The Diachronic Self: Contents

Contents

PART 1: REDUCTIONISM, CAUSE, AND IDENTITY

1. Ch.1: Causal Conditions for Continuity

3.   Diachronic Identity: A relational view. Self and self-phase.

11. Four Theories: Results of Narrow, Wide and Widest Reductionist theories as applied to a spectrum of cases.

18. Cases.

22. Cases and Theories: How the various theories treat the cases.

26. Causal Conditions: Internal, external, reliable and unreliable, direct and indirect causes of continuity. The Causal Condition.

33. Which Causal Condition?

34. Is a Causal Condition Needed? Critique of Kolak and Martin.

44. Argument from Perception: The perception of enduring objects.

47. Neurosurgeons and the Slippery Slope: Weakening causal links, levels of abstraction, and a slippery slope argument.

55. Series-Persons: Parfit’s argument against Nagel’s same-brain criterion.

59. Argument by Undermining Contrary Intuitions: Why the Widest Reductionist View produces unsettling intuitions.

64. Ch.2: The Terminus of the Self

66. Bodily Death and Personal Death: Death of the biological organism and death of the person.

69. Two Meanings of ‘Dead’: Temporary and irreversible loss of life.

73. Permanence vs Irreversibility: Permanent and Theoretical Death

79. Irreversible Cessation and Types of Continuity: Information vs function-based criteria.

91. Deanimate: A state apart from life and death. Distinctions between deanimate, inactivate and dormant.

98. Partial Death

106. Declaring Death and Deanimation: Declaration as partly factual assessment, partly decision.

108. Practical Importance of the Deanimate Category: Effects on attitudes, status, and survival prospects.

PART 2: TRANSFORMATION, CONCERN, AND VALUE

113. Ch.3: A Transformationist Account of Continuity

113. Introduction.

116. I. The Metaphysics of Connectedness

116. Measuring connectedness: The components of psychological continuity: memories, intentions, dispositions, beliefs, abilities, desires, values, projects.

148. II. Normative Inferences

149. Reductionism and the Depth of a Life: Is personal identity less deep on a reductionist view? Is death less significant on a reductionist view?

159. Transformationism: Connectedness vs. Continuity.

165. Disproportionality of Connectedness and Concern: Degree of concern for your future phase need not be proportional to connectedness degree:

·         Connectedness higher than apparent: Measures of centrality. Relative weighting of the components in terms of the types of centrality.

·         Intrinsically vs. instrumentally significant features.

175. Transformationism.

·         Valuing life as a whole/long stretches.

·         Ideal self: Changes that bring you closer to your ideal self do not reduce the degree of future concern. Difference with Taylor’s view of evaluations as foundation of identity.

·         Holding self-transformation as a central project.

197. Continuity and Structuring a Life

197. (a) Life Plans: Coherence of action & rational life plans.

202. (b) Principles: Incorporating principles to strengthen sticking to project. Self-definition by principles. Values & symbolism of actions. Principles as (i) Foundations: constitute/create identity; (ii) Regulators/filters: set boundaries to possible actions and identity.

210. Ch.4: Technological Transformation and Assimilation

211. I. Augmentative and Deteriorative Transformation

211. Augmentative vs. Deteriorative Transformation.

216. Raymond Martin on Transformation and Replacement.

229. II. Integration of Change

229. Assimilation

232. Functional integration.

·         Functional not structural integration; distributed existence.

·         Does integration require direct control?

·         Does integration require exclusive access?

·         Does not require choosing the mods.

·         Interdependence: Requires mutual support, feedback, homeostasis.

246. Enhancement vs. Supplementation

·         Enhancements as assimilated abilities, supplements as external.

·         Must enhancement require more effort?

·         Persistence of effects.

·         Chosen and imposed improvements: Ease of assimilation.

252. Merit in Sports, games, and tests.

·         Biological: steroids, bloodpacking, nutrition, high-altitude training.

·         Neurochemical: Smart drugs, mood modifiers (SSRI).

·         Genetic modification.

261. III. Intrinsic and Instrumental Bodily Identity

·         Physicalism and psychological reductionism. Bodies as means of expression.

·         Instrumental importance of material and form of the body.

·         Primacy of function over form.

·         Level of function.

·         Response to objections to rejection of intrinsic importance of bodily identity.

277. Conclusion

The technological and social trend towards increasing self-definition.

279. Bibliography