PART 1: REDUCTIONISM, CAUSE, AND IDENTITY
1. Ch.1: Causal Conditions for Continuity
3. Diachronic Identity: A relational view. Self and self-phase.
11. Four Theories: Results of Narrow, Wide and Widest Reductionist theories as applied to a spectrum of cases.
22. Cases and Theories: How the various theories treat the cases.
26. Causal Conditions: Internal, external, reliable and unreliable, direct and indirect causes of continuity. The Causal Condition.
33. Which Causal Condition?
34. Is a Causal Condition Needed? Critique of Kolak and Martin.
44. Argument from Perception: The perception of enduring objects.
47. Neurosurgeons and the Slippery Slope: Weakening causal links, levels of abstraction, and a slippery slope argument.
55. Series-Persons: Parfit’s argument against Nagel’s same-brain criterion.
59. Argument by Undermining Contrary Intuitions: Why the Widest Reductionist View produces unsettling intuitions.
64. Ch.2: The Terminus of the Self
66. Bodily Death and Personal Death: Death of the biological organism and death of the person.
69. Two Meanings of ‘Dead’: Temporary and irreversible loss of life.
73. Permanence vs Irreversibility: Permanent and Theoretical Death
79. Irreversible Cessation and Types of Continuity: Information vs function-based criteria.
91. Deanimate: A state apart from life and death. Distinctions between deanimate, inactivate and dormant.
98. Partial Death
106. Declaring Death and Deanimation: Declaration as partly factual assessment, partly decision.
108. Practical Importance of the Deanimate Category: Effects on attitudes, status, and survival prospects.
PART 2: TRANSFORMATION, CONCERN, AND VALUE
113. Ch.3: A Transformationist Account of Continuity
116. I. The Metaphysics of Connectedness
116. Measuring connectedness: The components of psychological continuity: memories, intentions, dispositions, beliefs, abilities, desires, values, projects.
148. II. Normative Inferences
149. Reductionism and the Depth of a Life: Is personal identity less deep on a reductionist view? Is death less significant on a reductionist view?
159. Transformationism: Connectedness vs. Continuity.
165. Disproportionality of Connectedness and Concern: Degree of concern for your future phase need not be proportional to connectedness degree:
· Connectedness higher than apparent: Measures of centrality. Relative weighting of the components in terms of the types of centrality.
· Intrinsically vs. instrumentally significant features.
· Valuing life as a whole/long stretches.
· Ideal self: Changes that bring you closer to your ideal self do not reduce the degree of future concern. Difference with Taylor’s view of evaluations as foundation of identity.
· Holding self-transformation as a central project.
197. Continuity and Structuring a Life
197. (a) Life Plans: Coherence of action & rational life plans.
202. (b) Principles: Incorporating principles to strengthen sticking to project. Self-definition by principles. Values & symbolism of actions. Principles as (i) Foundations: constitute/create identity; (ii) Regulators/filters: set boundaries to possible actions and identity.
210. Ch.4: Technological Transformation and Assimilation
211. I. Augmentative and Deteriorative Transformation
211. Augmentative vs. Deteriorative Transformation.
216. Raymond Martin on Transformation and Replacement.
229. II. Integration of Change
232. Functional integration.
· Functional not structural integration; distributed existence.
· Does integration require direct control?
· Does integration require exclusive access?
· Does not require choosing the mods.
· Interdependence: Requires mutual support, feedback, homeostasis.
246. Enhancement vs. Supplementation
· Enhancements as assimilated abilities, supplements as external.
· Must enhancement require more effort?
· Persistence of effects.
· Chosen and imposed improvements: Ease of assimilation.
252. Merit in Sports, games, and tests.
· Biological: steroids, bloodpacking, nutrition, high-altitude training.
· Neurochemical: Smart drugs, mood modifiers (SSRI).
· Genetic modification.
261. III. Intrinsic and Instrumental Bodily Identity
· Physicalism and psychological reductionism. Bodies as means of expression.
· Instrumental importance of material and form of the body.
· Primacy of function over form.
· Level of function.
· Response to objections to rejection of intrinsic importance of bodily identity.
The technological and social trend towards increasing self-definition.