three cases. Since this
theory requires for personal identity only that there be <i>some</i> causal relation between the earlier stage and the later one,
whether normal, reliable, or unreliable, Francis Bacon has continued on as the
same person in <i>A Heroic Reconstruction</i>.
The new Bacon is qualitatively identical to the historical Bacon, and the later
Bacon’s existence is dependent on the existence and qualities of the earlier
Bacon. The Universal Immortalists recreated Bacon because of his previous
existence, and they made him the way they did because of the way he was. CIWR
would describe the situation as one in which Francis Bacon jumped through time
from the 17th Century to the 24th, in principle just as if he had been in a
coma for seven centuries.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Despite
the apparent looseness of its causal condition for identity, CIWR would reject
the last two cases as instances of continuation of the same person. Although
qualitative identity is maintained in <i>Omega
Point Resurrection</i> and <i>The Luckiest
Man in the Universe</i> the earlier Bacon plays no role either in the coming
into existence or the qualitative identity of the second Bacon.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
Extreme Interpretation(s) of the Widest Reductionist View (EIWR) counts the
first four cases as instances of the same person continuing. They require only
that the later Bacon-like individual be qualitatively identical (or
sufficiently similar) to the earlier. No causal connection between the earlier
and later Bacons is necessary. I should note here that if Bacon II is
qualitatively the same as the original Bacon just before he died, there will be
some overlap. On the Closest Continuer variant of the Extreme Interpretation
this breakdown in transitivity does not disrupt identity. According to Parfit’s
version in which identity requires that “there does not exist a different
person who is also psychologically continuous with Y”, the matter is open to
interpretation. Since in the example as described, there is no actual <i>temporal</i> overlap, Parfit’s condition has
been fulfilled and identity is maintained. However the spirit of Parfit’s
fourth, no-overlap, condition may disallow even the non-temporal overlap. If
so, then we could redescribe the cases such that Bacon II is created in the
same state that the original Bacon had just died in, and then returned to
consciousness. Alternatively, we can throw out the no-overlap condition and
regard the Extreme Interpretation as an account of personal <i>continuity</i> (Parfitian survival) rather
than identity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
Moderate interpretation of EIWR (M-EIWR) differs from the Radical
interpretation of EIWR (R-EIWR) over the fifth case. M-EIWR requires that there
be a cause of the later Bacon, though it need not be a cause relating the
earlier to the later person. R-EIWR rejects even this causal condition,
requiring <i>only</i> qualitative
continuity. R-EIWR holds that the randomly created Bacon in <i>The Luckiest Man in the Universe</i> is the
same person as the historical Bacon. I will argue below that there is no
important difference between M-EIWR and R-EIWR in practice, and little
theoretical difference.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="CausesandContinuity"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="CausalConditionNeeded"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">CAUSAL CONDITIONS<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">All the theories examined here are reductionist.
Where they disagree is over the type or necessity of causation in personal
identity. In order to decide between the theories it will therefore be helpful
to more precisely distinguish the different types of cause at issue. After
setting these out I will give five arguments in favor of abandoning all but the
weakest causal condition. This will support a view as radical as the
Conservative Interpretation of the Widest View (which requires an indirect
cause of any kind), but not the Extreme Interpretation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Causes
can set out along three spectra: (1) From <i>normal</i>
to <i>any reliable</i> to <i>any</i> to <i>no</i> cause. (2) From <i>internal</i>
to <i>external</i>. (3) According to degree
of directness: From <i>direct</i> to <i>indirect</i> to <i>independent</i> cause.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b>(1) (a) Normal Cause:</b> The requirement
of a normal cause is embodied in the Narrow Reductionist View. The Physical
Criterion would take this to mean the standard continuity of a human brain. The
Psychological Criterion would add other, more complicated, conditions such as a
coherent development of later psychological traits out of earlier traits.
Continuity of the brain, considered on a gross level, is an insufficient
specification of a normal cause on the Psychological Criterion since the brain
may continue but its states might be radically disrupted in a way that
introduces a sudden and permanent change in personality. This might come about
as a result of some neurochemical shock, or due to an intense psychological
shock. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Clearly
the Narrow Reductionist has to make choices about what is to count as a normal
cause of psychological continuity. Some might count a sudden and profound
psychological change caused by the interaction of intensive “brain-washing”
with the existing personality as sufficiently abnormal to destroy personal
identity while others might not. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Another
question to be answered by the Narrow theorist is whether or not “normality” is
to be temporally indexed: Does “normal” mean “normal for 1990”, “normal up to
1990”, or “normal considering past, present, and future”? The problem is that
what is normal now may not always be so. A few hundred years ago, the normal
cause of good vision was having good natural eyes and no good vision existed
where eyes were faulty. Now, however, good vision is caused almost as often by
artificial devices and processes such as glasses, contact lenses, radial
keratotomy (and soon corneal sculpting). Perhaps one day unaltered brains will
not be the normal cause of psychological continuity. Just as we now often
replace other faulty organs with artificial organs, we might eventually replace
parts of the brain with functionally equivalent artificial parts (biological or
mechanical), and perhaps even the entire brain might be replaced (gradually
over time or all at once) with an artificial brain. If this were to occur would
the Narrow Reductionist say that the new method was an abnormal cause and
didn’t continue identity, or would she say that it is what is <i>currently </i>normal that counts? If the
latter, then why should we talk of a normal cause at all? Why not require
simply any reliable cause? Such indeterminacy in the normality condition strongly
suggests that this view is parochial and inessential.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b>(b)</b> <b>Any Reliable Cause:</b> This is the condition minimally required by the
Wide Reductionist View (and Nozick’s version of the Closest Continuer Theory).
A reliable but abnormal cause is illustrated by <i>The Transporter</i> (if we assume either that transporters are unusual
or that “normal” refers to historically normal). In the transporter case
psychological continuity is reliably maintained since the process is (by
hypothesis) both automatic and about as reliable as the brain in ensuring
continuity. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> To
be fanciful: Suppose that we are mistaken in our materialistic view that our
brains’ operations are determined by physical law and that in fact the
appearance of causal connectedness has always been brought about by “God.”
(That is, suppose God sustains the universe in existence rather than merely
having created it with the property of self-sustenance.) The normal and
reliable cause of psychological continuity is then God’s intentions and power
(assuming that God has a long-term intention to maintain standard operations).
One day God decides that he is bored with existing and decides to cease
existing. However, he feels responsible to his creation (or emanation) and so
changes the nature of the universe so that it is now self-sustaining just as we
materialists</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> always thought it was. The new cause of our
psychological continuity is not (yet?) the normal cause but it is just as
reliable as the old cause. The Wide Reductionist view sees this case as unproblematically
one where the reliable but non-normal cause is sufficient for continuity of
personal identity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b>(c)</b> <b>Any Cause:</b> This is illustrated by <i>A Heroic Reconstruction</i> and is the minimal causal requirement of
the Conservative Interpretation of the Widest View (CIWR). More accurately this
condition says: “Any relevant and sufficient cause connecting the earlier
entity with the later qualitatively identical entity.” This condition is less
demanding than the normal or any reliable causal conditions since the relevant
cause need be neither normal nor reliable. The dropping of these two conditions
is shown by <i>A Heroic Reconstruction</i>.
Here the new Bacon is clearly produced by a very abnormal cause. The causal
connection between the old and new Bacons is unreliable since it is mediated by
the intentions of other agents. If the Universal Immortalists had held
different beliefs and/or desires then the new Bacon would not have come into
existence. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Though
the requirements of normality and reliability are dropped on the “any cause”
view, there remains the requirement that there be a causal connection between
the earlier person and the later one. Nor can this be just any causal
connection. In the case of <i>Omega Point
Resurrection</i>, imagine that the second Bacon happened to pick up some old
writing of the earlier Bacon. The later Bacon then carries out an unfulfilled
intention expressed in that writing. This kind of connection would not be
sufficient for continuity of personal identity on the “any cause” view. In this
example, though there is a causal connection between the earlier and later
Bacons, it has nothing to do with the existence or qualitative identity of the
later Bacon (who was produced without any knowledge of the original). The “any
cause” condition requires that the causal connection be one necessary to
explain the coming into existence of the qualitatively identical later person
and sufficient to explain the qualitative similarity of the later person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b>(d)</b> <b>No Cause:</b> This drops even the requirement that the earlier entity
be causally connected in any way to the later one. This corresponds to the
Extreme Interpretation of the Widest View. There is a moderate and radical
version of the “no cause” view corresponding to the Moderate and Radical
interpretations of the Extreme Interpretation of the Widest View (M-EIWR and
R-EIWR). The radical interpretation takes “no cause” to mean not only that
there is no relevant cause connecting the earlier and later qualitatively
identical persons but also that there need be no cause of the later person at
all, i.e., the person could have come into existence without necessitating
prior causes.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b>(2) Internal to External:</b> An internal
cause of personal continuity is a cause operating within the physical system
that instantiates the person. The continuation of psychological relatedness
over time when supported by the continued internal operations of the brain is a
case of an internal cause. Internal causes are likely to be normal causes, but
there could be abnormal internal causes such as the gradual replacement of
brain tissue by artificial components. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> An
external cause exists where the continuity of personality results from
something other than the internal workings of the physical support system, such
as in <i>The Transporter</i>. If the
continuation of my personality depended on continual acts of God (as in some
interpretations of Berkeley’s views) then it would have an external cause. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
point of distinguishing a reliability spectrum from an internality-externality
spectrum is that, for many people considering the cases, an internal unreliable
cause is much less disturbing than an external unreliable cause. Suppose a new
disease became epidemic; in most persons this disease leads to rapid
deterioration of neural function, thereby destroying personality. Although the
brain in such a situation would not be a reliable cause of psychological
continuity, few would feel that the identity of those <i>not</i> succumbing to the disease was threatened. By contrast, the case
of A Heroic Reconstruction, which could be no less reliable a cause of
continuity than exists in the diseased-brain society, will lead far more people
to doubt the continued identity of persons. Doubts about continuity of identity
increase independently with both increasing unreliability and increasing
externality of causes.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b>(3) The Directness of a Cause:</b> This is
likely to be related to its reliability. Directness specifies how many steps
are necessary to the process that continues the qualitative identity. The more
steps there are <i>ceteris paribus</i> the
less reliable the cause of continuity will be. However, other factors may not
be equal. If the technology and construction of transporters were excellent,
then the indirectness of continuation by transporter may be no less reliable
than continuity resulting from normal brain operation. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> A
direct cause need not be normal: So long as the earlier state of the physical
system supporting personality directly leads to the next state of the system it
doesn’t matter whether the system is the normal one. A partially computerized
brain might just as directly cause later states of the system. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> An
indirect cause (as in <i>The Transporter</i>
and <i>A Heroic Reconstruction</i>) may or
may not involve actions on the part of other persons. If actions and decisions
of others are required in order to maintain continuity then the cause will
probably be more indirect and less reliable. The cause of continuity will
become increasingly indirect as more agents must decide whether to participate
in maintaining a person’s continuity. Every time continuity depends on
someone’s decision, the unreliability of the continuity increases. An
independent cause is the same thing as the moderate interpretation of “no
cause.” In this case the continuer of the earlier person has a cause that is
entirely unrelated to the earlier person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
foregoing suggests that the directness spectrum is not as deep as the
reliability or internality-externality spectra. Degrees of directness can be
reduced to combinations of degrees of reliability and internality/externality
(especially the former) whereas the latter two spectra cannot usefully be
reduced to each other. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><u><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="WhichCondition"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">WHICH CAUSAL CONDITION?<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The foregoing has consisted of conceptual
clarification and differentiation. I want to distinguish the various views as
sharply as possible in order to see precisely what is at issue between them.
Almost everyone (every reductionist at least) will be satisfied that personal
identity is secured so long as the normal continuity of the Narrow View is
maintained. But beyond that point intuitions differ over where the cut off
point lies. Some will reject <i>The
Transporter</i> case though most reductionists are willing to accept that as
preserving personal identity. Quite a few will draw a line between <i>The Transporter</i>, with its unusual but
reliable and fairly direct cause on the one hand, and all the later cases on
the other. Others will feel that the first three cases go together since there
is some important causal connection between the earlier and later persons. Very
few people will react differently in comparing <i>Omega Point Resurrection</i> and <i>The
Luckiest Man in the Universe</i>. I will provide several arguments that
together I take to strongly support the supposition that personal identity
exists in at least the cases of <i>My Brain
Transplant</i>, <i>The Transporter</i>, and <i>A Heroic Reconstruction</i>. Before arguing
that we should be willing to go as far as AHR and the Conservative
Interpretation of the Widest Reductionist View, I will argue that we should not
abandon all causal conditions. That is, we should reject the Extreme
Interpretation of the Widest Reductionist View. <i>Omega Point Resurrection</i> and <i>The
Luckiest Man in the Universe</i> are cases in which personal identity is not
maintained.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="CausalConditions"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif; text-transform: uppercase;">Is a Causal Condition Necessary?<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">According
to the Widest Reductionist View <i>any</i>
causal connection that preserves connectedness is sufficient for the very same
individual to continue. I distinguished two variants of this view—the
Conservative and Extreme Interpretations. The Extreme Interpretation allows
“any cause” to include <i>no</i> cause. That
is, psychological connectedness may persist over a causal discontinuity. This
section will argue against the Extreme Interpretation of the Widest
Reductionist View.<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> My view, like Parfit’s, is that it
is the effect rather than the kind of cause that matters in these cases. Thus
radically different mechanisms like brain transplants, teletransportation, or
personality reconstruction (as in <i>A
Heroic Reconstruction</i>) can maintain the connectedness necessary to personal
continuity and identity. As I will show (mostly in the final chapter), some
kinds of changes and causes of changes are more compatible than others with a
judgment that the same person continues. If we meet a friend whom we have not
heard from in ten years, and we are startled by the enormous difference in
their personality, it will matter to us how they became who they are now. If
they developed into their current self in normal ways we will not hesitate to
believe they are numerically identical with the person we used to know (or:
this stage is a continuer of the person-stage we used to know). If we discover
that the personality of the friend we once knew was destroyed and replaced with
an implanted persona (as portrayed in the movie <i>Total Recall</i> and Phillip Dick’s original story “We Can Remember It
For You Wholesale”), we may not regard the former person as having survived.<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Although I take a liberal view of
the kinds of underlying causes necessary for the same person to continue to
exist, I must challenge Daniel Kolak and Raymond Martin’s no-cause view in
“Personal Identity and Causality: Becoming Unglued.”</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 9pt;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Kolak and Martin present a range of cases intended
to make the reader “walk across the bridge” from normal, reliable causes to no
cause. Before developing my positive account of causal conditions for identity,
I will critically examine Kolak and Martin’s examples, showing why I think that
a causal requirement should be retained. In order to have a clear foil against
which to argue, I will first need to ensure that their examples genuinely are
cases of the absence of causal connection.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The two examples purport to describe
a situation in which sequences of events follow one another just as they do in
our universe (as we understand it), but where there is no causal connection
between events. The first example offered by Kolak and Martin asks us to assume
that science one day discovers that the universe is causally just like the
situation in their MOC Match Example. This involves supposing that<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Quotations">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">the entire universe as we now know it flickers on
and off every instant. Between instants, some sort of cosmic randomizing device
creates an infinite number of sequences and then selects and conjoins with the
others only those which correspond in a normal way to the previous instant. In
that case, what exists at any one instant did not causally arise out of what
existed at the previous instant. It is not likely, to say the least, that
science will discover this. But if it did, would it make any difference to our
concept of personal identity, or would we go on just as before? We believe that
we would go on just as before, and that the fact that we would casts doubt on
the causal condition. (p.344)<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> This example fails to support the
claim that a causal connection of some kind is unnecessary. One problem we face
immediately is in understanding the workings of the universe as their example
describes it. I can see two significantly different ways of interpreting this
example. According to the first, the universe described has two main components:
A cosmic randomizing device (CRD) that seems to be the active component, and
the universe as we perceive it, a universe that really consists of consecutive
universe-slices created by the CRD. The CRD is quite distinct from the
universe-slices, being itself stable and not subject to the constant flickering
into and out of existence. If the CRD is to generate universe-slices in a
normal way, as posited, then it must contain an internal model at least as
complex as the universe. Without a model this complex the CRD would be unable
to “correctly” select the configuration that matched the previous
universe-slice and bring it into existence. In this situation it appears that
the universe as we perceive it—the sequence of universe-slices—is irrelevant to
the progression of events; everything of importance takes place within the CRD
where the model of the universe evolves smoothly. The external universe-slices
appear to be nothing more than epiphenomena; as such Kolak and Martin’s first
example becomes no different from their second, making my criticisms of that
example applicable to this.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Leaving this interpretation aside,
the example admits of another interpretation. The most natural interpretation,
and the one that accords with Kolak and Martin’s description of the MOC Match
Example from which it is adapted, is one where a causal connection is
maintained. Though one universe-slice does not <i>directly</i> cause the next one to match its configuration, each
subsequent slice is configured by the CRD <i>because</i>
that configuration matches the foregoing slice. If it weren’t for the earlier
universe-slice and its unique configuration, the CRD wouldn’t have generated
the later slice. If the CRD is causing successive states of the universe to
match up then the example does <i>not</i>
illustrate a situation where we believe persons to have persisted in the
absence of causal connections.<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> For the example to meet the no-cause
requirement we must reformulate it. The best way is to exclude the <i>deus ex machina</i>, the CRD, leaving the
example otherwise unaltered. Given this third interpretation, the example is
genuinely one where there are no causal connections between (qualitatively
non-identical) states of the universe.<span style="color: magenta;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Their second case asks us to<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Quotations">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Suppose that what we ordinarily take to be causally
related stages of a continuing person are not related as causes and effects of <i>each other</i> but are rather epiphenomena
of some underlying process…<i><o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="Quotations">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">In our example it is our
bodies-plus-our-conscious-lives, the entire complexes of what most of us think
of as ourselves, that are causally impotent. This could happen if there were
very small temporal gaps between adjacent, “instantaneous” person-stages, and
no causal influence were transmitted across these gaps. Person-stages then
would merely appear to be causally related because the underlying process
insures [sic] that they give that appearance. Further, suppose that the
underlying process is not such that if we understood it, we would want to
include any of it into what we regard as a person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The
description of this example is brief, leaving it open to interpretation.
However, only one interpretation is strictly consistent with the authors’
intent to remove all causal connection between person-stages. This
interpretation says: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: .1in; margin-right: .1in; margin-top: 6.0pt;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">During
the fleeting span of each instantaneous person-stage, no change occurs and no
causes exist. The underlying process removes each stage from existence and
replaces it with a slightly different stage, producing the appearance of change
and causal connection between stages.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">This
makes the underlying process the Prime Mover and the clearly makes the stages
epiphenomena. There are causes operating, even though they are radically
different from those allowed by our current physical and biological models. In
these cases, between the stages of what we now think of as distinct, complete,
and continuing persons, there is no direct causal connection. If the
epiphenomenalist example turned out to be actual, Kolak and Martin claim that
such a discovery would not affect our everyday lives; “we would continue to
associate person-stages with persons in the same way that we do now.” (345) I
accept this conclusion; I would continue to believe in enduring persons.
Nevertheless, I deny that this example should lead us to reject causal conditions.
Not only does the example fail to justify throwing out all causal conditions,
it does not provide a reason to move beyond even the Narrow Reductionist’s
conservative position. Instead of rejecting causal conditions, we would have to
reformulate our conception of selves.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> If we discovered such an underlying
process, and that process was recognizable as a person, then we would merely
have to accept that we are located differently than we had believed, just as
someone studying neuroscience might realize that consciousness resides in the
brain and not the heart. We could explain the illusion of being centered in our
heads as being due to the location of most of our senses, just as today’s
experimenters strapped into virtual reality gear have had the experience of
viewing their bodies from the outside, and feel that they are located at their
point of view. Relocation of the self is easy enough to imagine, but Kolak and
Martin explicitly rule it out. They stipulate that the underlying process is
not itself a person. This leaves us with the option of redrawing the boundaries
of persons. Rather than being located only in brains and bodies, as we had
thought, we would see ourselves as spread out between brains, bodies, and the
underlying process, wherever it was located. Perhaps the newly discovered
process is a field composed of a novel form of energy, spread out over miles,
overlapping with the fields of other persons. If so, we would come to see
ourselves, contrary to our untutored perceptions, as much larger, and as being
able to share space with another person in a way that our bodies cannot. The
continuing experiences of our reconceived selves would be caused not by the
brain, or not by the brain alone, but the underlying-process-brain combination.
Whereas today we believe one thought (or emotion, or intention) to follow from
another because of causes found in the brain, after the paradigm-shattering
discovery we would believe that thoughts follow one another because of causes
embedded in the underlying process. The causes were there all along, even
though we were in ignorance of them, therefore they are the normal and
(presumably) reliable causes. The discovery, startling as it would be, would
give us no reason to move even beyond the Narrow Reductionist View.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The foregoing might not satisfy
Kolak and Martin. They stipulate in their epiphenomenalist example not only
that the underlying process is not a person, but the much more restrictive
stipulation that “the underlying process is not such that if we understood it,
we would want to include any of it into what we regard as a person.” The underlying process is not a person, nor
is the process plus apparent (causally unconnected) person-stages. This move is
intended to force us to the view that, since our experience tells us that we
are continuing persons, persons must be able to persist despite an absence of
causal connection between person-stages. Syllogistically, the argument boils
down to this:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">(1) We might discover that person-stages are
epiphenomena of an underlying (non-personlike) process and lack any causal
relation to one another.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">(2)
In that situation we would still believe persons to exist.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Therefore, causal connection between person-stages
is not necessary for continuation of persons.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> That is, we exist, possess
consciousness, and our experiences proceed in an orderly fashion, yet each
thought, each action, each feeling, each person-stage, has no causal relation
to the one before. If I accept Kolak and Martin’s analytical procedure, I must
reject one of the premises since I maintain the contrary of the conclusion.
Although I have reservations about the procedure I will not challenge it
because that would require arguments about the proper use of thought
experiments, and that would take me too far afield. Even accepting their procedure, I do not have
to accept the conclusion of the argument. If we were to uncover the truth of
this epiphenomenalist scenario, I would conclude that there were no persons. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Our notion of persons involves
enduring entities with certain properties such as (a capacity for) rationality,
responsibility, the ability to make choices, foresight, and (a capacity for)
self-restraint. None of these properties could exist in the epiphenomenalist
scenario. If I form an intention to do X at one moment, it can have no effect
whatsoever on whether I (or the appearance of a continuing “I”) later do X. The
succession of time-slices is determined by the non-personal underlying process
so that intentions will be followed by later actions that accord with those
intentions, yet there is no connection at all between the two. If I (the
momentary time-slice) had somehow formed a different intention, the underlying
process would nevertheless produce later time-slices according to its program.
Any decision I make at any moment can have no effect on “my” future actions.
Similarly, even if I had different experiences than I actually have, my
memories would be the same—as determined by the underlying process. If I were
to consider evidence different from that which I have, I would still reach the
same conclusion—the conclusion programmed by the underlying process. Nothing I
do now can make any difference to what I will do later. Nothing I have done in
the past can have any effect on what I choose to do now. The appearance of a
connection between actions and characteristics over time is <i>only</i> an appearance. The epiphenomenalist
scenario leaves no room for genuine choices, responsibility, or reasoning.
Without these characteristics the mere appearances left over do not remotely
satisfy our requirements for personhood. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Our experience seems to assure us
that there are persons and that this belief must persist after the
epiphenomenalist discovery. But our belief that we are persons, in the sense
standard for the term, is no more immune to revision and rejection than beliefs
about the rest of the world. Indeed, in the actual world, a substantial body of
research suggests we are systematically deluded about the nature of our
experience: see studies of blindsight, and experimentally-backed theories
asserting that we are never conscious of the present.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> I
conclude that this imaginary example should not lead us to abandon the causal
condition. Kolak and Martin are mistaken in their surprising assertion that
abandoning the causal condition in the face of this hypothetical discovery is a
conservative suggestion. If our successive conscious states were causally
unrelated, it is not true that everything else would be left intact. Nonsense
would be made of our notions of persons as agents, as responsible in any way
for our actions and thoughts, and of personal projects and goals of having any
value. Our intentions and memories and other characteristics would have nothing
to do with what we did. If we are satisfied that persons only persist in so far
as their phases are causally connected, we can move on to consider how liberal
we can be in allowing non-standard causal connections to count as maintaining a
person’s identity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Perception"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">ARGUMENT FROM PERCEPTION AND INTUITION<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">This argument supports a move at least up to the
Wide Reductionist View, and has been used by Nozick in defending the Closest
Continuer variant of Wide Reductionism. The essential idea is that we perceive
the continuation of objects according to a certain schema which is well
described by the closest continuer theory. This schema explains our intuitions
regarding the diachronic identity of changing objects. The unstated assumption
of Nozick’s point is that our conceptual understanding is strongly informed by
our perception. If our perception works according to a certain schema then this
provides some support to the belief that the schema well describes objects at
the conceptual level.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Nozick
describes experiments by psychologist Shimon Ullman intended to determine how
and when people classify discontinuous appearances as two appearances of the
same object and when as appearances of two different objects. An object was
shown moving in a straight line towards a screen and then disappearing behind
it. After a short time another object came out of the other end of the screen.
The angle of exit was varied, as well the object’s color, shape, and velocity.
The results of the experiments fitted the closest continuer hypothesis. For
example, if the object exited at a different angle, or after a delay, people
assumed that it had been struck behind the screen and was the same object. But
if two objects exited the screen, the one with the angle, velocity, etc., of
the entering object was thought to be the original object.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> In
these judgements of continuity of the same object, it does not matter whether
the object is perceived continuously. Nozick thinks that these experiments
support both parts of the Closest Continuer theory: (a) That a later object Y
is the same as an earlier object X only if Y’s properties grow out of, are
causally dependent on X’s properties at the earlier time; (b) there is no other
Z at the later time that stands in a closer (or as close) relationship to X
than does Y.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> If
the argument from perception has weight it supports Wide Reductionism because
it supports the view that something is the same thing so long as it is similar
and continues sufficiently smoothly from an earlier phase of an object. It
seems not to matter that the qualities of the object are not spatio-temporally
continuous. However, as Nozick presents it, the perception argument rules out
the Extreme Interpretation of the Widest View since this rejects (a). This
argument gives some support to the Conservative Interpretation of the Widest
View. CIWR weakens the causal condition considerably by allowing quite indirect
causes to maintain identity. Certainly CIWR is compatible with the experimental
results: The subjects do not know what is happening behind the screen; perhaps
some unusual causal process occurs, but one that results in an exiting object
with a similar enough trajectory, velocity, or appearance to convince the
viewers of its continuity with the object that entered. Although compatible
with CIWR, these results do not provide convincing grounds for moving from the
Wide to the Widest Reductionist view. The experiment does not test how the
subjects’ responses might be effected if they were to consider the possibility
that something highly unusual had happened behind the screen. Perhaps the entering
object was instantaneously scanned then disintegrated, and an exactly similar
object created according to the information gleaned in the scan and put back on
the original object’s trajectory. Perhaps the experiments weakly support CIWR
in particular in that unusual causes like this <i>could</i> have been operating, yet the subjects still made the
judgements they did. However, the experiment was not designed to specifically
test reactions to such situations.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> This
argument from perception is suggestive and may give some weight to the Wide and
even the Widest Reductionist Views, but it is not strong enough to give these
views sufficient support by itself. We might doubt that the operation of our
normal perception and conceptualization is a good guide to highly abstract
problems of identity as in personal identity. This is because of the Quinean
and Hansonian point that percepts must be conceptually interpreted, and
interpretations may be based on parochial experience and incorrect premises.
This first argument is therefore only a prelude to other more powerful
arguments.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Neurosurgeons"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">NEUROSURGEONS AND THE SLIPPERY SLOPE<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Here"></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Personal identity is
not defined by an entity’s continued possession of the same collection of
atoms. All versions of the psychological criterion of reductionism accept this,
as does Nagel’s physical same-brain criterion. The same-brain criterion requires
only that enough of one brain persists along a unitary spatio-temporal path.
The irrelevance of material persistence to personal identity or continuity is
supported by functionalism. Functionalism identifies beliefs, desires, and
other psychological states by their causal roles in an economy of such states.
My belief-that-p is distinguished by its relation to input, to other
psychological states, and to behavior.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Functionalism
supports psychological reductionism (Relation R) over physical reductionist
views like Nagel’s.</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[16]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Nagel’s view is that I am essentially whatever is
normally the cause of psychological continuity, and this is a brain composed of
the usual proteins. Nagel sometimes seems to want to say that it is the brain
in certain states, rather than simply the whole brain, that is essential to
identity. But even that version of the same-brain criterion conflicts with
functionalism. According to functionalists, a belief-that-p might, in
principle, be instantiated in a human brain in one way, and in an animal’s,
extraterrestrial’s, or computer’s brain in different material. Even in a
single, continuous brain, certain neurons might be replaced over time with functionally
equivalent elements made of an entirely different material. Even if the
majority of the brain were eventually replaced in this manner, functionalism
says that the same beliefs, desires, intentions and memories would persist.
Since, according to psychological
reductionism, a person just is psychological connectedness and continuity,
functionalism supports some version of psychological reductionism.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Functionalism’s
type-token distinction cannot help us decide <i>which</i> variety of psychological reductionism is correct because
types at one level of abstraction can be seen as tokens at a different level of
abstraction. This means that we cannot be satisfied with simply identifying the
R-relation with the functional level rather than the material level. Doing this
will not distinguish any of the theories beyond Wide Reductionism from one
another since they can all claim to identify a self with a functional level of
description.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> This
relativity of types and tokens can be illustrated as follows: A belief-that-p
is now tokened in me by group-of-atoms A. This group of atoms, at a particular
point in time, constitutes neuron group M. Here M, as constituted by specific
atoms, is a token. Over time the atoms constituting neuron group M change so
that M can be regarded as a type. Suppose that later my belief-that-p is
embodied a physically distinct neural circuit N in the same brain; at a higher level of abstraction the token is
now neuron group N and the type is the activation vector space</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[17]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> embodied in neuron group N. The activation vector
space might, at a later time, be instantiated in an artificial brain with
identical function to the biological organ, and where the vector space has
identical relations to other vector spaces in the artificial brain as it had when
instantiated in the original brain.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Functionalism
supports a move as far as Wide Reductionism but cannot decide between CIWR, and
EIWR. Functionalism gives conditions for the type-identity of cognitive states.
My belief-that-p in 1991 is type-identical with my belief-that-p in 1995 just
so long as both instances of belief-that-p have the same functional role.
According to psychological reductionism I am nothing more than the
connectedness and continuity of my psychological states. Thus, if a person is constituted
by an inter-related collection of psychological states each of which is
type-identical with an earlier person’s psychological states, the earlier and
later person are identical.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> However
functionalism does not specify whether a break in the spatiotemporal continuity
of a person disrupts the type-identity of psychological states. The question
does not normally arise, since functionalism is a thesis about the <i>type-identity</i> of psychological states,
whereas the current issue is the continuing identity of an <i>individual.</i> The personal identity question and functionalism are
related because, as noted above, an individual over time (or before and after
teletransportation) can be viewed as a series of collections of type-identical
psychological states. Functionalism might be held to support only Wide
Reductionism, or also one of the Widest Reductionist views. Functionalism is
not able to decide between these theories since it does not address the issue
of spatiotemporal continuity; it only talks about type-identity between
different individuals, or between earlier and later instances of the same
spatiotemporally continuous individual. There is no obvious reason, however,
why it is not compatible with the more liberal reductionist views. All
discussions of functionalism assume spatiotemporal continuity since, in a world
as yet lacking teletransporters and practicing Universal Immortalists, there
are no instances of persons with spatiotemporal discontinuities.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Since
I want to defend CIWR, which allows identity to persist across spatiotemporal
discontinuities, I will now leave functionalism aside. Different support is
required to move beyond Wide Reductionism to the Widest Reductionist theories.
This next stage is important because many people’s intuitions rebel when
examples involve these discontinuities. Many of those who can accept <i>My Brain Transplant</i> and <i>The Transporter</i> are troubled by <i>A Heroic Reconstruction,</i> and cannot
accept either <i>Omega Point Resurrection</i>
or <i>The Luckiest Person in the Universe</i>
as cases of continuing personal identity. The following series of cases begins
with Parfit’s neurosurgeon example. Parfit uses that example to show the
irrelevance of spatiotemporal continuity. To begin, here is Parfit’s story:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="Quotations">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">In <i>Case One</i>,
the surgeon performs a hundred operations. In each of these, he removes a
hundredth part of my brain, and inserts a replica of this part. In <i>Case Two</i>, the surgeon follows a
different procedure. He first removes all the parts of my brain, and inserts
all of their replicas. (p.474)<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> In
both cases the matter embodying mental items is different after the operation
from what it is before. But we have seen that this does not concern us. In Case
One there is spatiotemporal continuity between the old embodiments. One small
part of the brain is removed at a time; the new part is attached to the brain
and becomes part of it before another piece is removed and exchanged.
Throughout Case One the same brain remains. In Case Two, if we require
spatio-temporal continuity for physical objects then the same brain does not
exist after the operation. The new brain is functionally identical to the old
one but is a different brain. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> In
both of the cases there will later be a person whose brain will be exactly like
my present brain, and so that person will be psychologically continuous with
me. “And, in <i>both</i> cases, this
person’s brain will be composed of the <i>very
same</i> new components, each of which is a replica of some part of my brain.
The difference between the cases is merely the way in which these new parts are
inserted. It is a difference in the orderings of removals and insertions. In
Case One, the surgeon alternates between removing and inserting. In Case Two,
he does all the removing before the inserting.” (Parfit, p.475.) <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
example can be made even more compelling if we specify that in both cases I am
anesthetized before the operation. There is no difference in my experience
between the two cases. Now, how can the difference in the order of insertions
and removals be the difference between life and death? Why should it be vital
that the new parts are temporarily connected to the old parts? If the order of
insertions involved some further fact – perhaps a mystical force attaching only
to gradual insertions and removals – then the order would be significant. But
there is no further fact. The example can be varied by imagining an extremely
rapid robot surgeon who is able to remove and insert neurons so fast that the
new parts are connected to the old parts for only nanoseconds. This makes it
even more implausible to think that the continued existence of the same
physical brain is important.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> There
is no significant difference between Case Two and <i>The Transporter</i>. Wide Reductionism and CIWR are therefore
supported. The reliability of the cause of psychological continuity is
irrelevant to the issue of identity. So long as all the parts of the brain are
put together so as to produce psychological continuity we have maintained
identity. The neurosurgeon might have changed her mind about finishing the
operation. Perhaps after removing all the neurons she was told that I am an
evil person and, being a utilitarian, she desisted from inserting the new
neurons in order to rid the world of an undesirable person. Or perhaps she had
a heart attack before inserting the new neurons. Many causes could stop the
insertion process and thereby terminate the R-relation. Yet, surely, if the
insertion <i>does</i> go ahead despite these
uncertainties we have no reason to withhold the judgment that I have survived
the procedure. It appears then, that this example supports our move at least as
far as CIWR; any cause of continuity is sufficient. It need not be reliable so
long as it does actually operate in any instance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> It
is hard to see any non-arbitrary way of stopping the move from Case One of the
gradual insertions and removals to Case Two with its absence of spatio-temporal
continuity or reliable cause. The lack of grounds for refusing to move from one
case to another is the negative case in favor of CIWR. The positive case is
that what we care about is the R‑relation (see the fourth argument,
“Series-Persons”, below). Normally we are concerned about the continuity of the
brain because normally such continuity is practically necessary to the
maintenance of the R-relation. These cases just emphasize what we already have
grounds to believe: that what matters is the R-relation and not its normal
carrier.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
neurosurgeon cases are just one example of a slippery slope that moves us
irresistibly from intuitively plausible cases to those that are initially more
difficult. Many other slippery slopes could be constructed. For example, if the
opponent of CIWR tries to base his case on the <i>reliability</i> of the cause of continuity of the R-relation, we can
vary circumstances in such a way that the continuity of the brain becomes
unlikely. Brain continuity is never guaranteed: There are always strokes,
falls, speeding vehicles, and falling objects. Suppose the conditions of the
world changed so that the odds of brains surviving in one piece over the course
of a day became very much smaller. I doubt that anyone would then say that the
unreliability of my brain continuity meant that I was not the same person over
time even though I was lucky enough to avoid brain destruction longer than most
people. It would be tedious to construct more slippery slopes, so I will stick
with the neurosurgeon cases. Once we see that it is the R-relation that we
truly care about in these cases, we can see that many slippery slope moves
could be described to undermine arbitrary restrictions on the causes of
R-relation continuity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="SeriesPersons"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">SERIES-PERSONS<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">My elaboration of Parfit’s neurosurgeon example
indicates the difficulty that will face anyone attempting to limit personal
identity within a normal causal or spatio-temporal framework. In examining
Nagel’s view that we are essentially our brains, Parfit adds further weight to
the foregoing conclusion. He demonstrates that even if we accept Nagel’s claim
that “I” and “me” refer to whatever actually makes possible my psychological
continuity, we can still reach the Wide Reductionist View. The argument
involves Nagel’s notion of a “series-person.” I will present Parfit’s argument
briefly since I have nothing to add to it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Suppose
that the previous arguments are unsuccessful and that I am essentially my brain
and what matters to me is the continued existence of my brain. If this is what
persons essentially are I, as a person, cannot choose to take a different view
about what matters. But this leaves open another option. “While a person is, on
Nagel’s view, essentially a particular embodied brain, a series‑person is
potentially an R-related series of embodied brains.”</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[18]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Nagel imagines a community in which everyone enters
a Scanning Replicator once a year. The Replicator destroys the person’s brain
and body and creates an exact Replica (except that it has not aged) who is
R-related to this person. Nagel says that it would be rational for the
series-persons of the community to use this Scanning Replicator and Parfit adds
that such series-persons could live forever if they made back-up blueprints
every day. Persons do not survive the Replicator but series-persons do.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> If
Nagel is right that I am essentially my brain I cannot change my view about
what I am. But I can henceforth use pronouns to refer to series-persons. The
criterion of identity for persons is continuation of the brain but the
criterion for series-persons is Relation R with any cause (i.e., it is the same
as the criterion for persons if Nagel’s view is false). The words “I” and “me”
now refer not to the person Max More but to the series-person whose present
brain and body are the same as Max More’s brain and body. The previous sense of
“I” and “me” will henceforth be expressed by “old-I” and “old-me.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Any
activity that I carry out is being carried out by two different individuals <i>if</i> Nagel’s view is correct. Although the
two of us both take the same actions at the same time we are distinct: If we go
through a teletransporter then old-me, the person, would be destroyed, but I
the series-person would continue. The series‑ person was not brought into
existence by the invention of the concept. He has existed for as long as
old-me, the person. Unless teletransportation, uploading of my mind into a
computer, etc., become possible within my lifetime, I, the series-person, will
also cease to exist at the same time as old-me.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Supposing
Nagel’s view to be true, what matters for old-me is the continued existence of
my present brain. Despite this we can believe that what really matters is
relation R, <i>not</i> brain continuity.
Relation R is what matters for me, the series-person. Why speak and think as a
series-person rather than a person? Consider another concept of Nagel’s: The <i>day-person</i>. Essential to the existence
of a day-person is an uninterrupted stream of consciousness. Sleep or
anaesthesia is death for a day-person. The concept of a day-person applies to
reality but carves up reality into unimportant boundaries. We care about
relation R and not the noninterruption of consciousness. The concept of a
day-person is in this way inferior to the concept of a person. But then, if
Nagel’s view is true, the concept of a person is inferior to that of a
series-person in a similar way. The concept of a series-person appeals to what
is more important—relation R.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> If
Nagel’s view is false, the distinction between persons and series-persons is
unimportant. Our criterion of identity will fail to cover many imaginary cases
and some actual cases</span><a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[19]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> (such as people with divided hemispheres). Since
non-reductionism is false, questions about identity in those cases are empty.
We can give answers to these questions by extending our criterion of identity,
such as by making the criterion the non-branching holding of Relation R. On
that criterion persons <i>are</i>
series-persons and the distinction disappears. So, if Nagel’s view is false,
the criterion for identity of persons allows persons to survive
teletransportation. If Nagel’s view is true, persons cannot survive
teletransportation but then series-persons can proclaim their existence and use
pronouns to refer to themselves. Since the concept of a series-person would
carve up reality in less arbitrary ways this would be an improvement.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Consideration
of series-persons therefore supports the Wide Reductionist View. It can easily
also support the Widest View if we alter the example a little. In Nagel’s
example, each year people enter a Scanning Replicator. In the altered example,
we introduce an unreliable element of choice into the situation. Each person
goes into the Replicator each year with the hope of being scanned, destroyed,
and replicated in a de-aged body. However, the Scanning Replicators are
controlled by a sect of technocrats who have taken it upon themselves to
“improve society” by ending the existence of those they believe fail to meet
their criteria for “good citizens.” They make these decisions after an
individual has been scanned and destroyed but before they are replicated. If
they decide against someone, their stored pattern information is randomized or
overwritten. The process now is unreliable because it involves a choice. If the
people use “I” to refer to series-persons, they will still survive the scanning
and replicating process if those controlling it allow them to make it through.
Altered in this way, the series-person argument supports not only the Wide View
but also the Widest Reductionist View.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US;"><br clear="all" style="page-break-before: always;" />
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="UnderminingContraryIntuitions"></a><b><span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">ARGUMENT BY UNDERMINING CONTRARY
INTUITIONS<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Despite the arguments and cases I have presented,
doubt may linger over the case of <i>A
Heroic Reconstruction</i>. Where the causal connection between phases of a
person is highly roundabout and unreliable as in AHR, it may be hard to believe
that CIWR is true. Even if the arguments I have given together constitute a
strong case for this position, conflicting intuitions are likely to keep rising
from the grave to haunt us whenever we forget about the arguments and thought
experiments. As Hume noted, there are some philosophical views which go so much
against the grain that when we leave the attentive reflection that convinced us
of their truth we find ourselves once again feeling that a view is wrong even
though we cannot support our intuition. (This can be just as true of physical
theories such as relativity or the rejection of geocentrism.) I have found that
my intuitions about the more difficult cases have gradually shifted. As the
theoretical framework of the Widest View became embedded in my thinking my
intuitive reactions to bizarre cases like AHR increasingly conformed to the
theory.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> In
this final section I want to further undermine intuitions that conflict with
the theory by explaining why they exist. Intuitions arise because of
well-entrenched assumptions formed often unconsciously or implicitly. If it can
be shown that a certain intuition arises because it is normally well-grounded,
but that it becomes over‑generalized, then we can undermine the reasonableness
of forming beliefs on that intuitive reaction in cases outside its boundaries
of applicability.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> For
example, cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that humans typically use a
few heuristic rules such as the representativeness and availability heuristics
to make judgements in a wide range of cases. These heuristics work well much of
the time but occasionally lead us to the wrong conclusions, as can be
demonstrated by more sophisticated reasoning procedures such as probability
theory. Once we have explained why we use the heuristics, and once we have
defined their limited domain of applicability, we can deny any weight to
intuitive judgements where they stray beyond their effective domain. Similarly,
once we have Einsteinian and quantum mechanical physics—a physics well-grounded
in theory and observation—we need not give weight to the Newtonian intuitions
naturally derived from our normal experience of medium-sized objects with
medium velocities.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> A
common intuitive response when considering the role of causation in personal
identity is that we only survive if the normal cause of our psychological
continuity is maintained. For many educated people, this means they feel that
the brain (or enough of the brain) must persist. For others, it means that that
their “soul” must continue to exist, or perhaps that their soul must remain
embodied. Especially for those many people who do not spend time thinking
imaginatively about fictional or possible future scenarios, the very fact that,
say, the brain is <i>normally</i> the cause
of psychological continuity, is enough to wear deep grooves into their
intuitions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> In
all real cases that we have ever encountered, and perhaps in all cases that we
ever shall encounter, normal and direct causal connections <i>are</i> involved in the maintenance of psychological continuity and
connectedness. Explanations of why I am much as I was a few minutes ago, and
explanations of why I have changed somewhat from the way I was a year ago,
always in fact involve causal explanations of a familiar kind. The relation R
is, as a current matter of fact, embodied in brains and bodies. In the world as
it is and always has been the standard physical causes we see in brains and
bodies are practically essential to R-relatedness over time.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Disruptive
intervention in the causal chain, such as brain injury or destruction, or the
degeneration of aging, terminates the R-relation. It is understandable that we
are so concerned to ensure that the appropriate causes continue to operate. We
know that if our brains decay or are destroyed then we go with them. This fact
explains the attraction not only of the belief that normal, direct, and
reliable causal connection is necessary to personal identity but also the
appeal of the physical criterion of personal identity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> However,
as all the foregoing arguments have established, what really matters is
R-relatedness. We care about psychological continuity and connectedness. If
this can be secured by means other than the usual then we should be satisfied.
Not so many years ago the idea of having your body disassembled, beamed across
space, and reassembled would have terrified just about everyone. It would have
been thought of as death. Now, very many people have got used to the idea by
seeing it portrayed on <i>Star Trek</i>, by
reading discussions of personal identity, or other sources, and the imaginary
process is usually thought of as a means of travelling rather than as a means
of dying. Many of these people, if they considered it, might therefore agree to
the Wide Reductionist View, granting personal identity so long as there is some
causal connection between the earlier and later persons. Unlike previous
generations they do not think a normal cause is essential.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> The
third case I described, <i>A Heroic
Reconstruction</i>, will still upset many people, but the reason for this, is I
think, that they are not used to considering such events. If someone were to
produce a popular science fiction TV series based around the reconstructionist
attempts of the Universal Immortalists many more people would gradually come to
accept this as a way of surviving.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> Our
intuitions are explained by our concern that our psychological connectedness
and continuity be maintained. We are more uncomfortable about using a
transporter than about normal continuity because we find it easy to imagine the
transporter malfunctioning and leaving our disassembled atoms spread across
space. We have no theoretical grounds for rejecting abnormal or unreliable
causes of R-relatedness. Our concern is a perfectly reasonable <i>practical</i> concern. I will not place my
trust in an unreliable cause if I can do better. If I have a choice of
extending my lifespan by a proven and reliable medical technology, I will
obviously choose that over the possibility that I might one day be reconstructed
by Universal Immortalists. However, what I care about is continuing to exist,
not the means of this continuation <i>except
in so far as this is a practical question</i>. If psychological continuity is
maintained by a more unlikely method I will not complain. Just as in the
neurosurgeon case, I would much prefer that my neurosurgeon did not have a
heart attack, but if she did and her colleague managed to bring about the same
result then I would still have survived even though survival by that method was
much less likely.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> We
can conclude then, that while a normal, direct, or reliable causal connection
between earlier and later persons may be practically necessary for them to be
the same person, this is not conceptually or theoretically necessary. We care
about the continuation of our personality, our goals, projects, values,
memories, beliefs. Since normal, direct, reliable causal connections are
standardly necessary to this kind of continuation we will also care about those
kinds of connections instrumentally. But where standard kinds of causal
connectedness turn out in a particular case to have been unnecessary to
psychological continuity, we should realize that standard causal connections
and psychological connectedness have come apart, and that it is the latter that
should concern us. Having argued in favor of CIWR as the causal criterion to
satisfy if we are to continue to exist, I will now turn to the question of when
we cease to exist. Applying the Widest Reductionist View to the concept of and
criteria for death shows up the deficiencies in the criteria currently used.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h2>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Possibly also some accompanying
physical features—see Chapter on “Technological Transformation and Assimilation.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div class="Footnote" style="line-height: 12.0pt;">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-size: 10.0pt;">Armstrong develops this distinction in “Identity
Through Time” in Van Inwagen (ed), <i>Time
and Cause.</i><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div id="ftn3">
<div class="Footnote" style="line-height: 12.0pt;">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; text-shadow: auto;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-size: 10.0pt;">For instance in Parfit (1971) he says we can
“redescribe a person’s life as the history of a series of successive selves.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Hans Moravec, in <i>Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human
Intelligence</i> (recently supported in this thesis by Marvin Minsky), argues
that the coming decades will see a transfer of human personalities into a
synthetic hardware capable of running thousands to millions of times faster. If
this happens, then a later self-stage only a year older in objective time could
have developed so much that its earlier phases constituted a tiny portion of
it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Parfit, 1984, p.206.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Parfit, ibid, p.207.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Parfit, ibid, p.208<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Nozick, 1981, p.39.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn9">
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Except that Nozick allows the
possibility that features other than psychological ones may be constitutive of
identity (p.69). I will examine the question of what features other than
psychological we might include in the conditions for identity in the chapter
“Technological Transformation and Assimilation.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Nozick, p.43.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">
The Physics of Immortality</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">.
Doubleday, New York, 1994.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Of course dualists and idealists
may also believe the universe to be self-sustaining: They may be deists rather
than theists.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="line-height: 12.0pt; margin-left: .2in; text-indent: -.2in;">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Kolak and Martin (1987).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">L. Weiskrantz, 1986, <i>Blindsight</i>. B. Libet, <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i>,
1985,1987, 1989.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> This is a paraphrase of Nozick,
p.36-37.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[16]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Parfit provides several strong
considerations against Nagel’s brain criterion for identity in Parfit, 1984, S.93 and Appendix D.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn17">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[17]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> For a clear explanation of
activation vector spaces and connectionist views of concept formation and
learning see “On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective,” and
“On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach,” in Paul M. Churchland, 1989.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[18]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Parfit, p.289-290.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="file:///F:/Documents/Books/Dissertation%20The%20Diachronic%20Self/Dissertation,%20Final/1.DOC#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 8.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size: 8pt;">[19]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> Christine Korsgaard summarizes
these cases in “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency,” <i>Philosophy and Public Affairs</i>, Spring
1989, pp. 104-105.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-81421031362857088252014-08-26T16:28:00.000-05:002014-08-26T16:28:19.390-05:00The Diachronic Self: Contents<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="tab-stops: .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 16.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; text-transform: uppercase;">Contents<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">PART 1:
REDUCTIONISM, CAUSE, AND IDENTITY</span></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">1. Ch.1:</span></b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b><u>Causal
Conditions for Continuity</u></b></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">3.<b>
Diachronic Identity: </b>A relational view. Self and self-phase.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">11.<b> Four Theories:</b> Results of Narrow, Wide
and Widest Reductionist theories as applied to a spectrum of cases.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">18.<b> Cases</b>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">22.<b> Cases and Theories:</b> How the various
theories treat the cases.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">26.<b> Causal Conditions:</b> Internal, external,
reliable and unreliable, direct and indirect causes of continuity. The Causal
Condition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">33.<b> Which Causal Condition?</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">34.
<b>Is a Causal Condition Needed?</b>
Critique of Kolak and Martin.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">44.
<b>Argument from Perception:</b> The
perception of enduring objects.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">47.
<b>Neurosurgeons and the Slippery Slope:</b>
Weakening causal links, levels of abstraction, and a slippery slope argument.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">55.
<b>Series-Persons:</b> Parfit’s argument
against Nagel’s same-brain criterion.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">59.
<b>Argument by Undermining Contrary
Intuitions:</b> Why the Widest Reductionist View produces unsettling
intuitions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">64.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b>Ch.2: <u>The Terminus of the Self</u></b></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">66.
<b>Bodily Death and Personal Death:</b>
Death of the biological organism and death of the person.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">69.
<b>Two Meanings of ‘Dead’:</b> Temporary
and irreversible loss of life.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">73.
<b>Permanence vs Irreversibility: Permanent
and Theoretical Death</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">79.
<b>Irreversible Cessation and Types of
Continuity:</b> Information vs function-based criteria.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">91.
<b>Deanimate:</b> A state apart from life
and death. Distinctions between deanimate, inactivate and dormant.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">98.
<b>Partial Death</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">106.
<b>Declaring Death and Deanimation:</b>
Declaration as partly factual assessment, partly decision.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">108.
<b>Practical Importance of the Deanimate
Category:</b> Effects on attitudes, status, and survival prospects.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">PART 2:
TRANSFORMATION, CONCERN, AND VALUE<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">113.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b>Ch.3: <u>A Transformationist Account of
Continuity</u></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">113.
<b>Introduction.</b></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; text-transform: uppercase;">116. <b>I. The
Metaphysics of Connectedness<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">116.
<b>Measuring connectedness:</b></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";"> </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The
components of psychological continuity: memories, intentions, dispositions,
beliefs, abilities, desires, values, projects.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; text-transform: uppercase;">148. <b>II.
Normative Inferences<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">149.
<b>Reductionism and the Depth of a Life:</b>
Is personal identity less deep on a reductionist view? Is death less
significant on a reductionist view?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">159.
<b>Transformationism: Connectedness vs.
Continuity.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">165.
<b>Disproportionality of Connectedness and
Concern:</b> Degree of concern for your future phase need not be proportional
to connectedness degree:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Connectedness higher than
apparent: Measures of centrality. Relative weighting of the components in terms
of the types of centrality.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Intrinsically vs. instrumentally
significant features.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">175.
<b>Transformationism.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Valuing life as a whole/long
stretches.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Ideal self: Changes that bring
you closer to your ideal self do not reduce the degree of future concern.
Difference with Taylor’s view of evaluations as foundation of identity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Holding self-transformation as a
central project.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">197.
<b>Continuity and Structuring a Life<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">197.<b> </b>(a) <b>Life Plans:</b> Coherence of action & rational life plans.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">202.
(b) <b>Principles:</b> Incorporating
principles to strengthen sticking to project. Self-definition by principles.
Values & symbolism of actions. Principles as (i) Foundations:
constitute/create identity; (ii) Regulators/filters: set boundaries to possible
actions and identity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">210.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b>Ch.4:</b> <b><u>Technological Transformation and Assimilation</u></b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">211.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">
I. Augmentative and Deteriorative Transformation<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">211.
<b>Augmentative vs. Deteriorative
Transformation</b>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">216.
<b>Raymond Martin on Transformation and
Replacement.</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">229.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">
II. Integration of Change<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0in; mso-pagination: none;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-weight: normal;">229. </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Assimilation<span style="font-variant: small-caps;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></h2>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">232.
<b>Functional integration.</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Functional not structural
integration; distributed existence.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Does integration require direct
control?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Does integration require
exclusive access? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Does not require choosing the
mods</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Interdependence: Requires mutual
support, feedback, homeostasis.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<h2 style="margin-top: 0in; mso-pagination: none;">
<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-weight: normal;">246. </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif";">Enhancement
vs. Supplementation<o:p></o:p></span></h2>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Enhancements as assimilated
abilities, supplements as external.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Must enhancement require more
effort?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Persistence of effects.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Chosen and imposed improvements:
Ease of assimilation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">252.
<b>Merit in Sports, games, and tests.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Biological: steroids,
bloodpacking, nutrition, high-altitude training.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Neurochemical: Smart drugs, mood
modifiers (SSRI).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Genetic modification. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">261.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">
III. Intrinsic and Instrumental Bodily Identity<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Physicalism and psychological
reductionism. Bodies as means of expression.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Instrumental importance of
material and form of the body.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Primacy of function over form.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Level of function.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">Response to objections to
rejection of intrinsic importance of bodily identity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">277.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">
<b>Conclusion<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The
technological and social trend towards increasing self-definition.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">279.</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"> <b>Bibliography</b></span><b><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-20432375983070226092014-08-26T16:26:00.002-05:002014-08-26T16:26:43.878-05:00Abstract: The Diachronic Self: Identity, Continuity, Transformation (doctoral dissertation, 1995)After a long absence, I'm returning to my blog. This is primarily because of the difficulty of updating my main website and numerous requests to access my doctoral dissertation the link to which is broken. So, I'll post it here in chunks.<br />
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<b><span style="font-size: 18.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">ABSTRACT<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<b><i><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The
Diachronic Self: Identity, Continuity, Transformation<o:p></o:p></span></i></b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">By Max More</span><b><span style="color: red; font-size: 18.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">The
Diachronic Self </span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt;">fills out and clarifies the account of personal
identity presented by Derek Parfit in <i>Reasons
and Persons</i>. I go on to draw metaphysical and normative consequences of
this psychological reductionist theory. Some of the normative inferences
disagree with those of Parfit. I examine several candidates for a necessary
causal condition for personal identity or continuity and argue that we should
accept one of the most liberal conditions, allowing personal identity to
persist even if its cause is abnormal and unreliable. After establishing a
causal condition for identity I apply psychological reductionism to critically
analyze current conditions of and criteria for the death of persons. I argue
that cardiac and consciousness based conceptions are incorrect. In their place
I offer an information-based conception. I then go on to examine the relative
importance of various psychological connections, including memories,
intentions, dispositions, beliefs, desires, values, and projects. It turns out
that the significance of passive elements of the self, especially memories, has
often been overrated in discussions of identity. Drawing on my metaphysical
results, I draw a number of normative conclusions. I differ from Parfit in
holding that reductionism does <i>not</i>
make life less “deep” nor death less significant. I also argue that Parfit puts
too much emphasis on connectedness rather than continuity when assessing the
rational apportionment of future-concern. I look at the roles of an ideal
self-conception, life plans, and principles in generating and sustaining
concern for one’s farther future self-stages. The final chapter analyses how we
assimilate changes in our selves, especially physical changes resulting from
technology. I distinguish augmentative from deteriorative changes, and draw
normative inferences about whether rationally we should replace ourselves with
a better self, if that were possible. I develop an account of assimilation in
terms of functional integration, then go on to distinguish enhancement from
supplementation, noting the importance of this for normative concerns. Finally,
I determine the role of bodily form and function in a psychological
reductionist account of personal identity.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-47731887051501434452010-12-24T18:16:00.002-06:002010-12-24T18:19:15.746-06:00My new responsibility as CEO of Alcor FoundationAfter an exhaustive set of interviews and background checks, the board of directors of Alcor Life Extension Foundation have given me the position of CEO, starting January 1, 2011. This is a challenging and exciting opportunity, especially since it's a kind of return -- I started a cryonics organization (with several friends) in England way back in 1986.<br /><br />The official announcement is here: <a href="http://www.alcor.org/blog/?p=1473">Alcor blog</a>Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-2603898844037168212010-09-01T09:35:00.002-05:002010-09-01T09:38:05.187-05:00The Perils of Precaution, full versionThe combined six blog posts are now available in a single essay, with notes, on my main website: <a href="http://www.maxmore.com/perils.htm">http://www.maxmore.com/perils.htm</a>Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-15124547157476678832010-08-23T10:46:00.002-05:002010-08-23T10:49:24.023-05:00Perils, Part 6: Fatal to the Future<span style="font-weight: bold;">Fatal to the Future</span><br /><br />The precautionary principle is ultra-conservative. “Conservative” here does not mean “right-wing”, nor does it refer to the Republican Party in the USA or the Conservative Party in England. I mean it in the most literal sense: that which conserves the existing order. Factions of widely differing agendas may share an interest in the status quo. In the USA, this makes sense of the unholy alliance of religious conservatives and extreme environmentalists in their attack on biotechnology.<br /><br />The ultraconservative nature of the principle explains support for it both by environmentalists and large political and even commercial bodies. Some businesses are highly conservative and opposed to innovation—those who lack confidence in their ability to innovate or don’t want to bother. These organizations can use the principle to lock down the status quo, protecting their position from disruption by new and potentially superior technologies.<br /><br />Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, environmental policy specialist and editor of the journal <span style="font-style: italic;">Energy and Environment</span>, noted that “Virtually all scientific and technological discoveries create, initially at least, powerful losers who can activate the prevailing ideological and political system against the new.” The precautionary principle serves as a pretext for activists with anti-technology and anti-business agendas. Once the principle of precaution is in place, defenders of what is only have to raise the barest possibility of a harm to block the creative activity of the forces of what could be.<br /><br />Defenders of national economic interests (as they see them) can easily invoke the precautionary principle. The protracted dispute between the European Commission and the United States and Canada over restrictions on hormone-treated beef cattle is a case in point. The EC explicitly argued that the precautionary principle justifies restricting imports of U.S. and Canadian beef from cattle treated with particular growth hormones. Perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised that the World Trade Organization (WTO) comes under heavy attack from environmental precautionists, given that this body ruled in favor of the United States and Canada. The WTO pointed out that even the EC’s favored scientific studies failed to demonstrate a real or imminent harm when these hormones were used according to accepted animal husbandry practices. This finding has not stopped the EC from enforcing restrictions on hormone-treated beef. The European Commission has promised that it will not allow the precautionary principle to be abused. Apparently the EC believes that promises are made to be broken.<br /><br />Organizational learning experts have converged on the view that we learn best by experimenting, by learning in action. This is why companies shelling out their own money for corporate learning programs now favor learning on the job and simulations rather than traditional classrooms or standalone online learning courses. The precautionary principle is fatal to the future because it prevents us from learning by experimenting. Earlier in the chapter, we saw that the principle would have blocked most of the scientific discoveries of the past, as well as the technologies they enabled. Scientific and medical research necessarily gets going before we have all the information. We learned about some blood groups, for example, only by doing transfusions.<br /><br />The precautionary principle, by halting activity, reduces learning and reinforces uncertainty. When the FDA responded with excessive precaution to the 1999 death of a patient in a University of Pennsylvania gene therapy trial for a genetic disease, work in gene therapy throughout the country and beyond was set back by years. The FDA might instead have taken measures to ensure more thoroughly informed consent, or have put additional safeguards in place without halting all research. We will uncover a wider range of both potential harms and benefits through action learning—what organizational theorist Karl Weick has called “looking while leaping.” Allowing a diversity of directions for technological advancement produces more learning and problem-solving than a single direction imposed by a centralized policy-making institution.<br /><br />Practically all advances with a scientific basis come with some risk. If the mere possibility of harm—to someone, somewhere, somehow—is held up as sufficient reason to stop activity, we would have to say goodbye to all medical, engineering, and technological advances. Nor can precautionists reasonably require innovators to demonstrate the “necessity” of any particular advance. For one thing, necessity is in the eye of the beholder. The extreme environmental activist will judge just about every technological advance to be “unnecessary”.<br /><br />Besides, each technology invariably forms a bridge to later technologies with even greater benefits and lower costs. We complain about burning fossil fuels for energy, understandably enough. But they are far cleaner than burning wood, may well be made cleaner, and without them we would not be able to invest the resources and knowledge necessary for the transition to the solar-hydrogen-nuclear future.<br /><br />We saw that, compared with regulations for traditional breeding techniques, the regulation of gene-spliced crops is inconsistent, arbitrary, and not apportioned to risk. This has the effect of slowing innovation in impoverished parts of the world. Crop breeders who use traditional techniques test thousands of new genetic variants every year. When it comes to gene-spliced crops, however, requiring regulatory review of each and every variant effectively stifles research conducted with the most advanced and precise methods.<br /><br />Lying next to the almost-dead body of agricultural biotechnology we find medical biotechnology. Carl Djerassi, emeritus professor of chemistry at Stanford University, is the father of the modern contraceptive Pill. According to Djerassi, “The precautionary principle is also the principal reason why we still have no such [contraceptive] Pill for men.”<br /><br />Talking of dead bodies, if the precautionary principle is used to block genetic modification of insects and bacteria, bodies killed by Chagas’ disease will continue to pile up. This disease—accompanied by a resurgence of malaria, dengue fever, and yellow fever—has erupted in Latin America, infecting 12 million to 18 million people out of the 90 million in the area. Once infected with the protozoa <span style="font-style: italic;">Trypanosoma cruzi</span>, carried by several species of insects, between 10 and 30 percent of people develop chronic, life-threatening maladies such as heart failure. Already, 50,000 people die from invasion by this organism each year.<br /><br />No vaccine or cure exists for Chagas’ disease. That could change if the precautionary principle is kept at bay. Scientists hope to augment conventional public health measures with genetically modified insects and bacteria. They want to use the “sterile-insect technique” to combat Chagas’ disease—but will governments mouthing the precautionary principle allow the release of these genetically modified bugs?<br /><br />Many medical techniques and technologies now familiar to us, such as open-heart surgery, and X-rays, had to pass through what Norman Levitt described as a “heroic stage.” This will be just as true of future medical technologies. Consistent application of the precautionary principle would halt developments in their heroic, experimental, poorly understood phase, preventing them from ever becoming the standard techniques. Levitt goes on to say:<br /><br /><blockquote>At a more basic level, research programs in molecular biology would have been badly crippled. The now-standard tricks associated with 'genetic engineering' - restriction enzymes and the polymerase chain reaction - would have had a difficult time making their way into the armamentarium of investigators.</blockquote><br />Change happens regardless of the precautionary principle. If we stifle changes initiated by our brightest, most creative minds, we will be left with <span style="font-style: italic;">inadvertent </span>changes. The direction of those changes is far more likely to be one that we don’t like. The asymmetrical nature of the precautionary principle ignores natural, unchosen changes that have their origin in nature, chance, or the environment. But changes, advance, and progress that come from science are treated as the enemy.<br /><br />As Ingo Potrykus, emeritus professor of Plant Sciences at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, and the inventor of Golden Rice, said: “The application of the precautionary principle in science is in itself basically anti-science. Science explores the unknown, and therefore can <span style="font-style: italic;">a priori</span> not predict the outcome.”<br /><br />The future is the realm of the unknown. We can do much better to understand, anticipate, and prepare for the possible futures that lie ahead, but a large element of the unknown will remain. If we are to continue improving the human condition—and possible even move beyond it—we must remain open to the unknown. We must throw out the precautionary principle. Friends of the future will see how the principle would prevent us from developing and applying practically all of the emerging technologies for enhancing and transforming the human condition: genetic techniques, neuromedical implants, nanotechnology, biotechnology, machine intelligence, and so on. Had the precautionary principle been in effect at any time in the past, today would never have arrived. The precautionary principle is the enemy of extropy.<br /><br />If this principle should be avoided by policymakers and executives making a decision about the development, deployment, regulation, or marketing of a new technology, what are the alternatives? They should start out by thinking about the kind of decision they are making, then identify the optimal way to make it. This requires a structured decision-making process. The wisdom of ultimate precaution turns out to be false. Real wisdom comes from structure.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-25388582605899894622010-08-23T09:27:00.003-05:002010-08-23T09:34:20.401-05:00Perils, Part 5: Failures of the Precautionary Principle<span style="font-weight: bold;">Failures of the Precautionary Principle</span><br /><br />Having seen the precautionary principle in action, we can identify its shortcomings quickly. Before I get to two of the problems with especially strong anti-innovation effects, I want to examine eight other defects that render the precautionary principle capable of generating only dangerously distorted conclusions.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Failure of Objectivity</span>: Any decision procedure adequate for handling the complexities of technological and environmental risks affecting multiple parties must be objective. Objectivity here means “following a structured, explicit procedure informed by the relevant fields of knowledge.” Those fields include risk analysis, economics, the psychology of decision making, and verified forecasting methods. In the absence of a well-designed, structured procedure, assessment and decision making will be distorted by cognitive and interest-based biases, emotional reactions, ungrounded public perceptions and pressures from lobbyists, and popular but unreliable approaches to analysis and forecasting. The precautionary principle does nothing to ensure that decision makers use reliable, objective procedures. Several of the points below detail ways in which the principle lacks objectivity.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Distracts from Greater Threats</span>: The precautionary principle distracts citizens and policy makers from established, major threats to health. The heavy emphasis on taking precautionary measures for any proposed danger, no matter how speculative, draws attention away from any comparative assessment of risks and costs. The principle embodies the imperative to eliminate all risk from some proposed source, ignoring the background level of risk, and ignoring other sources of risk that may be more deserving of action. Environmental activists usually target human-caused effects while giving the destructive aspects of “nature” a free ride. Nature itself brings with it a risk of harms such as infection, hunger, famine, and environmental disruption.<br /><br />We should apply our limited resources first to major risks that we <span style="font-style: italic;">know </span>are real, not merely hypothetical. The more we attend to merely hypothetical threats to health and environment, the less money, time, and effort will remain to deal with substantial health problems that are highly probable or thoroughly established. The principle errs in focusing on future technological harms that <span style="font-style: italic;">might </span>occur, while ignoring natural risks that are <span style="font-style: italic;">actually </span>occurring.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Vague and Unclear</span>: Everything about the principle is easily interpreted in differing ways. As the authors of the May 2000 paper in <span style="font-style: italic;">Science</span>, say, “its greatest problem, as a policy tool, is its extreme variability in interpretation.” The Treaty on European Union gives the principle great importance by referring to it, yet does not define it. Once given a specific interpretation, the principle is simple. Simplicity is the source of its appeal. Simplicity is a virtue—so long as it does not come at the expense of adequacy.<br /><br />The precautionary principle is <span style="font-style: italic;">too </span>simple. In versions that mention “irreversible harm”, no account is given of irreversibility. Most environmental changes <span style="font-style: italic;">can </span>be reversed, though it may be costly to do so. Even when effects are truly irreversible, that fact alone does not make the changes <span style="font-style: italic;">significant</span>. The principle lacks clarity also because it leaves us without any guidance in cases where resulting harm arrives along with benefits—and this is the rule rather than the exception. The principle leaves us in the dark as to <span style="font-style: italic;">how </span>we should go about preventing harm. As we have seen, precautionary measures can themselves be harmful and costly.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Lack of Comprehensiveness</span>: Any procedure that claims to be both rational and equitable in assessing the desirability of restrictions on productive human activity must be <span style="font-style: italic;">comprehensive</span>. This means taking into account the interests of all affected parties with legitimate claims. It also means considering all reasonable alternative actions, including no action.<br /><br />A comprehensive decision procedure balances the benefits of restricting an activity that brings with it possibly harmful side effects against two factors: the benefits of the activity in question, and the costs and risks of the restrictions, regulations, or prohibitions. If a proposal has been made to restrict a technology, responsible decision makers will estimate the opportunities lost by abandoning it. If needs that were being met by the technology or productive activity will be met by other means, the costs and risks of those alternatives should be estimated. When making these estimates, decision makers should carefully consider not only concentrated and immediate effects, but also widely distributed and follow-on effects.<br /><br />The precautionary principle, with its typically agenda-driven, single-minded approach, fails the test of comprehensiveness. Officials and activists who use the principle routinely inadvertently or deliberately ignore costs and side-effects of regulations and prohibitions, as well as the potential benefits of a technology, both in the near term and as it might develop over time. As we saw in the case of drug regulation, regulators who start out doing something intended to be beneficial face incentives that encourage them to regulate excessively. The precautionary principle serves as a rationalization and an encouragement for regulators in making Type II errors.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Inappropriate Burden of Proof</span>: The precautionary principle illegitimately shifts the burden of proof (“reverse onus”) by requiring innovators and producers to prove their innocence when anyone raises “threats of harm”. Activists enjoy a favored status since they can raise the prospect of precautionary measures with no more evidence than their fearful imagination. All they need to show is that a <span style="font-style: italic;">possibility </span>of harm exists. No, not even this. All they need to show is that questions have been raised about the possibility of harm. Inventors and producers must then devote effort and resources to answering those questions.<br /><br />Proponents of the principle portray it as a value-neutral procedure for deciding on policies. Yet it gives the trump card to the status quo and against productive activity and innovation by default—no real evidence is needed. Producing and innovating become <span style="font-style: italic;">de facto </span>crimes whose perpetrators are guilty until proven innocent.<br /><br />The content—even the very name—of the principle positions environmental activists as friends and protectors of the common citizen. By shifting the burden of proof, advocates of precaution position themselves as responsible protectors of humanity and the environment, while positioning advocates of proposed activities or new technologies as reckless. By using reverse onus, the activists can impose their preferences without providing evidence, and without being accountable for the results of overly-cautious policies.<br /><br />To add to the fear-inducing power and chilling effect of the reverse onus, activists and regulators who invoke the precautionary principle invariably assume a <span style="font-style: italic;">worst-case scenario</span>. Any release of chemicals into the environment <span style="font-style: italic;">might </span>initiate a chain of events leading to a disaster. Genetically modified organisms <span style="font-style: italic;">might </span>cause unanticipated, serious, and irreversible problems. By imagining the proposed technology or endeavor primarily in a worst-case scenario—while assuming that <span style="font-style: italic;">preventing </span>action will have no disastrous consequences—the adherents of the principle immediately tilt the playing field in their favor. By combining reverse onus and catastrophic scenario-spinning, precautionists guarantee that managing <span style="font-style: italic;">perceptions </span>of risk becomes more influential in policy-making than the reality of risk.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Asymmetrical</span>: The precautionary principle inherently favors nature and the status quo over humanity and progress, while routinely ignoring the potential benefits of technology and innovation. As an example of this—meant only partly in jest—I would point to an odd dichotomy. Many environmentalists have been obsessed with opposing nuclear power. After all, to them, it represents advanced technology and humanity’s triumph over the vagaries of nature. At the same time, when have you <span style="font-style: italic;">ever </span>heard environmentalists and fellow precautionists raising concerns and urging public action over the dangerous act of <span style="font-style: italic;">sunbathing</span>? If this question seems a little peculiar, consider what sunbathers are doing: They are lying prone and helpless directly beneath a <span style="font-style: italic;">gigantic, unshielded nuclear fusion reactor</span>!<br /><br />The entirely serious point I want to make here is that the precautionary principle fails to treat natural and human threats on the same basis. Users of the principle routinely ignore the potential benefits of technology, in effect favoring nature over humanity. The principle does not account for the fact that the risks created by technological stagnation are at least as real as those of technological advancement. As biochemist Bruce Ames of UCLA has demonstrated, almost all of our exposure to dangerous chemicals comes in the form of <span style="font-style: italic;">natural </span>chemicals, such as aflatoxins in peanuts—which are among the most carcinogenic substances known. Yet fear and attention are primarily directed toward <span style="font-style: italic;">synthetic </span>chemicals. A particular chemical has the same effects regardless of whether its source is natural or synthetic. Despite this, activists treat human-derived chemicals as guilty until proven innocent, and naturally occurring chemicals as innocent until proven guilty.<br /><br />We can see an excellent example of the asymmetrical favoring of nature over humanity—in other words, the condemnation of conscious creative activity—in the wildly divergent attitudes of hardcore environmentalists and other precautionists toward gene-spliced crops and their more traditional counterparts. Proponents of the precautionary principle—if not utterly opposed to gene-spliced crops in their public pronouncements—encourage authorities to apply a heavy regulatory burden. When it comes to conventional crops, the same precautionary regulations are never urged. This makes sense, precautionists will say, because genetically modified crops introduce new and poorly understood risks. But is this true?<br /><br />Gene-splicing is simply the most scientifically advanced method of generating new plant varieties. More specifically, compared to other techniques, gene-splicing is more precise, restricted, and predictable than techniques devised earlier. Anti-technologists would have us believe that modern genetic techniques break radically with past practice. In reality, gene-splicing technology is a refinement of the less accurate, more uncertain techniques of the past. Those older methods—such as hybridization and induced-mutation breeding—lie behind the many new plant varieties introduced every year. No scientific review is required of them. No special labeling is required. Yet, because they are less precise, they bring potential hazards <span style="font-style: italic;">greater </span>than those from the more precisely targeted method of gene-splicing.<br /><br />Often these more traditional products result from “wide crosses”—applications of hybridization in which many genes are transferred from one species to another in a way that does not happen in nature. Wide crosses have many benefits such as introducing the hardiness of wild rice into cultivated rice, or integrating yellow dwarf virus tolerance and resistance into cultivated oats. But they <span style="font-style: italic;">could </span>also lead to problems. By introducing thousands of foreign genes into an established plant variety, the result could be the accidental introduction of toxins or allergens, or qualities such as increased invasiveness in the field.<br /><br />Similarly, a method in common use for the last 50 years called induced-mutation breeding, lacks the precision of gene-splicing. In this approach, plants used as crops are exposed to ionizing radiation or toxic chemicals in order to stimulate genetic mutations. No way exists to select the mutations; it is essentially a random process that leaves breeders with little idea of which mutations occurred or which ones produced a desired effect. Over the decades in which this method has been used, between one and two thousand mutation-bred plant varieties have been brought to market without any regulation to speak of. Although the results have typically been safe, problems have occasionally cropped up.<br /><br />If the precautionary principle were actually a useful tool, we would expect to see stricter precautions being applied to these less accurate, less predictable types of genetic modification. But the opposite has been the case. Activists and regulators have put all their energies into severely regulating gene-spliced products out of all proportion to their risk. The regulators not only inflate the risks of gene-spliced or “genetically modified” foods, they ignore the ways in which the newer technique can actually reduce risks.<br /><br />Aside from minimizing the dangers of introducing toxins, allergens, or other unwanted qualities, this technology makes it far easier to remove many natural allergens from the food supply. In addition, gene-spliced crops enable farmers to drastically reduce the use of pesticides. Unavailability of the better technology especially hurts farmers in poor countries, who continue to suffer from continual exposure to pesticides.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Fails to Accommodate Tradeoffs</span>: The way in which the precautionary principle shifts the burden of proof is no accident. Many proponents of the principle fully intend its nature-deifying, human-denying values to force the innovator and producer onto a rocky path. Another consequence is the inability of the principle to handle tradeoffs between harm to humans and to the environment. Since unaltered nature is implicitly an absolute value in the principle, no tradeoffs are to be allowed. The precautionary principle is all about avoiding possible harm—and human-caused harm, and primarily harm to the environment—rather than respecting a wider set of values.<br /><br />As the precautionary principle has come to be applied, all other values must bow to that of the precautionary activists. Anyone who expresses willingness to forego perfect environmental protection in favor of an easier life, greater health or wealth, or other values, needs to be shown the light according to the precautionist. In this way, the precautionary principle tends toward authoritarianism. If those poor, ignorant fools (no doubt blinded by the dark power of commercial advertising) cannot see what they should do, the activists will force them to do the right thing. Just as Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin saw themselves as the <span style="font-style: italic;">vanguard of the proletariat</span>, who knew the interests of the Russian workers far better than did the workers themselves, the precautionists wish to protect us from ourselves.<br /><br />The precautionary principle, in its absolutist, univalued approach, conflicts with the more balanced approach to risk and harm derived from common law. Common law holds us liable for injuries we cause, with liability increasing along with foreseeable risk. By contrast, the precautionary principle bypasses liability and acts like a preliminary injunction—but without the involvement of a court. By doing this, the precautionary principle denies individuals and communities the freedom to make trade-offs in the way recognized by common-law approaches to risk and harm. No other values are admitted as reason not to pursue extreme precaution.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Vulnerable to Corruption</span>: The inconsistent, discriminatory nature of precautionary regulations (as we saw in the case of gene-spliced foods) puts a kink in the rule of law. By giving regulators the power to insist on any degree of testing they choose, the precautionary principle opens up opportunities for corruption—undue influence, unfair targeting, and regulatory capture. It is the principle’s vagueness, inconsistency, and arbitrariness that appeals to regulators who enjoy expanding their powers and wielding them selectively. An increase in corruption and arbitrary regulatory power is further ensured by making precaution and prevention the <span style="font-style: italic;">default</span> assumption.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-90465046172988827982010-08-23T09:12:00.002-05:002010-08-23T09:16:49.866-05:00Perils part 3, The Tyranny of SafetyThe Tyranny of Safety<br /><br />The precautionary principle rides atop the wild horse that is our fundamental drive to avoid harm. I readily grant that caution is a perfectly sensible practice to adopt as we go about our lives. We get into trouble only when we elevate caution and cautionary measures to the status of an absolute principle—when we endow it with a crude veto power over all other values and over the use of maximum intelligence and creativity. Caution, like suspicion or anger or confidence, enjoys a legitimate place in our toolbox of responses. But it cannot serve by itself us as a comprehensive, judicious, rational basis for making decisions about technological and environmental concerns.<br /><br />There’s a simple but telling way to appreciate the threat to progress and human well-being posed by the precautionary principle: Take a look back at the scientific and technological achievements of the past, then ask: “Would these advances have been sanctioned or prohibited by the precautionary principle?” Consider a small sample of historical achievements that have improved human life:<br /> <br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The airplane</span>: Planes crash, don’t they? Serious or irreversible harm results without doubt.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Antibiotics and sulfa drugs</span>: Disallowed due to risk of side-effects.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Aspirin</span>: Along with aspirin’s wide range of beneficial effects come some significant adverse side-effects. Today’s level of regulation—which falls well short of the precautionary principle—might deny approval to aspirin.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">CAT scans</span>: Disallowed from the start by precaution due to risk from X-rays.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Chlorine</span>: A tremendous public health boon when used for disinfecting water, producing pharmaceuticals, and making pesticides. It’s also a poison gas.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The contraceptive pill</span>: One of the most powerful forces for social change would have been banned due to its association with an elevated risk of some cancers.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane)</span>:<span style="font-weight: bold;"> </span>This oft-maligned substance, discovered in 1939 by Paul Hermann Mueller (and for which he won the Nobel Prize in medicine), saved the lives of millions threatened by malaria. Throughout the Mediterranean region, DDT transformed malaria from ugly reality to fading bad dream. In 1970, The National Academy of Sciences declared: “To only a few chemicals does man owe as great a debt as to DDT.”<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Digitalis</span>: When William Withering extracted digitalis from the foxglove plant (<span style="font-style: italic;">Digitalis purpurea</span>) in 1780, he delivered the first effective drug in medicine. The precautionary principle might have locked down such a highly toxic substance, never allowing its highly beneficial effects on the heart to see the light of day.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Drugs</span>: Do any medical drugs have a proven absence of side effects?<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Electrification</span>: Providing electricity to people across the land requires power plants and transmission lines and creates pollution. Each step of the way clearly violates the precautionary principle.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Energy</span>: Production and use of fire, electricity, microwaves, and all forms of energy contravene the precautionary principle. The causal link between accidents with, or misdirected, energy and resulting harm is clear. To prevent the possibility of harm, the principle would prohibit all forms of energy production capable of powering any useful work. Back to living in caves, <span style="font-style: italic;">without </span>fire!<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The Green Revolution</span>: This has enormously boosted food production and averted famine throughout much of Asia and elsewhere. The Green Revolution would have been strangled in its crib by the precautionary principle. Genetically modified crops are running up against the principle, yet GM crops are created through a far <span style="font-style: italic;">more </span>precise process. The crops of the Green Revolution were arrived at by randomly mutating seeds and selecting plants with enhanced characteristics. No guarantee could have been given against any possibility of serious harm to humans or ecosystems.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Knives</span>: Enabled humans to eat, build shelter, and develop tools and cultural artifacts. Can also be used for destructive purposes. Say no more.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Nuclear research</span>: The dangers of radiation, illustrated by Marie Curie’s death, would lead the precautionary principle to block the development of NMR imaging, nuclear power, and nuclear physics.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Open-heart surgery</span>: This life-saving surgery might have been blocked early on, since it obviously carried a risk of causing death and opening a path for infections.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Organ transplants</span>: Early recipients often died—a little sooner than they would have otherwise.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Penicillin</span>: Dr. Gail Cardew of the Royal Institution in London has noted that this “wonder drug”, tested early on a human, turned out to be toxic to guinea pigs. A more precautionary approach at the time probably would not have allowed penicillin to be tried on humans.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">The periodic table</span>: Systematizes knowledge that can—and has—been used to make explosives for offensive purposes.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Physics research</span>: Study of the principles of motion culminating in work by Newton might have been prohibited. That knowledge created the basis for ballistics.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Radar</span>: If the precautionary ethos, rather than wartime necessity, had prevailed, we would never had enjoyed the benefits of radar. The microwaves emitted by high-powered radar can harm or kill a person standing in front of the antenna.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Railways</span>: When travel by rail first became a real option, some critics warned that people would die when they exceeded 30 mph. Some early travelers attributed their real or imagined sickness to their railroad trip.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Vaccines for rabies, measles, polio, smallpox</span>: Consider that, for instance, Salk’s polio vaccine was a live culture. The probability of protection brought with it a 5% risk of contracting the disease. All vaccines carry a small risk of harmful infection. If Jenner was experimenting with inoculation today, he would be attacked for transferring tissue across species boundaries, and his work shut down as contravening the precautionary principle.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">X-rays</span>: Before safe doses had been determined, early researchers into X-ray medicine died.<br /><br />Just about <span style="font-style: italic;">every </span>human activity <span style="font-style: italic;">could </span>“raise threats of serious or irreversible harm to human health or the environment.” Had the precautionary principle been imposed throughout history, we would still be living poor, nasty, brutish lives—if humans still existed.<br /><br />The precautionary principle, if applied to real innovation throughout our past, would have stifled progress. As many of the historical examples indicate, this means not only losing the benefits of creativity, but also suffering the natural harms that would continue and multiply unchecked. We need not look to the past to see harm being done. Patients who could benefit from xenotransplantation continue to suffer because of overblown fears about the possible transmission of porcine retroviruses. Neurological disease continues to run its devastating course while drugs that might help are blocked by people fearing a pharmacological “underclass”. Long term storage of nuclear waste continues to be blocked by groups feeding fears of remote, theoretical risks, while they ignore the current, real problems they keep alive.<br /><br />Recently, a study was published that found an increased incidence of multiple sclerosis (MS) among people who had received hepatitis B shots in the 3 years prior to disease onset. If advocates of the precautionary principle jump on this result, they could cause much needless suffering and death. The kind of fear that drives the principle will ignore the fact that this result comes from a single, unverified study. It will also ignore the crucial information that MS affects about 2.5 million people, but hepatitis B affects 350 million people.<br /><br />Whether it’s in the name of the principle, or the simple visceral reaction that has the same effect, scared people turning down the hepatitis B vaccine would be a health disaster. Exactly this kind of unmeasured, fearful response to vaccines has already popped up many times, a recent example being parents who refuse to have their children vaccinated with a new combination vaccine.<br /><br />Consider the case of the rotavirus vaccine. Rotavirus is the most common cause of severe diarrhea among children. According to the Centers for Disease Control, it results in the hospitalization of 55,000 children annually in the United States, and the death of 600,000 children annually worldwide. That’s the death of one child every minute. These children are pushed over a rocky path on the way to death, enduring vomiting and watery diarrhea along with fever and abdominal pain.<br /><br />Although the disease was discovered three decades ago, no rotavirus vaccine for this devastating disease was available until 1998. In 1999, after just nine months on the market, Wyeth Laboratories voluntarily pulled their vaccine, RotaShield, because it was associated with a slightly increased risk of intussusception (bowel obstruction). In wealthy countries, this can typically be treated, but in places where it isn’t, the result can be a very severe disease or, occasionally, death.<br /><br />No rotavirus vaccine was available anywhere for five years, even in the developing world, where one in every two hundred and fifty children dies from the disease. The precautionary agency in this case was the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). This is a horrifying example of caution that kills. Several years after the withdrawal, it remains unclear whether the Rotashield vaccine really causes additional bowel disorders. Even if it does, the risk is small. According to a report by NIH scientists in the <span style="font-style: italic;">Journal of Infectious Diseases</span>, that vaccine might have led to 1 excess case per 32,000 vaccinated infants. More than ten times that number (around 1 in 3,000 infants during their first year) develop intussusception anyway. This report found an overall <span style="font-style: italic;">decrease </span>in intussusception among infants under a year old during the period of exposure to the rotavirus vaccine. The bottom line in the developing world: the precautionary blocking of a vaccine has killed millions of children.<br /><br />Another upshot of this episode is noteworthy. For half a century, new pharmaceutical products have been introduced first in the United States and Europe, only later reaching the developing world. This is changing. In planning ahead for the launch of its vaccine, Rotarix, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) held its half-dozen trials in developing world countries including Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, and Malaysia. GSK plans to make Rotarix available in Mexico right away. When it comes to a rotavirus vaccine, it is now the United States that is the third world country. After Wyeth’s experience (albeit with a differently-derived vaccine), GSK has no plans to request approval from the US food and Drug Administration.<br /><br />The point here is not that precautionary restrictions are never justified. It is not that unfettered innovation is always best. It is not that environmental concerns are to be dismissed. It is that an excessive focus on preventing one perceived problem can create even worse problems. Nor is this a counsel of despair. Better decision processes are available.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-59731651083496650652010-08-22T20:53:00.005-05:002010-08-23T09:19:20.761-05:00Perils, Part 4: The Paradox of the Precautionary PrincipleThe rotavirus case illustrates what I call the <span style="font-style: italic;">paradox of the precautionary principle</span>: The principle endangers us by trying too hard to safeguard us. It tries “too hard” by being obsessively preoccupied with a <span style="font-style: italic;">single </span>value—safety. By focusing us on safety to an excessive degree, the principle distracts policymakers and the public from other dangers. The more confident we are in the principle, and the more enthusiastically we apply it, the greater the hazard to our health and our standard of living. The principle ends up <span style="font-style: italic;">causing </span>harm by diverting attention, financial resources, public health resources, time, and research effort from more urgent and weighty risks.<br /><br />Adding insult to injury, in practice this rule assumes that new prohibitions or regulations will result in no harm to human health or the environment. Unfortunately, well-intended interventions into complex systems invariably have unintended consequences. Only by closely examining possible ramifications can we determine whether or not the intervention is likely to make us better off. By single-mindedly enforcing the tyranny of safety, this principle can only distract decision makers from such an examination.<br /><br />Our choices of modes of transport provide a simple example of the paradox of the precautionary principle. What image comes to mind when we hear the words “airplane crash”? A terrifying plunge, an enormous smash, hundreds of dead bodies, billows of black smoke. On hearing news of a spectacular plane crash, some travelers choose to go by car instead. (A smaller number of people won’t take a plane at <span style="font-style: italic;">any </span>time, though they rarely claim this to be a calmly rational choice.) The same effect has been observed in the case of train accidents. Plane and train crashes are dramatic events that impress themselves on our minds, encouraging us to believe that those modes of travel are intolerably risky. The facts are otherwise—as most of us know, if only vaguely.<br /><br />Consider that in 2000, the world’s commercial jet airlines suffered only 20 fatal accidents, yet they carried 1.09 billion people on 18 million flights. Even more remarkable, if you add up all the people who died in commercial airplane accidents in America over the last 60 years, the number you will arrive at is smaller than the number of people killed in U.S. car accidents in any three-month period. These totals are telling, but the most relevant figures compare fatalities per unit of distance traveled. By that measure, in the United States you will be 22 times safer traveling by commercial airline than by car. (This conclusion is from a 1993-95 study by the U.S. National Safety Council.)<br /><br />Air travel has become much safer since 1950, bringing down the number of fatal accidents per million aircraft miles flown to 0.0005. To put your risk of death into proportion, consider that in 1997 commercial airlines made 8,157,000 departures, carried 598,895,000 passengers, and endured only 3 fatal accidents. While switching from road to air reduces your risk 22 times, if you were to switch from train to air, you would reduce your risk 12-fold.<br /><br />You’re considerably more likely to die while engaging in recreational boating or biking than while traveling by air. Given that you need to travel, by taking a precautionary approach that leads you to avoid the possibility of a spectacular air crash, you would be exposing yourself to a greater risk of injury or death. Be cautious with precaution!<br /><br />In comparing the fatality rates of air travel and road travel, we have been comparing like with like. The paradox of the precautionary principle becomes even more dangerous when a preoccupation with one value, such as safety, distracts us from other values. We may be able to improve an outcome according to one measure, but it will often come at the cost of worsening an outcome according to a different measure. In that case we will face choices that the precautionary principle is poorly equipped to handle. To see this, consider the Kyoto protocol.<br /><br />The Kyoto protocol is an international precautionary commitment to reduce the emission of gases suspected of causing global warming. Supporters of Kyoto typically favor forcing down emissions of these gases by raising fuel economy standards for cars and trucks. The effects of enforcing similar fuel economy standards in the United States has pushed automakers to come out with smaller, lighter, more vulnerable cars. According to a study by the Harvard School of Public Health, this results in an additional 2,000-4,000 highway deaths per year. In this case, we are buying some climate remediation at the cost of many lives. We are improving outcomes according to one measure but worsening them according to another measure.<br /><br />Regulation of economic activity—whether precautionary in origin or not—involves a more general and well-established tradeoff. Known as the “income effect”, this tradeoff is shaped by a correlation between wealth and health. Implementing and complying with regulations imposes costs. Political scientist Aaron Wildavsky observed that poorer nations tend to have higher mortality rates than richer ones. This correlation is no coincidence. Wealthier people can eat more varied and nutritious diets, buy better health care, and reduce sources of stress (such as excessively long working hours) and thereby reduce consequences such as heart attacks, hypertension, depression, and suicide.<br /><br />In counting up the anticipated benefits of regulations, we should therefore also consider what they may cost us—or cost poorer people in countries affected by international regulations. Some regulations will amount to a lousy deal. Although precise numbers are hard to pin down, a conservative estimate from the research suggests that the income effects leads to one additional death for every $7.25 million of regulatory costs. Many regulations impose costs in the tens of billions of dollars annually. That implies thousands of additional deaths per year. Safety is not free. Regulatory overkill can be just that.<br /><br />If only activists would appreciate this point as they move from opposing chlorine to opposing “endocrine disruptors” and phthalates (used to soften plastics). The story of the antichlorine campaign does not offer much hope. The price of precaution can be exorbitant, especially for developing countries. Toward the end of the 1980s, environmental activists had focused their attention on purging society of chlorinated compounds. As part of this campaign, activists spread disinformation in all directions. They worked especially hard to persuade water authorities in numerous countries that allowing chlorination of drinking water amounted to giving people cancer. In Peru, they succeeded. The consequences were dire.<br /><br />Finding themselves in a budget crisis, Peruvian government officials saw in the cancer-risk claims a handy excuse to stop chlorinating the drinking water in many part of the country. They could cover their backs by pointing to official reports from the US Environmental Protection Agency that had alleged that drinking chlorinated water was linked to elevated cancer risks. (The EPA later admitted that this connection was not “scientifically supportable.”) Soon afterwards, cholera—a disease that had been wiped out in Peru—returned in the epidemic of 1991-96. 800,000 suffered and 6,000 died in Peru. Then it spread to Columbia, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala. Around 1.3 million people were afflicted, and 11,000 or more were killed by the disease.<br /><br />The drinking water system had been deteriorating before this, so we cannot place the entire blame on the single decision to stop chlorinating. But chlorinating the water would probably have prevented the epidemic from getting started. Absence of the treatment certainly made the situation far worse. The high price paid for that precautionary measure is not unusual or surprising in poorer countries. The elimination of DDT further illustrates the point.<br /><br />DDT ended the terrible scourge of malaria in some third-world countries by the late 20th century by ending malaria-carrying mosquitoes. But environmentalists targeted the pesticide, claiming that it might harm some birds and might possibly cause cancer. Malaria control efforts around the world quickly fell apart. This devastating affliction of nature is rapidly gaining strength in earth’s tropical regions. Malaria epidemics in 2000 alone killed over a million people and sickened 300 million. Once again, those least able to bear it were the ones to pay the high price for precautionary tunnel vision.<br /><br />Have aggressive environmental activists learned from these experiences and changed course? Hardly. “Green at any price” seems to be their motto as they mutter speculations of doom while trying to strangle the technology of gene-spliced (or “genetically modified” or GM) crops. In this case, there may be hope. Late in 2004, both China and Britain looked set to approve gene-spliced crops, despite well-organized and funded opponents—opponents who don’t hesitate to destroy crops being grown for research. And in 2005, the FDA began loosening its restrictions on bioengineered rice.<br /><br />If these countries open the way for this vital part of agricultural biotechnology, it will mean a reversal of years of public policy that has restricted and raised costs of research and development. The result should be to spur innovation and to renew food productivity growth in the developing countries., ushering in a second Green Revolution.<br /><br />These are just a few of the many cases illustrating the dangers of the precautionary principle. Environmental and technological activism that wields the precautionary principle, whether explicitly or implicitly, raises clear threats of harm to human health and well-being. If we apply the principle to itself, we arrive at the corollary to the Paradox of the Precautionary Principle:<br /><br /><blockquote>According to the principle, since the principle itself is dangerous, we should take precautionary measures to prevent the use of the precautionary principle. </blockquote><br />The severity of the precautionary principle’s threat certainly does not imply that we should take <span style="font-style: italic;">no </span>actions to safeguard human health or the environment. Nor does it imply that we must achieve full scientific certainty (or its nearest real-world equivalent) before taking action. It <span style="font-style: italic;">does</span> imply that we should keep our attention focused on established and highly probable risks, rather than on hypothetical and inflated risks. It also implies an obligation to assess the likely costs of enforcing precautionary restrictions on human activities. Clearly, we need a better way to assess potential threats to humans and the environment—and the consequences of our responses. In order to develop a suitable alternative, we first need to appreciate the full extent of flaws in the precautionary approach.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-78590445678999396892010-08-22T10:35:00.006-05:002010-08-23T09:18:56.456-05:00Perils, Part 2: Pervasive Precaution<span style="font-weight: bold;">Pervasive Precaution</span><br /><br />The precautionary principle, as defined by Soren Holm and John Harris in <span style="font-style: italic;">Nature </span>magazine in 1999, asserts:<br /><blockquote>When an activity raises threats of serious or irreversible harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures that prevent the possibility of harm shall be taken even if the causal link between the activity and the possible harm has not been proven or the causal link is weak and the harm is unlikely to occur.</blockquote><br />The version from the Wingspread Statement, 1998:<br /><blockquote>“When an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.”</blockquote><br />The precautionary principle has taken many forms, but these definitions capture the essence of most of them. Starting life as the German <span style="font-style: italic;">Vorsorgeprinzip </span>(literally “precaution principle”), this rule assumed a role in institutional decision making in the North-Sea conferences from 1984 to 1995, and in the deliberations leading to the Rio Declaration of 1992, the UN Framework Climate Convention of 1992, and the Kyoto Protocol. Formulations of the principle do vary in some important ways. The fuzziness resulting from this lack of a standard definition causes trouble, but is also the very characteristic that appeals to advocates of technological and environmental regulation. They have come to favor the precautionary principle—in whatever form best helps them maneuver policies so as to further their goals.<br /><br />In its most modest form, the principle urges us not to wait for scientific certainty before taking precautionary measures. Considered out of context, that policy is entirely reasonable. We rarely achieve the high standard of scientific certainty about the effects of our activities. But this fact applies just as much to actions in the form of restrictions, regulations, and prohibitions as to innovative and productive activities. By recognizing the frequent necessity to act or refrain from acting in conditions of uncertainty, we are not thereby committed to favoring a policy of restrictive precautionary measures. This message about certainty and action therefore tells us little. And the rest of the principle provides no further guidance about choosing under uncertainty.<br /><br />Its roots in the German <span style="font-style: italic;">Vorsorgeprinzip </span>mean that the common use of the principle goes well beyond urging preventative or prohibitory action based on inconclusive evidence. An attribute more central to the principle is the judgment of “better safe than sorry”. In other words, err on the side of caution. While this sentiment makes for a perfectly sound <span style="font-style: italic;">proverb</span>, it provides a treacherous foundation for a <span style="font-style: italic;">principle </span>to guide assessments of technological and environmental impacts. As a proverb, “better safe than sorry” is counterbalanced by opposing—but equally valid—proverbs, such as “he who hesitates is lost”, or “make hay while the sun shines.”<br /><br />Precautionary measures typically impose costs, burdens, and their own harms. Administering precautionary actions becomes especially dangerous when the principle says, or is interpreted as saying, that those actions are justified and required “if any possibility” of harm exists. In this (typical) interpretation, it becomes ridiculously easy to rationalize restrictive measures in the absence of any real evidence. Clearly, this pushes the principle far beyond dismissing the need for fully established cause-effect relationships.<br /><br />Statements of the precautionary principle vary also in whether or not they specify that the principle deals with threats of <span style="font-style: italic;">serious </span>or <span style="font-style: italic;">irreversible </span>harm or damage. Problems arise with the usage of “serious” and “irreversible”, but at least this clause limits the application of the principle. More demanding versions of the principle, such as the widely-quoted Wingspread Statement, call for precautionary measures to come into play even when the possible harm is <span style="font-style: italic;">not </span>serious or irreversible.<br /><br />Statements of the precautionary principle may include a cost-effectiveness clause. This happens all too rarely in practice, perhaps because most advocates of the principle aim to <span style="font-style: italic;">stop </span>the targeted technology or activity, not to maximize welfare. The Rio Declaration of 1992 stands out by incorporating such a clause:<br /><br />“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures.”<br /><br />Some worthy attempts have been made to improve the principle by adding to it. In 2001, the European Environment Agency issued a document conveying “Late Lessons from Early Warnings”, which issued twelve accompanying guidelines. These included some excellent recommendations, such as “Identify and reduce interdisciplinary obstacles to learning”, and “Systematically scrutinise the claimed justifications and benefits alongside the potential risks.” Unfortunately, advocates of the principle have not paid attention to these suggestions, and many of them co-exist uncomfortably with the main thrust of the principle. Another noteworthy attempt at amelioration is a May 2000 <span style="font-style: italic;">Science </span>paper titled “Science and the Precautionary Principle”. This set out five “Guidelines for Application of the Precautionary Principle”: Proportionality, nondiscrimination, consistency, cost-benefit examination, and examination of scientific developments.<br /><br />With or without patches, the deeply flawed precautionary principle can cause trouble. It already has. Awareness of the pervasive, profoundly restrictive force of the principle is all the more remarkable for its relative obscurity, especially outside Europe. Even among widely read people, a large majority do not recall ever having heard the term—although they have certainly heard “better safe than sorry”. Yet the dominant influence of the principle can be found everywhere.<br /><br />Consider, for a start, the central role of the precautionary principle in shaping environmental policy in the European Union. The foundational Maastricht Treaty on the European Union states that “Community policy on the environment…shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive actions should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.” The United Nations joined the precautionary bandwagon when the UN Biosafety Protocol led the way for other international treaties by incorporating the precautionary principle. Some other examples of the principle explicitly at work:<br /><br /><ul><li>Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 ILM 1541.</li><li>Second North Sea Declaration.</li><li>Ministerial Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, Nov. 25, 1987, 27 ILM 835. </li><li>United Nations Environment Program.</li><li>Nordic Council’s Conference.</li><li>Nordic Council’s International Conference on Pollution of the Seas: Final Document Agreed to Oct. 18, 1989, in Nordic Action Plan on Pollution of the Seas, 99 app. V (1990) .</li><li>PARCOM Recommendation 89/1 - 22 June, 1989.</li><li>The Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources: </li><li>Third North Sea Conference.</li><li>Bergen Declaration on Sustainable Development.</li><li>Second World Climate Conference.</li><li>Bamako Convention on Transboundary Hazardous Waste into Africa.</li><li>OECD Council Recommendation C(90)164 on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, January 1991.</li><li>Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.</li><li>The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 1992.</li><li>Climate Change Conference (Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992).</li><li>UNCED Text on Ocean Protection.</li><li>Energy Charter Treaty.</li></ul><br />The influence of the principle has been felt in South America too. Transgenic crops have been prohibited throughout Brazil since 1998. In that year, a judge made an interpretation of the version of the principle included in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development—a statement coming out of the 1992 Earth Summit held in Brazil.<br /><br />The precautionary principle is followed even more widely than it might seem from official mentions, especially in the United States. We often find the principle being applied without disclosure or explicit acknowledgment. Perhaps this happens because the principle ably captures common intuitions that grow out of fear fed by lack of knowledge. Our first reaction to an apparent threat is usually: <span style="font-style: italic;">Stop it now! </span>We may disregard the costs of stopping the threat. Our sense of urgency may blind us to considering whether we might have better options at our disposal.<br /><br />When the United Kingdom faced the appalling, if over-inflated, menace of bovine spongiform encephalitis (BSE), people quickly demanded that authorities require proof of virtually zero risk for any substance that might have BSE contamination. Professor James Bridges, chair of the European Commission’s toxicology committee, referred to this “extreme precautionary approach in the context of other food risks” and noted it had “involved enormous costs”. Of course, if such proof could be provided (which it surely cannot) and at a low cost, the demand would be reasonable. But the actual reaction lacks any sense of proportionality and objective risk assessment.<br /><br />In the United States, the President’s Council on Sustainable Development affirmed the precautionary principle, without using the term explicitly, in its statement:<br /><blockquote>There are certain beliefs that we as Council members share that underlie all of our agreements. We believe: (number 12) even in the face of scientific uncertainty, society should take reasonable actions to avert risks where the potential harm to human health or the environment is thought to be serious or irreparable.</blockquote><br />The United States has made extensive use of precautionary prevention—sometimes quite sensibly—even if no mention is made of a principle. Sometimes precautionary prevention has been applied <span style="font-style: italic;">earlier </span>in the US than in Europe. The European Environment Agency publication “Late Lessons from Early Warnings” notes four examples: The Delaney Clause in the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 1957–96, which banned animal carcinogens from the human food chain; a ban on the use of scrapie-infected sheep and goat meat in the animal and human food chain in the early 1970s; a ban on the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in aerosols in 1977, several years before similar action in most of Europe; and a ban on the use of DES as a growth promoter in beef, 1972–79, nearly 10 years before the EU ban in 1987.<br /><br />The most formidable manifestations of the precautionary principle in the US may be found in the regulatory practices of the FDA (Food and Drug Administration). It’s not the only US government agency applying the principle, usually without naming it—and without calculating its costs and benefits. The EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) bound itself to the principle in developing and enforcing regulations on synthetic chemicals. US regulators have taken an even <span style="font-style: italic;">more </span>strongly precautionary approach than Europe to some kinds of risks, such as nuclear power, lead in gasoline, and the approval of new medicines—which takes us back to the FDA.<br /><br />Precautionary FDA regulation may have the most drastic impact on human well-being of any mentioned so far. The FDA has successfully sought to extend its powers over the decades, first solidifying its authority to determine when a new medication could be considered <span style="font-style: italic;">safe</span>, and later to determine when it could be considered <span style="font-style: italic;">effective</span>. If the agency were using a purely rational approach to regulation—one that accurately aimed at maximizing human health—it would fully account for both the risks of approving a new medicine that might have damaging side-effects, <span style="font-style: italic;">and </span>the dangers of <span style="font-style: italic;">withholding </span>approval or <span style="font-style: italic;">delaying </span>approval to a potentially beneficial medicine. In practice, this is far from the way the FDA operates.<br /><br />In reality, the FDA consistently follows a path close to one that the precautionary principle would prescribe: It puts all its energies into minimizing the risk of a new drug that might be approved, then goes on to cause harm. Very little energy goes into considering the potential benefits from making the new treatment available. Regulators can make mistakes on both sides of this balance.<br /><br />If they approve a drug that turns out to be harmful, they have made a “Type I error”, as it is called in risk analysis. They might also make a Type II error by making a beneficial medication unavailable—by delaying it, rejecting it for consideration, by failing to approve it, or by wrongly withdrawing it from the market.<br /><br />Both types of error are bad for the public. For the regulators, the risk of Type I errors looks much more frightening that Type II errors. If they make a Type II mistake and prevent a beneficial treatment coming to market, few people will ever be aware of what has been lost. Probably the media will be silent, and Congress will join them. Regulators have little incentive to avoid Type II errors. But what of the prospect of making a Type I error? This is a regulator’s worst nightmare.<br /><br />Suppose you are the regulator, and you approve a promising new drug that turns out to be another Thalidomide, causing horrible deformations in newborns. Or, consider what it felt like to be one of the regulators who approved the swine flu vaccine in 1976. The vaccine did its job, but turned out to cause temporary paralysis in some patients. Such a Type I error is immediately obvious and attains a high profile as lawyers, the media, the public, and eager politicians pile on, screaming at you with rage and blame. We’ve seen this more recently in the cases of Vioxx and Celebrex.<br /><br />You will hardly be a happy official, and your career may be destroyed. You approved the drug according to your best judgment, but your error is not forgiven or forgotten. Given these asymmetrical incentives, regulators naturally tend to err far on the side of being overly cautious. They go to great lengths to avoid Type I errors—a factor that has raised the cost of new drug development and approval into the hundreds of millions of dollars and added years to the process. (The only effective countervailing force in recent history has been the focused pressure of activists to speed approval of AIDS drugs.)<br /><br />Regulators, then, will not make an objective, comprehensive, balanced assessment of both Type I and II risks. The overall outcome is a regulatory scheme driven by incentives that bias it strongly against new products and innovation. Some of the regulators themselves have recognized and publicly expressed these uneven pressures. Former FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt put it this way:<br /><br /><blockquote>In all our FDA history, we are unable to find a single instance where a Congressional committee investigated the failure of FDA to approve a new drug. But, the times when hearings have been held to criticize our approval of a new drug have been so frequent that we have not been able to count them. The message to FDA staff could not be clearer. Whenever a controversy over a new drug is resolved by approval of the drug, the agency and the individuals involved likely will be investigated. Whenever such a drug is disapproved, no inquiry will be made. The Congressional pressure for negative action is, therefore, intense. And it seems to be ever increasing.</blockquote><br />The writings of well-known prophets of gloom provide further evidence of the pervasiveness of precautionary thinking. Consider Bill Joy’s much-discussed essay in <span style="font-style: italic;">Wired</span>, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us.” Joy proposed that we apply a precautionary approach to a limited number of technologies—but technologies with a powerful reach and impact. He labeled the inventions that frightened him as “GNR”, standing for genetic engineering, nanotechnology, and robotics. Joy focused on these three areas, but his fears apply to any form of technology endowed with the power of self-replication. In his manifesto, he warned of what he saw as immense new threats:<br /><br /><blockquote>Our most powerful 21st-century technologies - robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotech - are threatening to make humans an endangered species… Thus we have the possibility not just of weapons of mass destruction but of knowledge-enabled mass destruction (KMD), this destructiveness hugely amplified by the power of self-replication.<br /><br />And if our own extinction is a likely, or even possible, outcome of our technological development, shouldn't we proceed with great caution?<br />I think it is no exaggeration to say we are on the cusp of the further perfection of extreme evil, an evil whose possibility spreads well beyond that which weapons of mass destruction bequeathed to the nation-states, on to a surprising and terrible empowerment of extreme individuals.</blockquote><br />Just like other advocates of precautionary measures, Joy concluded with a call for restricting or <span style="font-style: italic;">relinquishing </span>technology. Going further than many (at least in their public statements), Joy also called for “limiting our pursuit of certain kinds of knowledge.” He also mentioned that he saw many activists joining him as “the voices for caution and relinquishment…” I will return to Joy’s proposed precautionary measures and their effects near the end of the chapter. In a later chapter, I will consider the views of Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, and Michael Sandel, all of who take precautionary approaches to enhancement technologies, which include Joy’s GNR trio.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-38412351872244192952010-08-22T00:40:00.003-05:002010-08-22T00:47:17.746-05:00The Perils of PrecautionThis is the first in a series of entries of what is chapter 2 of my book-in-progress, The Proactionary Principle. I will post a new section of that chapter every day or two. Following that will be sections from chapter 4, <span style="font-style:italic;">The Proactionary Principle </span>(my alternative to the precautionary principle).<br /><br /><br />When you hear the word “mother”, what comes to mind? If you are like me, mother stands for comfort, for love and, above all, for protecting and nurturing the young. Those lurid and repellant news stories of mothers who murder their children revolt and fascinate us precisely because they violate our expectations so brutally. We expect mothers to watch over their offspring, to safeguard them, to take precautionary measures. When we see mothers filling this age-old role, all feels right with the world.<br /><br />But what if a mother is killing with kindness? What if, by protecting her child from a perceived danger, she is opening the door to a greater danger? What if the overprotective mother encourages thousands of other mothers to follow her example? How do we feel then? Her excessive—or misdirected—precaution now puts in peril a multitude of innocents.<br /><br />In the process of writing this chapter, I came across a website that claims to reveal the truth about vaccines. The mother who runs this site had her son vaccinated with the usual treatments, starting at two months of age. At fifteen months, one week after being vaccinated for several dangerous conditions, the boy starting having seizures. No definite connection was established with the vaccine, and reactions typically occur more quickly. This unfortunate woman is now devoting herself to broadcasting dire warnings about the vaccine menace. To the extent that the conviction of her personal voice succeeds in influencing others, she will be responsible for greatly raising the risk of serious illness in numerous children.<br /><br />The mother had read a fact sheet explaining that a vaccine can cause serious allergic reactions, and induce seizures in 6 out of 10,000 cases. She writes that, “like so many of us, I never thought it meant my child.” This comment indicates a failing in the thinking of this mother—a failing that sparked such appalled outrage in me that little room was left for sympathy. First, she read about the small odds of an adverse reaction but ignored it—because it didn’t mean her child. (Why not? Because believing something comfortable was more important to her than seeing reality?) Then, after the misfortune of her son being one of those suffering adverse reactions (assuming the vaccine <span style="font-style:italic;">was </span>the cause), she ignored the dangers for which the vaccine was prescribed and set about encouraging other women to refuse to vaccinate their children. <br /><br />This <span style="font-style:italic;">aggressive ignorance </span>typifies the danger of allowing caution without knowledge and fear without objectivity, to drive our thinking and decision making. When we overly focus on avoiding specific dangers—or what we perceive to be dangers—we narrow our awareness, constrain our thinking, and distort our decisions. <br /><br />Many factors conspire to warp our reasoning about risks and benefits as individuals. The bad news is that such foolish thinking has been institutionalized and turned into a principle. Zealous pursuit of precaution has been enshrined in the “precautionary principle”. Regulators, negotiators, and activists refer to and defer to this principle when considering possible restrictions on productive activity and technological innovation.<br /><br />In this chapter, I aim to explain how the precautionary principle, and the mindset that underlies it, threaten our well-being and our future. The extropic advance of our civilization depends on keeping caution in perspective. We <span style="font-style:italic;">do </span>need a healthy dose of caution, but caution must take its place as one value among many, not as the sole, all-powerful rule for making decisions about what should and should not do.<br /><br />I will show how the single-minded pursuit of precaution has the perverse effect of raising our risks. Then I’ll point out many ways in which the principle fails us as a guide to forming a future with care <span style="font-style:italic;">and </span>courage. That will set the stage for an alternative principle—one explicitly designed for the task.<br /><br />Our Endangered Future<br />Continued technological innovation and advance are essential for our progress as a species, as individuals, and for the survival of our core freedoms. Unfortunately, human minds do not find it natural or easy to reason accurately about risks arising from complex circumstances. As a result, technological progress is being threatened by fundamentalists of all kinds, anti-humanists, Luddites, primitivists, regulators, and the distorted perceptions to which we are all vulnerable. A clear case of this shortcoming is our reasoning about the introduction of new technologies and the balance of potential benefits and harms that result. <br /><br />Most of us want to do two things at the same time: Protect our freedom to innovate technologically, <span style="font-style:italic;">and </span>protect ourselves and our environment from excessive collateral damage. Our traditional thinking has shown itself not to be up to this task. If we are serious about achieving the right balance of progress and protection, we need help. Suppose your friend wanted to make your favorite meal for you, and you knew he was clueless about cooking. To improve the chances of enjoying a delicious feast, while minimizing wasted ingredients, damaged utensils, and hurt feelings, you might gently urge him to use a <span style="font-style:italic;">recipe</span>. Reasoning about risk and benefit is similar. Only we call the recipe <span style="font-style:italic;">structured decision making</span>. <br /><br />One recipe for making decisions and forming policies about technological and environmental issues has become popular. This decision recipe is known by the catchy name of <span style="font-style:italic;">the precautionary principle</span>. This principle falls far short at encouraging us to make decisions that are objective, comprehensive, and balanced. It falls so far short that cynics might wonder whether it was devised <span style="font-style:italic;">specifically </span>to stifle technological advance and productive activity.<br /><br />Regulators find the principle attractive because it provides a seemingly clear procedure with a bias towards the exercise of regulatory power. The precautionary principle’s characteristics suit it well for the political arena in which regulators, hardcore environmental, and anti-technological activists pursue their agenda. Their interests, and the nature of the principle, practically guarantee that no consideration is given to an alternate approach: making decision making less political and more open to other methods. With rare exceptions, political decisions ensure that for every winner there is a loser. That’s because political decisions are imposed by the winners on the losers. Decisions made outside the political process typically enable all sides to win because there are multiple outcomes rather than just one.<br /><br />Some well-intended people who genuinely <span style="font-style:italic;">do </span>share the goal of a healthy balance of progress with protection have attempted to salvage the precautionary principle. In the absence of a more appealing alternative, they hope to reframe it and hedge it so that it does the job.<br /><br />Before setting out a positive alternative for making decisions about the deployment or restriction of new (or existing) technologies, I want to make completely clear why I consider the precautionary principle not only inadequate but dangerous.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-28135679963374690512009-11-07T01:10:00.005-06:002009-11-07T17:32:52.620-06:00The Myth of StagnationThe philosopher Bernard Williams once wrote a piece on “The Tedium of Immortality”. Although I have long thought his view reeked of sour grapes, he expressed similar sentiments to those I’ve heard many times over the years. “The Myth of Stagnation” is my rebuttal to those sentiments.<br /><br />This is a slightly-edited excerpt from a chapter (“The Psychology of Forever”) I wrote back in 1996, but which has never been published. Although I might write some of it a little differently today, I haven’t changed my views about any of the ideas expressed here. You will find this essay along with related thoughts as a chapter in the forthcoming book, <span style="font-style: italic;">Death and Anti-Death Volume 7</span>, edited by Charles Tandy.<br /><br /><br />"Growing old is no more than a bad habit which a busy man has no time to form."<br />André Maurois, <span style="font-style: italic;">The Art of Living</span>, “The Art of Growing Old” (1940).<br /><br />Life is good, some will grant. Life offers numerous paths and possibilities. But isn’t life good only because it is limited in length? If we lived indefinitely, potentially forever, wouldn’t we eventually stagnate, lose interest, become bored?<br /><br />Certainly this belief has been pushed at us for centuries through stories, from Jonathan Swift’s Struldbruggs in <span style="font-style: italic;">Gulliver’s Travels </span>(1726), Eugene Sue’s <span style="font-style: italic;">The Wandering Jew </span>(1844-5), and Karel Capek’s <span style="font-style: italic;">The Makropoulos Secret </span>(1925), to more recent tales as presented in John Boorman’s 1974 movie <span style="font-style: italic;">Zardoz</span>.<br /><br />The world of <span style="font-style: italic;">Zardoz</span>, set in the distant future, has been divided into two realms: the Vortex, where dwell the immortals, and the Outlands, home to the short-lived Brutals. The decadent, impotent immortals have lost their vitality. An especially intelligent Brutal, played by Sean Connery, invades the Vortex, introducing chaos, destroying their society, and returning the immortals to a natural state. That is: <span style="font-style: italic;">dead</span>. Even in the heroic <span style="font-style: italic;">Highlander </span>movie, the grand prize for the sole surviving immortal (“There can be only one!”) is wisdom-with-death.<br /><br />I suspect this cultural tendency to see indefinite lifespan or potential immortality as a curse serves as a psychological defense against the historically undeniable fact of human mortality. So long as mortality was an unalterable part of the human condition, it was understandable if we fooled ourselves into believing that physical immortality would be dreadful. I am suggesting that mortality no longer need be accepted as inevitable. If indefinitely extended longevity is achievable, continuing to cling to the immortality-as-curse myth can only destroy us.<br /><br />To begin uncovering the errors fueling opposition to extreme longevity, consider first the distinction between seeking immortality and seeking indefinite lifespan. Suppose we were to grant that we might become bored of life, whether it be centuries, millennia, or eons from now. We might even grant that boredom was inevitable given a sufficiently extended life. Granting these suppositions for now, what follows? Only that literal immortality—living forever—would not be desirable. But forever is <span style="font-style: italic;">infinitely </span>longer than a billion years. If there were, in principle, some limit to the length of a stimulating, challenging, rewarding life, we could not know where it lies until we reached it.<br /><br />If immortality should not be a goal, <span style="font-style: italic;">indefinitely </span>long lifespan can be. If, one day we find ourselves drained, if we can think of nothing more to do and our current activities seem pointless, we will have the option of ending our lives. Alternatively, we might change ourselves so radically that, although <span style="font-style: italic;">someone </span>continues to live, it’s unclear that it’s us. But we cannot know in advance when we will reach that point. To throw away what may be a vastly long stretch of joyful living on the basis that <span style="font-style: italic;">forever </span>must bring boredom and stagnation would be a terrible error.<br /><br />Stagnation sets in when motion ceases. Motion, change, and growth form the core of living. We will stagnate if we either run out of the energy to stay in the flow of life, or if we exhaust all the possibilities. I suggest that while some people run out of energy at any age, doing so is not inevitable. I further suggest that life’s possibilities are literally unbounded. Certainly we can see this to be true for millennia to come.<br /><br />Theoretically arguments from physics, cosmology, and computer science indicate that even true immortality and infinite variety cannot be ruled out. First, then, why do many people run out of energy and settle into a stagnant decline? If we survey the diversity of personalities around us, one thing will become clear: People get bored because they become boring.<br /><br />Sadly many people don’t wait for old age to become boring. The prospect of extended longevity repels them since even their current lives are dull. What makes them become weary? They make themselves that way in several ways.<br /><br /><br /><a href="http://www.maxmore.com/mythofstagnation.htm" target="_blank">Continue on the full text of this essay</a>.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-9003867695961785582009-09-09T18:02:00.001-05:002009-09-09T18:07:33.590-05:00Why Catholics Should Support the Transhumanist Goal of Extended LifeWhy Catholics Should Support the Transhumanist Goal of Extended Life<br /><br />(A talk being translated to Italian and delivered to a Catholic conference on "The idea of earthly immortality: a new challenge for theology", September 2009).<br /><br />Intellectual honesty is extremely important to me. Therefore, I must say at the beginning that I am not religious. As the founder of modern transhumanism, I am a rationalist and do not see good reason to believe in the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. At the same time, I have studied and understand religion in general and the Catholic faith in particular. I have studied and taught philosophy of religion for many years—including Mount St. Mary’s in Brentwood, California, and have engaged in discussions with many Catholic philosophy students. In addition, I have enormous respect for St. Thomas Aquinas—undoubtedly the greatest of all Catholic theologians.<br /><br />For Aquinas, faith and reason are compatible and should lead to the same answers, so long as we use our God-given reason carefully. This is a core part of Scholastic philosophy and its blending of revealed wisdom with Aristotle’s philosophy. Aristotle appeals to me for several reasons, the main one for our current purpose being his virtue ethics. It is from a perspective of a virtue ethics of human flourishing that I will argue that Catholics should adopt a generally favorable attitude toward transhumanism and, especially, the pursuit of greatly extended maximum life spans.<br /><br />Catholic theologians and other thinkers have long been strong defenders of the sacredness of life. They have opposed terminating the life of fetuses and have resisted the resort to suicide. The core transhumanist goal of extended life in the physical realm is thoroughly consistent with this pro-life stance. I prefer the term “extended life” (or “indefinite life span” or “agelessness”) to the term “physical immortality”. I am far from sure that genuine immortality—living literally forever—is possible. Even if we live until the far-future decay or implosion of the universe, that falls infinitely short of forever. A trillion years is but an infinitesimal fraction of eternity.<br /><br />Even if we succeed in fully understanding and conquering the aging process—as I believe we probably will in the coming decades—our life spans will continue to be limited by factors such as accident, murder, and wars. In a world without aging, we are likely to focus on continuing to reduce the death rate. But, for any period of time—whether a year, a century, or a millennium—we will face a certain probability of death. By “death”, I mean a permanent physical death; loss of personal continuity beyond the point where it can be restored by the medical science and practice of the day.<br /><br />Literal physical immortality, then, is probably not an option. Agelessness or indefinite life may well be. A substantial and growing number of gerontologists see this as a realistic goal. In part, it’s for this reason that I say that immortality is not truly the goal for most of us as transhumanists. The goal is indefinite life spans. We aim to continually improve ourselves and enhance our capabilities. That makes degenerative aging and involuntary death our mortal enemies. We want to live for now and for the indefinite future. But we cannot know whether we will want to continue living far in the future. Perhaps, after centuries or millennia, we will choose to restore the aging process and allow our physical lives to reach an end. (I believe Catholic moral philosophy may not see this as suicide, but as choosing to move on to the afterlife.)<br /><br />Transhumanists seek radically extended lives as part of a philosophy that affirms continuous improvement of ourselves, not only intellectually and emotionally but also morally and what might be called spiritually. This goal seems consistent with Catholic views about virtue and the duties of human beings to serve and glorify God. This would not be true if it were possible to point to passages in the Bible—especially in the literal text of the New Testament—that declared longer lives to be contrary to God’s will or to His plans for us. In fact, there is nothing in the Bible that rejects extended physical lives. The Bible appears to be neutral on the topic.<br /><br />We might even interpret it to have a favorable attitude if we focus on the stated life spans of many early people in the Bible. A major effort to combat physical aging is run by the Methuselah Foundation—named after a man reputed to have lived for 969 years, narrowing exceeding the life spans of several others, including Jared (who lived to 962) and Noah (who lived to 950). The longest-lived person for whom we have reliable records in modern history was Jeanne Calment, who died at the age of 122 years, 164 days. The Bible mentions no fewer than 33 people who lived beyond the age of 123. Whether we take those ages literally or metaphorically, the Bible seems to suggest that our current life spans are not as long as those of people clearly favored by God. And why should a life span of 78 be any more privileged and accepted than historical life spans of 40 or even 30?<br /><br />In other words, the current average longevity of human beings has varied greatly over time. There is no reason to accept the current state of affairs as uniquely right or divinely commanded. The Catholic Church has no objection to the historical progression of science and technology that has gradually reduced the death rate and extended our lives. In fact, Catholics naturally stand behind efforts to alleviate the suffering of disease and aging and the maintenance and restoration of the healthy, flourishing physical being gifted to us by God.<br /><br />The Catholic Church should no problem supporting the extension not only of the average life span, but also the maximum life span. At least since Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical <span style="font-style: italic;">Humani Generis</span>, it has become clear that there is no conflict between evolution and the doctrine of the faith regarding man and his vocation. As Pope John Paul II put it: “Today, more than a half-century after the appearance of that encyclical, some new findings lead us toward the recognition of evolution as more than a hypothesis.”<br /><br />This is especially important in the current context, because the maximum human life span is a product of morally arbitrary evolution, not the result of any divine edict that has ever been communicated to us. Aging and biological senescence and death are the products of evolution. As such, they have no special moral status, whether naturalistic or divine. Aging is essentially a disease process. It results from the failure of our evolved biological mechanisms for cellular repair. We have been endowed with rational capacities unique in all the world. I can see no reason why we should not direct those rational faculties toward improving on what nature has so wonderfully but imperfectly developed. The goal, of course, is not an extended period of decrepitude but an extended period of healthy and vigorous life.<br /><br />It would be enough for the Catholic Church to support anti-aging efforts simply by acknowledging that this involves relieving suffering and infirmity, and that senescence is not a divinely-commanded condition. But there are positive arguments for actively combating the ravages of aging and the inevitability of biological death. One of these might come from taking the lead of Jesus, who repeatedly urged us to “do as I have done”. Jesus did not look at physical weaknesses and sickness and say “My Father has commanded it. Accept your suffering and impending death.” On the contrary, Jesus made it a core part of his mission to heal the sick and even raise the dead.<br /><br />This implies that, while suffering may have value, the kind of involuntary, guiltless suffering imposed by age-related illness and senescence is not inherently noble. We can grant that suffering might improve us and can have a valuable place in our lives, without accepting every kind of suffering. Suffering comes in many forms, so reducing or even eliminating suffering due to aging and death still allows plenty of room for a salutary or redemptive role for suffering.<br /><br />Catholics faced with disease and suffering do not hesitate to support medical research even as they minister to the spiritual needs of victims. I believe that, as it becomes ever more feasible to prevent and reverse the diseases of aging, our moral responsibility to help in doing so becomes greater. Extending the maximum human life span has not seemed feasible until recent years. As more evidence accumulates showing that we can successfully combat aging and the inevitability of biological death, I would expect to see the Church actively supporting or conducting research.<br /><br />A final observation: From a specifically Christian perspective, extending the maximum healthy life span of humans beyond the current limit of around 123 years would have another major benefit: It would give us more time to develop virtue, to do good works, to serve God, and to save souls. This alone should be reason enough to vigorously support the quest for ageless bodies and indefinite life spans. Few of even the most optimistic transhumanists expect the world to ever be perfect. To the extent that the world remains imperfect—and far inferior to Heaven—a longer existence in the physical world might perhaps be regarded as a milder form of purgatory. It can be seen as a divine blessing: an extended opportunity to improve ourselves, do good works to redeem ourselves, to glorify God, and to more fully earn a place in Heaven.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-59493729862271122192009-08-08T16:28:00.003-05:002009-08-09T00:09:39.948-05:00Climate Consensus? Maybe, But About What?(This is a slightly edited version of a post I made to the WTA-Talk email list on July 31, 2009.)<br /><br />James Hughes posted [on the WTA-Talk email list] the results of one particular survey that reported apparently strong agreement on something or other. James especially highlights the figure of 97% agreement. That does indeed sound very impressive. I do think that such a tight consensus among a group of scientists would be something to give considerable epistemic weight to -- at least in the absence of major objections, say from a neighboring discipline. I’m perfectly willing to be persuaded that a consensus on some clear point exists that I currently disagree with. So far, however, I haven’t been given sufficient reason to do so. Let's look at little more closely at this particular survey and my reasons for doubt.<br /><br />>Two questions were key: Have mean global temperatures risen compared<br />>to pre-1800s levels, and has human activity been a significant <br />>factor in changing mean global temperatures?<br />><br />>About 90 percent of the scientists agreed with the first question and 82 percent the second.<br /><br />These numbers are lower than the most impressive one of 97%, but still high.<br /><br />>The strongest consensus on the causes of global warming came from<br />>climatologists who are active in climate research, with 97 percent <br />>agreeing humans play a role.<br /><br />Agreement was lower in certain groups:<br /><br />>Petroleum geologists and meteorologists were among the biggest<br />>doubters, with only 47 percent and 64 percent, respectively, <br />>believing in human involvement.<br /><br />Why would agreement be higher among the climatologists than among other scientists, including meteorologists and physicists? One plausible answer is that it's because the climatologists can make better judgments. (Although evidence-based forecasting shows that expert forecasts of future changes cannot be trusted with this kind of problem.) Another plausible answer is that groupthink is at work, as it is in so many areas of human activity. This is hardly an arbitrary suggestion, given all the accusations of "denial" and "planetary traitors" and the strong pressures being exerted against skeptics.<br /><br />Of course there are other surveys, which produce different results. Climatologists are only one group qualified to answer these questions. But l'll set that aside here.<br /><br />One question that comes to mind is; How were the people to be questioned selected? What percentage of the total does the 3,100 or so represent? From what I've seen, some 10,200 earth scientists were contacted. Only 3,100 replied. Now, these <span style="font-style:italic;">may </span>be representative, or they may not be. Anyone with an academic background in the social sciences, or statistics knows that samples can and often do misrepresent the whole. Given the thousands of scientists who have signed dissenting opinions, I'm not terribly confident that the percentages of respondents in this survey accurately represent the whole group. It seems, for instance, that earth scientists working in private industry were ignored. Given that government-funded scientists may have an incentive (above and beyond the obviously heavy peer-pressure) to agree, the results may not give an accurate picture of all relevant scientists.<br /><br />These questions come to mind especially because of the highly politicized nature of this discussion. Also, specifically, because of misrepresentations such as seen with the IPCC report, where a small group of people claim to speak for a much larger group. (Compare the summary of the IPCC report to the actual details of the report...)<br /><br />Other surveys have yielded different percentages. You can see that just from the <a target="_blank" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_opinion_on_climate_change">Wikipedia article</a>.<br /><br />But, set aside these concerns.<br /><br />Much more troubling are the questions and the conclusions so quickly drawn from them. Consider the questions. What exactly were those surveyed being asked?<br /><br />1. "Have mean global temperatures risen compared to pre-1800s levels?" <br />1800 was around the time that we began to recover more quickly from the Little Ice Age. So what does this tell us? Not much about today or about human activity. It does show that climate scientists agree that the global temperature changes over time. Who is going to disagree with <span style="font-style:italic;">that</span>?<br /><br />2. Has human activity been a significant factor in changing mean global temperatures?<br />So, 82% said yes to this. Is this anything to get excited about? Should it impress those of us who are a bit skeptical about warming catastrophe stories? Suppose you are entirely certain that carbon dioxide released by humans is not the cause of global warming. You would still easily grant that global mean temperatures has risen due to the urban heat island effect.<br /><br />In addition, the question is very vague, certainly if "significant" is taken in the sense of statistical significance (as it presumably is by these scientists). If those climate scientists believed that only 2% or 5% of observed warming could be attributed to human activity, they would still agree with that statement.<br /><br />How many would still agree if the question was:<br />-- Do you agree that warming was almost certainly primarily due to human activity? (Not just "significant".)<br />-- Is global warming principally or quantifiably due to human activity?<br />-- Are you certain or almost certain that human activity would cause a degree of future warming that constituted a catastrophe?<br />-- Do you believe that large cuts in carbon dioxide would be effective or cost-effective?<br />-- Do you believe that the Kyoto Protocol is a sensible solution?<br /><br />Claiming consensus -- even if entirely justified -- on such vague questions that few skeptics would disagree with is an easy victory that gets us nowhere with any discussion that matters. Once again, dumbing down the issue to a "consensus" of some vague kind isn't useful.<br /><br />Aside from the foregoing points, I have to say that given the inaccuracy of climate models (as shown comparing them to the past), being impressed by a supposed (or even real) consensus of climate scientists doesn't look too different from relying on a consensus of astronomers. (I would have equally harsh things to say about economists, when they model whole economies...) Granted, that's overstating it. But not by a whole hell of a lot. Again, see my previous post pointing to an audit of the forecasting methodology of the IPCC report, which is considered the gold standard.<br /><br />I just can't see climate modeling as having attained the status of a hard science at this stage. Even if there was a rock solid consensus on some point of interest (rather than on statements that I have no problem with at all), I would not feel rationally compelled to assent to it as I would, for instance, in the case of a consensus among particle physicists who tell me not to worry about strangelets as they start up the Large Hadron Collider.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-73162909508579075752009-08-08T15:09:00.005-05:002009-08-09T15:44:18.371-05:00My Current View of the Global Warming ControversyIn the raging debate over global warming (or climate change), each side contributes to polarization and misrepresentation of views. Too many of those who see themselves as part of the “consensus” about anthropogenic global warming (AGW) have a habit of ignoring the differences among those who disagree with them. These people are eager to slap the label “denier” and “anti-science” on the skeptics. (Both those labels have been applied to me by Mike Treder, who has consistently proven the most dishonest and arrogant example of what I’m talking about.)<br /><br />We skeptics (okay, “planetary traitors” if you prefer) actually hold a wide range of views. I’m tired of being labeled a “denier” of some unspecified received truth. I do not deny, for instance, that there has been some global warming this century. My doubts about the claimed (and possibly real) consensus concern other beliefs. To set the record straight (and to make it a bit harder for people like Treder to misrepresent me), here are my <span style="font-style:italic;">current </span>views, as of early August 2009:<br /><br />• It’s <span style="font-style:italic;">highly </span>probable that there has been some global warming this century—probably about 0.7 degrees C.<br /><br />• The climate is dynamic and is continually changing. Further, it changes in different ways in different places. For instance, it may be warming in some areas while it cools in others. Local, specific examples are not good evidence for a global trend.<br /><br />• There has been no warming over the past 12 years—despite continued human-related emissions.<br /><br />• Over the next century, it’s extremely uncertain how much, if any, further GW/AGW to expect.<br /><br />• Climate models are not proven reliable or accurate. Climate modeling is still an infant science.<br /><br />• GW is far from the most urgent or important global issue for us to deal with. (See the work of The Copenhagen Consensus. Also see <a href="http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2008/06/02/is-climate-change-the-worlds-most-important-problem/">this </a>[yes, it’s from a Cato blog, so start up your <span style="font-style:italic;">ad hominems</span>]. Some problems that are more deserving of attention: Hunger, malaria, and unsafe water.<br /><br />• Enormously expensive actions to reduce/stop GW by severely restricting CO2 emissions are premature. (Global wealth decades in the future will be far higher than with restrictions; mitigation is vastly more efficient, to whatever extent it might be needed.)<br /><br />• Given the considerable uncertainty (and also taking in account geopolitical and health considerations), it probably makes sense to move strongly toward nuclear power (and more solar, wind, and wave power where feasible) and to encourage or even subsidize research into alternative energy sources.<br /><br />• The extent to which global warming is anthropogenic is much more uncertain than asserted by the “consensus”/orthodoxy.<br /><br />• The extent to which a consensus actually exists is not clear, nor is it clear on what exactly the consensus agrees (beyond the fact of some warming over the last century and some contribution by human activities).<br /><br />I reserve the right to change these views as I continue to study this interrelated set of complex issues.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-81579647808653942352009-07-26T22:36:00.005-05:002009-07-26T23:32:31.818-05:00BMI: Badly Misleading InformationMetrics can be helpful in tracking progress and measuring adherence to processes. One process that is important to many people is that of losing weight or, more precisely, reducing their level of body fat. A simple metric for that purpose would certainly be helpful. At the same time, such a metric could help private and public agencies assess the prevalence and degree of obesity nationally and internationally. “But such a metric already exists!” you might exclaim. It’s the Body Mass Index (BMI).<br /><br />For those of us still using bizarre imperial units, the BMI is calculated by measuring your weight in pounds and your height in feet. You then multiply your weight by 4.88 and divide the result by your height squared. For a 6’ 00” person weighing 200 lbs, their BMI is 27.1. So, yes, we have a simple metric, but this BMI is Balmy Metric Idiocy. It’s Badly Misleading Information.<br /><br />The Proactionary Principle urges us, when making decisions, to strive for <I>objectivity </I>and to use <I>evidence-based methods</I>—not simply methods that are widely accepted and used. The great disparity between the high popularity of the BMI and its low level of objectivity and accuracy serves as an object lesson. It’s not just that millions of dieters use the BMI. It has been used and recommended for years by nutritionists, trainers, and official health, wellness, and fitness organizations. Governments are using it to define many millions of people as overweight and obese for the purposes of crafting health policy. The US National Institutes for Health (NIH) starting use BMI in 1985 to set cut-off points for weight and health.<br /><br />So, what’s wrong with the BMI? I first realized one of its shortcomings when I ran the calculation for myself. I had been working on regaining some lost muscle mass. In doing so, I had put on a couple of pounds of fat along with the muscle. Despite the small gain, I know that I was still fairly lean. This was confirmed by having the gym staff (on more than one occasion) use their more expensive version of the Tanita bioelectrical impedance scale I have in my bathroom. The result: 12.5% body fat. This was a bit lower than the result on my cheaper Tanita scale at home, but close. Given that result—and the fact that I could easily see my abdominals in the mirror—I should expect the BMI to come out clearly below 25, right?<br /><br />Using the BMI calculator at MSNBC (and verified by my own calculation), I discovered that my BMI was 27.1 According to that, I was overweight. At the same time, the BMI calculator complained that my waist size was “not typical”. I take it that “not typical” means that I had more muscle than most people. That is one major problem with the BMI: It utterly fails to distinguish between fat and muscle.<br /><br />Take a slightly more non-typical example (but not at all an unknown one): An athlete or bodybuilder with 10% body fat weighing 225 lbs and standing 6 feet tall. At that body fat level, the BMI <span style="font-style: italic;">should </span>be no more than around 20 (the lower end of normal). In fact, it might well be under 20, since few people have that low a level of body fat. Instead, the BMI comes out as 30.5. The BMI is telling this highly conditioned, wonderfully lean athlete that he is in fact obese!<br /><br />It’s true that the BMI is a pleasantly simple metric. Simplicity is good, but not at the expense of necessary accuracy and information. Because it considers only height and weight, the BMI doesn’t discriminate between fat, muscle, organ, and water. As such, it’s a foolish way to define normal, overweight, or obese. It doesn’t take into account body frame, making it blind to the differences between men and shorter women. Studies show that BMI does a particularly poor job when applied to children, especially when comparing children of differing ethnic groups. For instance, “<a href="http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/5200/">Slight Sri Lankan children in Australia have more body fat than white Australian children with the same BMI</a>."<br /><br />Another fatal weakness of the BMI is that it tells us little about people’s health status or probable future health. One reason for this is that it makes no distinction between the places where fat is stored on the body. It’s now known that abdominal fat is a better indicator of future health problems than fat in other areas, but the BMI is oblivious to this finding. The numbers of the BMI yield a misleadingly precise classification, despite the fact that it’s hard to see any difference in increased risk for premature death or serious illness between those who are of normal weight (BMIs of 20-25), overweight (25 to 30), and obese (over 40).<br /><br />Risks only go up for those classified as underweight (BMI < 18) or as morbidly obese (BMI < 40). If you have a BMI between 25 and 26, you’re classified as overweight. Yet studies by Flegal at the US Center for Disease Control found this group had the best longevity prospects. A study by Gronniger found that moderately obese men (as classified by the BMI) had the same mortality rate as men of “normal” weight.<br /><br />The BMI is arbitrary in the way it classifies people as normal, overweight, and obese. No scientific basis has been found for labeling people as overweight or obese on the basis of their BMI. What the BMI really does is to codify someone’s subjective views of overweight and obesity into a pseudo-objective metric. I don’t say this to make things easier for fat people. Personally, I work at staying reasonably lean and I have a strong aversion to body fat in other people. My own arbitrary measures would be at least at strict as those embodied in the BMI—were I to attempt to force my preferences onto everyone else, under cover of science.<br /><br />As I have argued in the context of critiquing the “precautionary principle”, activists <I>like </I>arbitrariness. Arbitrary measures and principles are easily manipulated by special interests. Politicians can use the arbitrariness of the BMI to hype a “war on fat” and to troll for votes by exaggerating health risks. The weight loss industry and those who sell weight loss drugs can do the same.<br /><br />The BMI is a simple, slim measure, but it’s too simple to do the job. A better approach will, of necessity, be a little better filled out with information and wisdom. If you hadn’t considered these points before, now you know. Don’t be a Bloody Moronic Idiot by continuing to use the BMI.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-38579748690549843362009-07-22T23:17:00.000-05:002009-07-22T23:18:22.240-05:006 Ways to Mismanage RisksHow did so many financial companies do such a poor job of risk management during the recent financial crisis? Numerous factors contributed to the problems including (as I argued in an earlier blog entry) problematic government regulation. In a March 2009 <span style="font-style: italic;">Harvard Business Review </span>article, Rene Stulz offers his own insightful take on “6 Ways Companies Mismanage Risks”.<br /><br />As we’ve seen in responses to previous crises, organizations both public and private have not done well at making the kinds of changes that effectively prevent a different set of problems cropping up in future. Attention to the six problem areas Stulz discusses would probably help. These are: 1. Relying on historical data. 2. Focusing on narrow measures. 3. Overlooking knowable risks, such as those outside the class of risks normally associated with particular units, and those related to the hedging strategies used to manage risks already identified and assessed. 4. Overlooking concealed risks. 5. Failing to communicate. 6. Not managing in real time.<br /><br />Stulz concludes by calling for “sustainable risk management”. This includes using scenario analysis to take into account catastrophic risks. You can find my more detailed review of Stulz’ article and a link to the article itself <a href="http://www.manyworlds.com/exploreCO.aspx?coid=CO7220911465437">here</a>.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-43037723537216133652009-06-21T17:50:00.004-05:002009-06-21T18:50:15.285-05:00Singularity and Surge ScenariosHow fast will the future arrive? How will that future differ from the present? We need to have a good sense of the possible and plausible answers to those questions if we are to make smart decisions about technology, the economy, the environment, and other complex issues. The process of envisioning possible futures for the purpose of preparing more robust strategies is often called <span style="font-style: italic;">scenario planning</span>. I prefer <span style="font-style: italic;">scenario learning </span>or <span style="font-style: italic;">thinking</span>, because scenarios foster prepared minds by “learning from the future”, and they provide a forum for integrating what has been learned into decision making.<br /><br />It’s important to realize that scenario learning is <span style="font-style: italic;">not </span>a forecasting method. Its purpose is not to pinpoint future events but to highlight large-scale forces that push the future in different directions. If we are to develop robust strategies, policies, and plans, we need a sufficiently diverse set of scenarios. In recent years, the success of the Singularity concept has narrowed the range of scenarios pondered in many discussions. The Singularity was conceived and developed by Vernor Vinge (inspired by I.J. Good’s 1965 thoughts on “the intelligence explosion”), Hans Moravec, and Damien Broderick. Over the last few years it has become strongly associated with the specific vision expounded in great detail by Ray Kurzweil.<br /><br />Responses to Kurzweil’s bold and rich Singularity scenario have often been polarized. To some readers, the Singularity is obvious and inevitable. To others, the Singularity is a silly fantasy. My concern is that the very success of Kurzweil’s version of the Singularity has tended to restrict discussion to pro- and anti-Singularity scenarios. Just as the physical singularity of a black hole sucks in everything around it, the technological Singularity sucks in all discussion of possible futures. I’d like to open up the discussion by identifying a more diverse portfolio of futures.<br /><br />We could chop up the possibilities in differing ways, depending on what we take to be the driving forces and the fixed factors. I choose a 2 x 5 matrix that generates 10 distinct scenarios. The “5” part of the matrix refers to five degrees of change, from a regression or reversal of technological progress at one extreme to a full-blown Singularity of super-exponential change at the other. The “2” part of the matrix refers to outcomes that are either Voluntarist or Authoritarian. I’m making this distinction in terms of how the trajectory of change (or lack of it) is brought about—either by centralized direction or by a primarily emergent or distributed process, as well as by the form it ends up taking.<br /><br />As a transhumanist, I’m especially interested in the difference between the Singularity and what I call the Surge. In other words, scenarios 9 and 10 compared to 7 and 8.<br /><br />So, we have five levels of change, with each level having two very broadly defined types, as follows: [<span style="font-style: italic;">click to enlarge</span>]<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_h20_dR3Wj4U/Sj7GP7a5cAI/AAAAAAAAABk/3hoTO5WPReI/s1600-h/Paste62120090.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 101px;" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_h20_dR3Wj4U/Sj7GP7a5cAI/AAAAAAAAABk/3hoTO5WPReI/s320/Paste62120090.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5349931384313573378" border="0" /></a><br />Level 1 is the realm of Regression (or Reversal) scenarios. In “U-Turn”, civilization voluntarily abandons some or all technology and the social structures technology makes possible. It’s hard to see this happening on a global level, but we can imagine this happening due to cultural exhaustion from the complexities of technologically advanced living (this is the “Mojo Lost” variant. A religion or philosophy might arise to translate this cultural response into action. In the “Hard Return” variant, a similar outcome might result from global war or from the advent of a global theocracy.<br /><br />Level 2: Stationary. Bill Joy’s advocacy of relinquishing GNR (genetic, nano, robotic) technologies is a partial version of this, at least as Joy describes it. A more thorough relinquishment that attempted to eradicate the roots of dangerous technologies would have to be a partial Level 1 scenario. Some Amish communities embody a partial Stationary scenario, though most Amish are not averse to adopting new technologies that fit their way of life.<br /><br />The Steady State scenario seems to me quite implausible. It involves everyone somehow voluntarily holding onto existing technology but developing no new technologies. This might be slightly more plausible if hypothesized for a far future time when science has nothing more to discover and all its applications have been developed. The Full Stop variant of the Stationary level of change is more plausible. Here, compulsion is used to maintain technology at a fixed level. Historically, the western world (but not the Islamic world) experienced something very close to Full Stop during the Dark Ages, from around 500 AD to 1000 AD (perhaps until 1350 AD).<br /><br />If extreme environmentalists were to have their way, we might see a version of Full Stop that I call Hard Green (or Green Totalitarianism) come about. A more voluntarist version of this might be called Stagnant Sustainability.<br /><br />Level 3: Linear Progressive. This level of change might also be called “Boring Future”. It’s a scenario of slow, gradual advance in traditional areas that we see in most science fiction—especially SF on TV and in the movies. Technology advances and society changes at a linear pace. The recent past is a good guide to the near future. Most of us seem to have expectations that match Level 3. Kurzweil calls this the “intuitive linear” view. I don’t feel much need to distinguish the Voluntarist and Authoritarian versions, except to give them names: Strolling and Marching.<br /><br />Level 4: Constrained Exponentially Progressive (Surge scenarios). This level of scenarios recognizes that technological progress (and often social progress or change) is not linear but exponential, at least some of the time and at least for many technologies and cultures. The past century is therefore not a good guide to the century to come. Overall, despite setbacks and slowdowns, change accelerates—technology surges ahead, sometimes then slowing down again before surging ahead once more. We can expect to see much more change between 2010 and 2060 then we saw between 1960 and 2010. To the extent that this change comes about without centralized control and direction, it’s a scenario of Emergent Surge. To the extent that a central plan pushes and shapes technological progress, it’s a Forced Surge.<br /><br />Level 5: Super-exponentially Progressive (Singularity scenarios). The Singularity scenarios arise when we project the discontinuous arrival of superintelligence, or otherwise expect double-exponential progress. Yudkowsky’s “Friendly AI” is a clear instance of the Humanity-Positive Singularity, though not the only possible instance. There are other ways of distinguishing various Singularity scenarios. One way (going back to Vinge) is in terms of how the Singularity comes about: It might be due to the Internet “waking up” augmentation of human biologically-based intelligence, human-technology integration, or the emergence of a singular AI before humans exceed the historical limits on their intellectual capabilities.<br /><br />By defining and naming these scenarios, I hope to make it easier to discuss a fuller range of possibilities. We might use these scenarios (suitably fleshed out) as a starting point to consider various questions, such as: Is continued technological progress inevitable? Could we plausibly envision civilizations where progress halts or even reverses? What factors, causes, and decisions could lead to halting/stagnation or regression?<br /><br />My own main interest, for now, lies in considering the differences between the Surge and the Singularity scenarios. They may not appear to be very different. I believe that there is a quite a difference in the underlying view of economics and social, psychological, and organizational factors. I will explore the Surge vs. Singularity issue more in a later post, and in the sixth chapter of my forthcoming book, <span style="font-style: italic;">The Proactionary Principle</span>. I will consider, for instance, factors favoring a Surge rather than a Singularity, such as adoption rates, organizational inertia, cognitive biases, failure to achieve super-intelligent AI, sunk costs, activist opposition, and regulation and bureaucratically-imposed costs—nuclear power in the USA being a good example.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3128629259461943328.post-40875619693413411472009-05-31T13:32:00.005-05:002009-05-31T13:38:19.010-05:00Spurring Executives to Think Longer-TermWhile I think there is value in the high-level discussions of what caused the financial mess and ensuing economic contraction, not enough attention has been given to the specifics. While I agree with those who point the finger at government policies (see previous blog entry), I also agree that the market economy does experience swings. These are not necessarily bad, but smoothing them out a bit is probably good -- making economic coordination easier and reducing the costs of misallocated resources.<br /><br />I don’t mean heavy-handed government intervention that acts in a way that prevents the circuit breaker from blowing. On the contrary, many of the most important ways of moderating the swings consist of removing and preventing government interventions of the kinds I listed in my previous entry.<br /><br />More relevant are means of helping us learn more quickly, thereby reducing the magnitude of the problems resulting from failure. Designing institutions and learning processes to learn from “fast failure” through many modest experiments (as well as developing better means of anticipation) seems to be a promising approach. This is really just a practical implementation of <a href="http://www.maxmore.com/pcr.htm">pancritical rationalism</a>, and was nicely described in some detail by Stefan H. Thomke in his book <span style="font-style: italic;">Experimentation Matters</span>.<br /><br />We won’t really make major progress in moderating the business cycle until we can find better ways of reducing the endemic biases in human thinking. We also need to continue improving our understanding of feedback systems and problems resulting from imitative behavior. (Imitation may be why all major mortgage debt rating agencies used the same flawed ratings models for poorly-understood derivatives, though that may have more to do with SEC regulations.)<br /><br />One factor that no doubt contributed to the problems is the way executive compensation has been incentivizing executives to take on excessive risk in pursuit of short-term gains. That is not inherent in the market system; it's a result of the specific compensation schemes used. Four authors have recently published a working paper suggesting a better compensation scheme. My review of “Dynamic Incentive Accounts” is <a href="http://www.manyworlds.com/exploreCO.aspx?coid=CO5290911481773">here</a>.Max Morehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09399507145120248307noreply@blogger.com0